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ABSTRACT 
 
The Role of Credit Ratings on Capital Structure and its Speed of Adjustment in  
Bank-Oriented and Market-Oriented Economies.  
 
by 
 
WOJEWODZKI Michal 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
This study investigates both the direct and indirect roles of credit ratings (CR) 
on the capital structures of 1,513 firms operating in 19 countries with different 
financial orientations and levels of economic development over the 20-year period 
(1991-2010).  
Until recently, it has been common place to classify countries into capital 
market-based oriented (MB) and bank-based oriented (BB) in terms of their 
financial systems’ orientation (Antoniou et al. 2008). Traditionally, in MB 
economies (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the U.K., and the U.S.) having a CR helps firms 
issue equity or bonds. In contrast, in BB economies (France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain), companies tend to obtain loans from 
banks with which they maintain a long-term relationship. The creditworthiness of 
the firms is thus assessed by banks without much need for external CR. 
I find that the CRs’ impact on a capital structure is more significant and 
negative in countries with more MB oriented financial systems when quantified by 
the Financial Architecture variable (measuring the size, activity and efficiency of a 
stock market vis–à–vis the banking system of country annually), but not by the 
traditional division into MB and BB countries. This is consistent with the pecking 
order theory and information role of CRs in issuing equity, as well as the evidence of 
a rapid development of stock markets in many BB countries, which dulls the 
distinction between the traditionally defined MB and BB economies. Furthermore, 
the relation between the CRs and firms’ leverage ratio is significantly stronger for 
companies operating in advanced countries than companies operating in developing 
economies. Moreover, my analysis shows that CRs play more significant role in the 
U.S. than in other countries.  
In addition, I find that companies with poorer CRs display a faster speed of 
adjustment towards a desired level of gearing. This phenomenon takes place 
 
 
regardless of financial orientation or economic development of a country and can be 
linked with a different degree of financial constraints across differently rated firms.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The Big Three credit rating agencies (CRAs): Standard & Poor's Ratings 
Services (S&P), Moody's Investors Service (Moody’s), and Fitch Ratings (Fitch) 
have an immense power over the capital markets worldwide. According to U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a CRA “provides its opinion on the 
creditworthiness of an entity and the financial obligations (such as, bonds, preferred 
stock, and commercial paper) issued by an entity.” (SEC, 2011a). The role of credit 
ratings (CRs) issued by the CRAs on the investment decisions has been rising 
rapidly along with the dramatic growth of the global financial markets (especially 
during the last three decades).  
CRs highly influence issuers’ access to and cost of funds. By changing a 
security’s or borrower’s CR, the CRA sends a signal to investors about this 
security’s or borrower’s altered creditworthiness, which in turn affects the investors’ 
required rate of return. Moreover, higher CRs improve the marketability of the 
securities issued, partially due to restrictions imposed on many institutional 
investors (prohibited them from purchasing speculative-grade offerings). Due to 
their regulatory importance and de facto oligopoly in the credit rating industry
1
, they 
strongly influence firms’ and countries’ fund-raising abilities and costs.  
However, despite the prestige seemingly bestowed on the major CRAs by 
certain sectors of the media, there are critics of the CRAs and the power they enjoy. 
The history of the CRA critique is rich especially during the last 15 years. Many 
academics argue that rating agencies failed in predicting the financial turmoil such 
as the Southeast Asia crisis in 1997 (Gonzalez et al., 2004). Furthermore, despite the 
                                                     
1
 See Appendix B for the number of ratings in existence as of year-end 2010 and reported by each of 
10 CRAs registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs). 
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CRAs’ claims of non-cyclicality of their ratings2, a number of researchers find 
evidence to the contrary (Ferri et al., 1999; Monfort and Mulder, 2000). Amato and 
Furfine (2003) assert: 
However, when rating agencies do make a change, they overreact relative to 
present conditions, and the nature of this overreaction is positively correlated 
with the state of the aggregate economy. This could be the consequence of 
excessive optimism (pessimism) during upturns (downturns) on the part of the 
rating agencies (p.12). 
More recently the IMF (2010) analyzes the smoothing methodologies used by the 
rating agencies in order to maintain CRs stability. Its findings indicate that in times 
of stress, this method only delays the inevitable, spurring even larger CR 
adjustments (than otherwise would have happened). 
In the early 2000s a number of significant rating mistakes occurred (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom and Global Crossing scandals), which damaged the agencies’ reputations 
and attracted researchers’ attention alike (Altman and Rijken, 2004, 2006; Danvers 
and Billings, 2004; Hill, 2004; Partnoy, 2006). It is widely acknowledged that the 
recent financial crisis of 2008 has its roots in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage debacle 
of 2007 in which the CRAs were largely involved (Duff and Einig, 2009). Due to 
that fact, the CRAs have suffered from a fresh wave of criticism from investors, 
regulatory bodies and politicians. The public opinion accused CRAs of failing to 
recognize the coming financial tsunami and misguiding the investors by 
issuing/assigning triple-A CRs to companies and structured securities (e.g. AIG or 
mortgage-backed assets) shortly before they collapsed or turned “toxic” (Benmelech 
and Dlugosz, 2009; Blinder, 2007). Rating agencies are blamed for producing 
procyclical firms’ and sovereigns’ CRs which prolonged and strengthened the recent 
global recession or failed to warn investors about Greece’s government-debt crisis 
(Chakrabortty, 2012).  
                                                     
2
 See S&P (2010a, 2010b). 
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In addition, the CRAs were accused of not being transparent (Parker et al., 
2008), using flawed credit scoring models (IOSCO, 2008), lack of communication, 
serious conflict of interest in the CRAs way of doing business, and so-called 
“ratings shopping” due to their revenues coming predominantly from the fees from 
rating issuers (Deb et al., 2011; US Senate Committee, 2008), producing inflated, 
low-quality or unreliable ratings (Calomiris, 2009), failing to find enough qualified 
employees (CESR, 2008), and lack of ratings diversity
3
 (Partnoy, 1999). Partnoy 
(2006) indicates that CRAs bear no direct liability for mistakes in their judgments, 
claiming that their ratings are merely “opinions”4. The above-mentioned flaws 
undermine CRAs’ claim of the accuracy and non-cyclicality of their services and 
have negatively affected the agencies’ reputation in the eyes of many. 
The CRAs counter-argue that their reputation and credibility play a pivotal role 
in ensuring that their services are of high quality. They typically assert that once 
reputation is lost or harmed, CRs would become unreliable making their products 
worthless. This kind of reasoning can only apply in an environment in which CRAs 
and their performance can be effectively monitored, and with a real competition. 
However, Camanho et al. (2010), Mathis et al. (2009), and others point out that due 
to high barriers to entry and lack of data availability and the CRAs liability for their 
mistakes, these features (monitoring and competition) are not met in the rating 
industry.  
Despite these critiques, in the light of the recent capital structure literature, both 
the regulatory and informatory function of CRs force the managers from the 
market-based economies of the U.S. and the U.K., as well as from mainly 
                                                     
3
 This strand of criticism takes place with respect to both CRs grading at a particular point in time 
and the extent of synchronicity in CRs revisions amongst major CRAs. 
4
 Until recently in the U.S., Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) were 
exempted from experts’ liability under section 11 of the Securities Act (Deb et al., 2011). 
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bank-based economies of Continental Europe, to consider their firms’ CRs as one of 
the most important factors when making financing decisions (e.g., Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Servaes and Tufano, 
2006). Deb et al. (2011) argue forcefully that “hardwiring of ratings is now so 
pervasive that market participants could not ignore them even if they did not 
consider them reliable” (p.3). In addition to that, they address the potential problem 
of crowding out private information gathering. In a similar vein, the extensive use of 
CRs in regulation, investment process and financial contracts may lead to a common 
misperception that the ratings issued by CRAs are to some extent official, and 
therefore truth, triggering overreliance on CRs. Consequently, it is obvious that the 
investigation of capital structure changes of a rated company and the understanding 
of it cannot be complete without an inclusion of this entity’s CR. However, prior 
research has left untouched a number of important issues. 
First, papers that include CRs among the determinants of capital structure are 
conducted with respect to samples of U.S. companies (Byoun, 2011; Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006; Hovakimian et al., 2009; Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Leary and Roberts, 
2005; Sufi, 2009).  
To the best of my knowledge, there has been no such study undertaken with 
respect to other economies. This seems most surprising taking into consideration the 
documented importance of CRs on financing decisions and the global presence of the 
CRAs and their services
5
. Furthermore, the existing U.S. literature gives mixed 
results
6
. In my study I hope to fill this gap in the literature by including a set of 
                                                     
5
 According to Djankov et al. (2007), in 2003 at least one private CRA was present in 71 out of 129 
countries examined in their study. In addition, they find a strong, positive relation between the 
existence of a CRA and the level of private credit to GDP.  
6
 Hovakimian et al. (2009), Kisgen (2009), and Tang (2009) argue that the higher the CRs, the higher 
the firm’s gearing ratio. Arguments for the opposite are presented by Byoun (2011), Frank and Goyal 
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variables capturing the impact of CRs on firms financing
7
 in 19 countries with 
different financial orientations, economic development, and from various 
geographical regions (four continents). As such, it has by far the most comprehensive 
international coverage. 
Second, despite the rapidly growing literature on dynamic capital structure 
(Fama and French, 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Ö ztekin 
and Flannery, 2012), there are only two studies (Faulkender et al., 2012; Kisgen, 
2009)
8
 that examine the influence of CRs on the speed with which firms rebalance 
their debt ratios towards target levels. Kisgen (2009) focuses on CRs’ changes 
(downgrades and upgrades), based on the idea of firms having minimum target 
ratings along with optimum gearing ratios. He finds that downgrades carry additional 
substantial costs
9
 which are higher than the costs associated with the adjustment 
towards a desired leverage ratio which in turn makes firms adjust faster. However, in 
case of an upgrade he finds no significant change in companies’ speed of adjustment 
(hereafter SOA). Faulkender et al. (2012) compare the SOAs of rated and non-rated 
companies and argue that when firms are over- (under-) levered, and have bond CRs, 
they adjust substantially slower (faster) than non-rated firms. They assert that the fact 
of having or not a CR “affect leverage adjustment speeds so greatly that they can 
reverse the usual finding (…) that under-levered firms adjust less rapidly than 
over-levered firms” (p.643). They also find that the companies adjust with faster 
                                                                                                                                                      
(2009), and Leary and Roberts (2005). 
7
 I employ a set of interaction variables between the CRs and firm lagged leverage ratio, country’s 
financial orientation, economic development, and the bond market development, which capture the 
second order effects of CRs on firms’ capital structure and on its adjustment speed towards the 
optimum level of gearing. 
8
 Both of these papers analyze the U.S. market. 
9
 Among others, lower CRs are associated with higher costs of borrowing. 
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speed when the costs of doing so are sunk relative to when these costs are 
incremental. 
I add to these two studies by investigating the impact of different-grade CRs on 
the SOAs of companies operating in the U.S. and 18 other countries. The results 
suggest that regardless of financial systems’ orientation or the economic development 
of a country, firms with poorer CRs enjoy faster SOAs. This evidence can be 
explained by the different degrees of financial constraints (Byoun, 2011; Faulkender 
et al., 2012; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) experienced by firms with different CRs. 
Third, in the light of the aforementioned criticism of CRAs and their products, 
there is the ongoing policy debate in regards to the assumed liability of CRAs, 
reliability of ratings, overreliance on CRs by financial market participants, and the so 
called “cliff effect10”. This debate has led to a series of reforms in the credit rating 
industry undertaken by regulators in the U.S. since 2006
11
. These reforms coincide 
with the last 5-year period of my sample which offers me an opportunity to 
investigate if it affected the relation between CRs and the capital structure of firms. 
My analysis shows that the impact of CRs on capital structure fluctuations was 
more significant during the first decade (1991-2000) as compared with the second 
decade (2001-2010) of the sample (the second period being the period of growing 
criticism of CRAs and their services) in MB and American samples of firms. In 
addition, my results suggest that the recent series of rating industries’ reforms in the 
U.S. (2006-2010) carried no significant impact on the relation between CRs and 
capital structure. 
                                                     
10
 The “cliff effect” occurs when a CRA downgrades a firm from an investment- to a 
speculative-grade, which can trigger discontinuous growths in the cost of borrowing, as well as, 
disastrous selloffs of this firm’s securities (Deb et al., 2011). This in turn can drive the firm further 
into difficulties, (not enough cash to meet its current financial obligations, another downgrades, and 
increases in the funding costs), and finally even into the firm’s insolvency.  
11
 With the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 passed by the U.S. Congress. 
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Fourth, there is ample evidence showing that in the MB oriented U.S. firms with 
better credit ratings are more prone to issue equity instead of debt (e.g., Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). On the one hand, this phenomenon stems from the change in a degree 
of both information asymmetry and adverse selection costs of equity vis-à-vis debt 
(the main factors standing behind the pecking order theory (POT)). Since companies 
with high CRs are informationally more transparent than firms with low CRs, they 
experience lower information asymmetry and adverse selection problems in the 
process of issuing equity
12
. Consequently the CRs are negatively related to 
underpricing of equity offerings and according to Liu and Malatesta (2007) 
“improving credit rating levels before SEOs can significantly reduce the cost of 
equity capital” (p.7). On the other hand, companies with high CRs are usually those 
with large internal funds exceeding their investment needs (Byoun, 2011) and in line 
with the POT they use extra cash to retire existing debt rather than equity
13
 (Myers, 
2003). In addition, existing literature documents that firms’ CRs is considered to be 
one of the most important factors for CFOs in deciding about current level of 
leverage, or why not add more debt in capital structure (e.g., Brounen et al., 2004; 
Servaes and Tufano, 2006). Highly rated companies enjoy good market reputation 
and have easier access to cheap debt (according to the trade-off theory (TOT), e.g., 
Tang, 2009). However, the better the CR, the less debt could be issued before the CR 
dropped
14
, forcing companies to maintain low leverage ratios (e.g., Shivdasani and 
Zenner, 2005). 
                                                     
12
 A number of studies suggest that lower information asymmetry diminishes firms’ cost of equity 
financing causing a change in the preference ranking over financing sources (predicted by the POT), 
and leading to lower leverage ratios (Agarwal and O’Hara, 2007; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). 
13
 This in turn effects in decreased debt-to-equity ratios. 
14
 When CRAs assess firms’ creditworthiness, they pay close attention to firm indebtedness. In other 
words, the higher the company’s leverage, the higher the default probability and a possibility of a 
lower CR 
8 
 
Up until recently, according to the prior literature (Antoniou et al., 2008), 
countries were typically categorized into MB and BB in terms of the orientation of 
their financial systems. Traditionally, in BB countries, companies tend to obtain 
loans from banks with which they maintain a long-term relationship. The 
creditworthiness of the firm is thus assessed by the bank without much need for the 
external CR provided by the CRA. In other words, the financial orientation of a 
country can also change the magnitude of firm-specific determinants’ impact on 
debt-equity ratios.  
In order to capture this indirect relation I split the overall sample into two 
subsamples (MB and BB oriented economies) based on the traditional division of a 
country’s financial system orientation. Additionally, I interact firms’ CRs with the 
market-based dummy variable (MBDUM)
15
. To the best of my knowledge, there has 
been no study devoted to this issue.  
Fifth, a number of studies investigating the disparities in debt levels of 
companies operating in MB and BB countries present contrasting results even when 
the same countries are examined
16
. Until the beginning of 1980s, the widely accepted 
arguments claimed that due to differences in the size and development of financial 
intermediation, the leverage levels were higher in the BB economies such as Japan 
and continental Europe as compared to MB countries, e.g., the U.K or the U.S. 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). However, during the last two decades of the 
twentieth century the stock markets in many countries that are regarded as BB 
expanded more than 13 times in terms of market capitalization, whereas equity 
                                                     
15
 MBDUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the economy has the market-based (MB) financial 
system and zero if the economy’s financial system is bank-based (BB). 
16
 While Borio (1990) and Antoniou et al. (2008) report German companies (operating in a 
bank-based country) as more highly geared than Canadian firms (from a market-based economy), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) find evidence for the opposite.   
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financing grew more than 16 times (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). During the same 
period, in the MB oriented U.S. and U.K. the corresponding growths were roughly 
fourfold. In the light of the aforementioned evidence, a number of scholars question 
the validity of the distinction drawn between the BB and MB financial orientation, 
especially in regards to firms’ financing decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Tadesse, 2006). Nonetheless, relevant studies still utilize the crude division of 
financial systems into MB and BB. 
My thesis is the first which employs an additional and alternative way to classify 
a country’s corporate financing type: the Financial Architecture (FINARCH) 
variable
17
. This variable is the first principal component of three indices measuring 
the size, activity and efficiency of a stock market vis–à–vis the banking system of 
country annually. The more MB-oriented financial system is represented by the 
higher values of the FINARCH determinant. Tadesse (2002) argue that such a 
variable more adequately “measures the degree of market orientation of a financial 
system” (p. 763). In order to assess the influence of an economy’s financial 
orientation on the relation between CRs and companies’ capital structure I 
incorporate the interaction term between firms’ credit ratings and the FINARCH 
variable.  
I find that except for Japanese companies, the impact of CRs on a capital 
structure is more significant in more market-oriented financial systems (measured by 
the FINARCH variable), whereas the simple division into MB and BB countries, has 
no significant influence on the CR effect. 
Sixth, there is evidence (Deb et al., 2011; Li et al., 2006) outlining the pivotal 
importance of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) 
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and their services in the U.S. Furthermore, the CRs assigned for the Japanese firms 
by the CRAs based in the U.S. are deemed to be downwardly biased as compared 
with American firms
18
 (e.g., Behr and Güttler, 2008; Nickell et al., 2000; Packer and 
Reynolds, 1997). This fact may lead to a diminish reliability of CRs’ informatory 
role on the process of issuing equity and bonds from the perspective of Japanese 
investors and firms alike. However to this date there has been no study devoted to 
the examination of differences between the CRs effects on a firm’s capital structure 
in the U.S. and Japan. 
Finally, my panel data set spans 20 years which is more than most other relevant 
studies (Antoniou et al., 2008; de Jong et al., 2008; González and González, 2008; 
Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012 which investigate periods of 14, 5, 10, and 16 years 
respectively). This longer timespan allows for a better perspective on the firms’ 
capital structure policies and their fluctuations over time. 
Summarizing, the objectives of my thesis are: 
1. To assess the CRs’ impact on firms’ capital structure, speeds with which they 
adjust towards the optimum levels of leverage, and their fluctuations over time. 
2. To examine disparities in CRs’ effect on capital structure between companies 
operating in bank-based (BB) and market-based (MB) countries, and in 
particular between the U.S. and Japan. 
3. To examine disparities in CRs’ effect on firms’ capital structure between 
advanced and developing countries. 
 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief review 
of literature related to three major issues addressed in my study: firm’s capital 
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structure, the financial orientation of a country, and credit ratings. In Chapter 3, I 
develop hypotheses, econometric models and elaborate on variables and data used in 
the statistical analyses. All the results and their implications are described in the 
following Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is a summary of my main findings. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter offers a summary of the studies relevant to three major topics 
combined in this paper: the theoretical background of firm financing, orientation of 
a country’s financial system, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit ratings (CRs), and 
the credit rating industry’s reform in the U.S. 
 
2.1 Theories of Capital Structure 
 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) formulated their influential irrelevance 
theory, a number of papers have been written that extend or critique their work and 
more theorems have been developed. From the previous literature one can 
distinguish among three major strands of capital structure studies: the trade-off 
theory (TOT), the pecking order theory (POT), and market timing. All these efforts 
were undertaken in order to answer the fundamental question: how do firms choose 
their source of financing? Over fifty years later, Huang and Ritter’s (2009) statement 
that “No single theory of capital structure is capable of explaining all of the 
time-series and cross-sectional patterns that have been documented.” (p.238) 
reflects perfectly the current situation in the field of capital structure. 
The TOT (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) claims that the firms’ capital structure 
is chosen based on the idea of achieving an optimal level of leverage. This 
value-maximising debt ratio is achieved by balancing the costs and benefits of debt 
financing. Each company has its own target leverage which it endeavors to maintain 
by adjusting its ratios towards this target. The speed of this adjustment depends on 
the adjustment’s costs as compared to costs of being away from the optimum 
leverage. On the one hand, we have the advantages of leverage such as the reduction 
13 
 
of corporate tax. On the other hand, firms incur the costs of financial distress both 
direct and indirect (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and various agency costs (Jensen, 
1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lin et al., 2011; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990). 
Finally, there are the advantages and drawbacks of signaling through increasing the 
firm’s leverage as enunciated by Ross (1977). Among the studies that support the 
TOT a survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) finds that over 80 per cent of firms do 
target their debt ratios. More recently, Frank and Goyal (2003) present the evidence 
consistent with the TOT. 
According to the POT formulated by Donaldson (1961), and further developed 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), companies do not aim at any 
specific debt-equity ratio. Due to the asymmetric information between managers and 
investors, markets usually underprice the issued shares. Hence, to minimise the 
adverse selection problem, firms give preference to internal financing (retained 
earnings) over debt and then to debt over equity when firms need to raise funds for 
investment. Moreover, in the POT, in contrast to the TOT, companies have no target 
debt ratios. Their leverage levels are just the outcomes of the imbalances between 
retained earnings and firms’ investment activities. Consequently, the speed of 
adjustment (SOA) is expected to be insignificant and close to zero. The POT 
enjoyed a period of ascendancy in the 1990s. In their study, Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) argue for the validity of the POT over TOT. 
The market timing theory also eschews the idea of an optimal capital structure. 
Instead, as Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue, management is more prone “to issue 
equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, 
and to repurchase equity when their market values are low” (p.1). Firms minimize 
the cost of financing by timing the market. Akin to the POT, firms do not have target 
leverage ratios to which they would adjust their capital structure. Relating to the 
14 
 
market timing theorem, Zwiebel (1996) introduces a managerial entrenchment 
theory in which managers’ stubbornness, due to their firms’ good performance, 
causes them to refuse new debt issues to rebalance their capital structure. 
One way to reconcile the TOT and the POT was developed by Fischer et al. 
(1989), who use dynamic modeling in capital structure analysis. It allows the firms 
to follow the POT in the short run and the TOT in the long run. Whenever the 
adjustment costs of rebalancing towards the optimal level of leverage outweigh the 
cost of being outside of the aforementioned optimum, the managers will allow their 
firm’s leverage to divert temporarily from it and make the adjustments into their 
debt ratios only occasionally (when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs 
associated with it). Due to these market frictions, the lagged debt ratios have an 
impact on the SOA, which is expected to be less than one and greater than zero. The 
research supporting a dynamic capital structure has been growing quickly and can be 
categorized into two groups as follows. 
The first category of studies (Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1991; Hovakimian et al., 
2001; Mackie-Mason, 1990) employs qualitative dependent variables to investigate 
how firm-specific determinants influence company’s decisions to issue or 
repurchase its equity and debt. Supporting the TOT, they document that firms are 
more likely to issue stocks or repurchase debt when their current gearing ratio is 
above their target. Furthermore, Hovakimian et al. (2001) argue that “the deviation 
between the actual and the target ratios plays a more important role in the 
repurchase decision than in the issuance decision.” (p.1). They explain this 
phenomenon by a larger degree of discretion enjoyed by firms when their capital is 
repurchased than when capital is issued. Therefore, target capital structure can play a 
greater role in the repurchase of equity or debt. 
The second (and more voluminous) category of research analyzes the average 
15 
 
SOA with which companies converge towards their desired leverage levels using 
partial-adjustment models of capital structure. Employing this approach, Alti (2006), 
Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2004), Harford et al. (2009), Huang and 
Ritter (2009), Leary and Roberts (2005), Lemmon et al. (2008), and Strebulaev 
(2007), document that firms rebalance their debt financing with various SOA toward 
their target debt levels.  
As Hovakimian and Li (2011) observe, the pace of this adjustment has 
significant consequence for the validity of TOT. For example if a firm closes 
between 7 and 18 percent of the gap between its actual and target gearing within one 
year (Fama and French, 2002), it will take between ten and a half and three and a 
half years to close half of the gap between companies’ current and target levels of 
debt. In such case, an optimal level of debt plays only a secondary role in the 
financing decision-making of the firms, consistent with the hypothesis that factors 
proposed by other capital structure theories (the POT and the market timing) 
outweigh the costs of being away from target debt ratio. If however the annual 
magnitudes of SOAs are found to be much faster (approximately 34 and 36 percent 
for market and book gearing ratios respectively) as in Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
then the target debt is of pivotal importance for firms suggesting that the POT and 
market timing are not the dominant factors.  
Prior studies report different SOAs over time and different SOAs for firms of 
different size (Antoniou et al., 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and Rangan, 
2006). Moreover, the existing literature finds evidence that depending on the degree 
of financial constraints it faces, a company exhibits different rates of convergence 
towards its desired level of debt. Over-leveraged (under-leveraged) firms should 
adjust relatively faster (slower) (Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012). 
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Recently, a number of studies undertake an international comparison of SOAs 
and document that the speeds with which firms converge towards their target 
leverage levels vary substantially. Antoniou et al. (2008) find evidence that 
companies based in France (Japan) display the fastest (slowest) SOAs of 
approximately 40 and 11 percent within one year, whereas those operating in the U.S. 
or the U.K. fall in between those numbers. They argue that different SOAs among 
countries may be an outcome of their financial systems and their orientation 
(market-based and bank-based). González and González (2008) examining a sample 
of 39 countries, find support for a presence of target leverage and SOAs in 37 of 
them
19
. They report much faster and roughly similar SOAs of 40 percent for the U.S. 
and the U.K. in contrast to very fast adjustment ratios of over 50 percent a year for 
Japan and France. Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012) claim that an economy’s legal and 
financial institutions significantly influence the SOAs due to distinct costs and/or 
benefits associated with the adjustment process. Furthermore they document that on 
average firms based in MB oriented countries adjust with greater speed towards their 
target gearing ratios as compared with companies based in BB countries. They argue 
that their results “suggest that a market-based structure imposes lower costs of 
adjusting or higher benefits of converging to a firm’s optimal capital ratio, or both” 
(p.103). 
The capital structure debate becomes even more complex with inclusion of the 
inertia hypothesis (Welch, 2004). Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch 
discounts both the TOT and the POT. Instead, he argues that a profitable company 
will enjoy a rise in the price of its stock, which in turn will lead to an increased 
market value of a firm. Welch states that lagged stock returns are the best tool in 
forecasting company’s capital structure. Rauh and Sufi (2010) find that debt 
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heterogeneity explains a non-negligible portion of differences in capital structures. 
Graham (2000) argues against the TOT, and states that firms often tend to be 
under-leveraged, which according to Faulkender and Petersen (2006) is due to the 
limited access to the debt market. They assert that the TOT model, while focusing on 
the demand side of debt financing fails to include the variables that measure the 
constraints on a firm's ability to increase its leverage (the supply side) such as a 
presence of credit ratings (CRs). 
All in all, an extensive literature has formed during the last fifty years or so that 
investigates the main forces driving the firms’ capital structure. Most of these studies 
focus on a number of the firm-specific determinants with regard to the agency costs, 
information asymmetry, and taxes. 
 
2.2 Countries’ Financial Orientations 
 
2.2.1 Market-Based and Bank-Based Financial Systems 
 
For over a century policymakers and researchers have argued about the merits 
and demerits of BB vis-à-vis MB systems and their relative superiority in terms of 
the economic growth, firms’ survival, and degree of ease in raising capital. 
According to Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000) “In bank-based systems, banks 
provide most of the credit to the economy. In market-based systems, firms raise funds 
in capital markets (bond and equity markets)” (p.4). This phenomenon stems from 
the fact that the BB structure is characterized by the banking system being relatively 
more developed as compared to the stock market. The opposite is the case of the MB 
economies where stock markets are larger and more liquid (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 1999). Existing research traditionally focuses on four countries. Japan and 
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Germany are considered as a benchmark for the BB economies, whereas the U.S. 
and the U.K. are considered as the benchmark for the MB economies (e.g. Antoniou 
et al., 2008; Borio, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
The BB view emphasizes the beneficial role of financial intermediaries in 
gaining and interpreting the information about companies and their managements, 
enhancing capital allocation and corporate governance (Diamond, 1984). Allen and 
Gale (1999) claim that the BB environment is more efficient in dealing with the 
firms’ liquidity risk, which in turn promotes better investment decisions. Boot and 
Thakor (1997) point out that a coalition of banks often cooperate when lending to 
big companies, and do much better than the uncoordinated market investors in terms 
of monitoring and mitigating moral hazard inherent in the borrowers. The supporters 
of the BB orientation argue that more liquid markets in the MB countries result in 
low costs and ease of trading, therefore, investors do not devote adequate effort to 
monitoring, which in turn may lead to a lower level of monitoring of borrowers 
(Bhide, 1993). 
The proponents of market-oriented (MB) financial systems mention, among 
others, its positive role in improving liquidity (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) and 
fostering stronger corporate governance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Moreover, 
Levine (2002) asserts that the MB environment is more efficient in promoting 
effective risk management. Tsoukas (2011) concludes that the more developed the 
stock market, the greater the chance of survival for the firms in the given country
20
. 
Likewise, the more the economy depends on the banking system as a financing 
source, the lower the chance of a firm’s survival. This is particularly the case during 
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times of recession
21
. In a recent study, Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012) observe that the 
MB structure is associated with lower costs and greater benefits of being close to the 
targeted level of debt for firms (faster SOAs). As a result, companies in MB 
countries as compared to firms in the BB countries adjust much faster towards target 
leverage ratios (annually by 19 and 3 per cent respectively). Morck and Nakamura 
(1999) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that banks do not provide enough 
funding for innovative projects due to their inherent risk aversion and conservatism. 
Thus, they argue for the superiority of MB financial structure in terms of firms’ 
financing. This argument is confirmed by studies of Bencivenga and Smith (1991) 
and Saint-Paul (1992) who also find that market oriented financial systems promote 
financing of long term projects, which in turn fosters new technologies with long 
development stages. 
Tadesse (2002) argues that when a country is financially under-developed or has 
a majority of small firms, the BB system is more efficient in fostering economic 
growth. For financially developed countries or for those dominated by large 
companies, the MB system is superior. Antoniou et al. (2008) assert that firms 
operating in the bank-oriented Japan and Germany maintain higher levels of 
leverage compared to companies from MB countries, e.g., the U.S. and the U.K. 
Furthermore, Japanese and French firms encounter the slowest and the fastest SOA, 
respectively. Giannetti (2003) documents a higher degree of firms’ leverage in 
European countries with less developed stock markets. However, Schmukler and 
Vesperoni (2000) come to the opposite conclusion. As a possible explanation for 
their findings, they propose higher liquidity constraints in the BB economies with 
the banking system not providing enough credit to the companies.  
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2.2.2 Financial Architecture 
 
A number of studies examining the disparities in debt levels of firms operating 
in MB and BB countries present contrasting findings. Antoniou et al. (2008) and 
Borio (1990) report German companies (BB country) as more highly geared than 
British firms (MB country). However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) arrive at a 
different conclusion. Due to these diverse results and a rapid development of stock 
markets in many of BB countries during last three decades (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), many scholars criticize the traditional differentiation between BB or MB 
economies as being inaccurate. Tadesse (2006) concludes “There is no uniformly 
accepted empirical definition of whether a given country's financial system is 
market- or bank-based” (p. 764). I employ an additional and alternative way22 of 
capturing the financial orientation of country’s financial system by using the 
FINARCH variable measuring a financial system’s activity, size, and efficiency 
developed and used by Čihák et al. (2012), Levine (2002), and Tadesse (2002, 
2006).  
In a nutshell, FINARCH is an index of the degree of stock market orientation in 
the given country. This index is formed by taking the first principal component of 
three other indices measuring the size, activity and efficiency of stock market 
vis–à–vis the banking system of economy. The more MB-oriented financial system 
(represented by the higher values of FINARCH variable) should make equity 
financing cheaper and more easily available for the companies. This in turn, 
according to the pecking order theory (POT), would induce firms to raise their funds 
via stock markets rather than by bond issuance or bank loans. 
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(mentioned in the introduction and further described in Appendix E). 
21 
 
Following Tadesse (2006), the size index measures the size of equity markets as 
compared with that of banking industry in each of the countries. The stock markets’ 
size is captured by the ratio of the market capitalization of domestic stocks to the 
GDP of the economy, whereas the size of banking industry is given by the bank 
credit ratio
23
. This size index merges these two measures into one ratio (first divided 
by the second) such that the larger the ratio, the more MB-oriented the financial 
system. Activity index is formed by dividing the total value of shares traded to the 
GDP by the bank credit ratio. Like before, the higher the value of index, the greater 
the degree of MB financial orientation of a country. The efficiency index is 
calculated as the product of the turnover ratio (ratio of the value of total shares 
traded to average real market capitalization) and banks’ overhead ratio24. 
Summing up, The FINARCH variable enables me to measure the level of the 
stock markets development relative to the banking industry in three dimensions: size, 
efficiency and activity, as well as their annual fluctuations. In contrast to the 
questionable MB/BB differentiation, it captures the different pace of overall 
development of stock markets across groups of countries. 
 
2.3 Credit Ratings 
 
2.3.1 Capital Structure and Credit Ratings 
 
Another strand of research relates to the significance of credit ratings in the 
process of the firms choice between debt and equity financing. A credit rating 
agency (CRA) provides information about financial instruments and their issuers in 
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the form of a credit ratings corresponding to the assessed creditworthiness of the 
issuing body. Consequently, credit ratings (CRs) can be seen as a proxy for the 
probability of firms’ defaults. Thus, they enable institutional and individual investors 
to value the financial instruments and set the required yield on them accordingly to 
their level of default risk. The CRAs by downgrading (or upgrading) a certain 
financial asset, such as a corporate bond, have the power to create (or destroy) the 
value of that asset. According to Estrella et al. (2000), in 2000, the number of CRAs 
was somewhere between 130 and 150 worldwide, out of which 26 were based in the 
G10 countries
25
 (except Luxembourg). In regards to NRSROs in the U.S. at the end 
of 2012, eleven CRAs were operating. However, both the U.S. and global credit 
rating industries are overwhelmingly dominated by three major rating agencies: 
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. The immense power of the largest CRAs is 
described by Friedman (1996): 
There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United 
States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy 
you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your 
bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful. 
Ingram et al. (1983) find evidence for bond price fluctuations as a reaction to 
changes in the CRs. Hand et al. (1992) document a significant impact of changes in 
CRs on bond and stock excess returns. Kashyap et al. (1994) use bond CRs to 
distinguish between financially constrained (those without bond CRs) and 
unconstrained companies (those having bond CRs). Graham and Harvey (2001) 
through a survey carried on the U.S. firms’ CFOs document that CR is the second 
most important factor (nearly on the par with financial flexibility) when making 
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financing decisions. According to their survey, over 57 percent of managers find 
their company’s CR very important. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) find even stronger 
evidence for the importance of credit ratings from a survey of European companies’ 
managers: firms’ CR and financial flexibility being very important for roughly 91 
and 73 percent of CFOs respectively. Leary and Roberts (2005) divided their sample 
into two portfolios: companies with above and below speculative-grade CRs. Their 
results show a negative association between the investment CRs and a debt issuance. 
The presence of CRs is used as a proxy for a firm’s access to the public debt markets 
by Faulkender and Petersen (2006). In their research, they document that firms with 
CRs have on average debt ratios 35 per cent higher. This relation is confirmed by 
Sufi (2009) who examines the effect of the commencement of bank loan ratings in 
the U.S. in 1995. 
Kisgen (2006) undertakes the first thorough investigation of credit ratings by 
introducing his Credit Rating-Capital Structure Hypothesis (CR-CS Hypothesis) and 
argues that a better CR is beneficial for a firm. He concludes that companies 
expecting changes in their CRs tend to issue equity instead of bonds in order to 
avoid the extra costs of downgrade or later capitalize from an upgrade. These 
findings are contrary to the pecking order theory (POT). Kisgen and Strahan (2010) 
argue that CRs influence investors’ willingness to lend, since they often include 
non-public information provided by companies to CRAs. Hovakimian et al. (2009) 
report that a decrease in CRs triggers a fall in firms’ leverage, but the same firms on 
average do not respond to CRs upgrades. They asserted that this evidence could 
result from targeting a certain minimum CR by the companies. Frank and Goyal 
(2009) observe a significant and positive (negative) impact on the total debt to book 
(market) assets ratios if a firm has a debt with an investment-grade rating. Tang 
(2009) utilizes the Moody’s CR refinement introduced in 1982. His study shows that 
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firms with an enhancement in ratings (e.g. from Aa to Aa1), gain better access to the 
credit market. Hence, they react with increasing debt financing relative to equity 
financing. Moreover, Tang documents that companies upgraded by the CRA on 
average invest more, grow faster, and keep less retained earnings than downgraded 
firms. 
Kisgen (2009) claims that a “complete model of capital structure must include 
credit ratings along with standard tax, information, agency, and financial distress 
factors” (p.1324), and that using a dummy variable for a downgrade better explains 
the firm’s capital structure than its Z-score, profitability, and even leverage. He 
documents the positive relationship between the CRs and firms’ gearing levels. In 
addition, his results show that downgraded firms adjust significantly faster towards 
their target levels of gearing. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that downgrades to 
below-investment grade substantially alter firms’ investment and financing decisions. 
Byoun (2011), according to his Financial Flexibility Hypothesis (FFH), finds 
evidence of an inverted-U shaped association between leverage and CRs. He argues 
that due to the different stage of a firm’s development, there is a negative 
relationship between the CRs and gearing ratios, but non-rated companies have 
lower debt-equity ratios than rated firms. Most recently, Faulkender et al. (2012) use 
bond ratings
26
 to distinguish between financially constrained (without bond CRs) 
and unconstrained companies (with bond CRs). They find that over- (under-) levered 
companies with debt CRs adjust substantially slower (quicker) towards their target 
leverage ratios than non-rated firms. 
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2.3.2 Credit Rating Industry’s Reforms in the U.S. (2006-2010) 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, during the last 15 years or so, there has been a 
growing discontent with the CRAs and their CRs leading to severe criticism from 
investors, scholars, and government bodies alike. The current reforms of the credit 
rating industry undertaken by regulators in the U.S. endeavor to tackle five broad 
categories of problems identified in the ongoing debate (Deb et al., 2011). These five 
areas of focus listed by them are: (1) lack of diversity in ratings, (2) regulatory and 
mechanistic reliance (3) conflicts of interest and ratings shopping, (4) faulty 
methodologies and inadequate risk models applied by CRAs, and (5) misperception 
of what ratings represents.  
These reforms are relevant to my study. First, American firms account for the 
majority of my global sample. Second, in my thesis I use the CRs issued by S&P 
which is one of the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs) based in the U.S. Thus, both S&P and its CRs are directly affected by the 
series of regulatory changes described in this section. Third, the U.S. is a traditional 
benchmark for a MB country where CRs are expected to have a significant impact 
on capital structure. Finally, the reforms coincide with the last five years of the 
period analyzed in my thesis (2006-2010)
27
 which offers a unique opportunity to 
examine the impact of CR industry’s reform on the relation between CRs and firms’ 
debt ratios. 
On the 29
th
 of September 2006, Congress enacted the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act (CRARA), which among other things, gave a definition of a “Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization” (NRSRO) and the rules of its 
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registration process. According to SEC (2007), CRARA gives: 
authority for the Commission to implement registration, recordkeeping, 
financial reporting, and oversight rules with respect to registered credit rating 
agencies, and directs the Commission to issue final implementing rules no later 
than 270 days after its enactment (or by June 26, 2007). (p.1). 
These goals were achieved by adding Section 15E and amending Section 17 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. By the 26
th
 of June 2007, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented Exchange Act Rules 17g-1 through 
17g-6. Appendix A offers the detailed explanation of those Rules. 
 
[Insert Appendix A here] 
 
Following the implementation of the NRSRO Rules in 2007, the SEC 
commenced granting registrations to applicants (CRAs). By the 23
rd
 of June 2008, 
10 registrations were granted
28
. Based on the number of ratings in existence as of 
year-end 2010 reported by each of 10 CRAs registered as NRSROs and summarized 
in Appendix B, it is clear than by far the largest two CRAs are S&P and Moody’s 
with roughly 1.2 and 1 million CRs respectively. Together with the third largest 
NRSRO they accounted for over 97 percent of ratings issued by all registered CRAs.  
 
[Insert Appendix B here] 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned Rules, the SEC amended a number of them 
in February and December 2009 as described by SEC (2011b): “with the goal of 
further increasing the transparency of NRSRO rating methodologies, strengthening 
the disclosures of rating performance, prohibiting NRSROs from engaging in certain 
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S.A. de C.V. on the 5
th
 of November 2012). 
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practices, and enhancing NRSRO record keeping.” (p.1) 
Finally, on the 22
nd
 of July 2010 the so-called “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act’’ was signed into law. First, it amended Section 15E in 
order to improve the regulation and oversight of registered CRAs by forcing new 
reporting, disclosure and examination rules. It obliges the SEC’s staff to undertake 
an investigation of all NRSROs at least once a year. Moreover, under Section 15E, 
the SEC is required to publicize a yearly report written in an understandable manner 
and summing up the main findings of the examination conducted, the relevant 
responses by the CRAs to any significant regulatory inadequacies detected, and 
whether the CRAs implemented the recommendations of the SEC from the prior 
reports. The Dodd-Frank Act also strengthens the SEC’s oversight prerogatives by 
establishing an Office of Credit Ratings (Deb et al., 2011). Lastly, one more reform 
of the Dodd-Frank Act will have a substantial impact on firms using CRs in their 
filings with the SEC. This reform was a repeal of Rule 436(g) which was effectively 
insulating NRSROs from the liability as experts under Section 11 of the Securities 
Act (Carbone, 2010). 
 Summarizing, the ongoing current reform of a credit rating industry in the U.S. 
started with the Rating Agency Reform Act in 2006 and was followed by 
implementation and a series of amendments of rules in 2007 and 2009, and later in 
2010 by the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. All of these regulatory efforts were 
suppose to alleviate CRAs and CRs-related deficiencies.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the hypotheses development, data sources, variables’ 
explanations, basic model, and methods of estimation. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses development 
 
Up until recently, according to the prior literature (Antoniou et al. 2008), 
countries were categorized into capital market-based (MB) oriented and bank-based 
(BB) oriented in terms of the orientation of their financial systems. Traditionally in 
BB countries, the banking industry supplies the majority of credit to firms 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). Ties between companies and the banking sector, 
such as loan commitments (Mishkin, 2005) are stronger than in the market-based 
(MB) countries. Due to the close long-term relation between lenders and the 
borrowing firms, banks enjoy the advantages of inside monitoring. This in turn 
decreases the information asymmetry and allows banks to assess the 
creditworthiness of a borrower using either their own internal credit ratings or some 
other credit scoring systems, without a need for external credit ratings (CRs).  
Companies that operate in the countries regarded as MB do not have such a 
close relationship with a bank and may suffer from a greater degree of information 
asymmetry. The individual or institutional lenders cannot assess the quality of 
borrowing firms and their investments. A credit rating agency (CRA) can bridge this 
gap by providing CRs which can highly influence companies’ access to and cost of 
funds. By changing a firm’s CR, the CRA sends a signal to investors about this 
firm’s altered creditworthiness, which in turn affects the investors’ required rate of 
return.  
29 
 
In my thesis I apply a twofold approach in order to capture this higher 
importance of CRs in economies traditionally regarded as MB. First, I divide the 
overall sample into two sub-samples: MB and BB oriented countries, Second, I 
interact firms’ CRs with the market-based dummy variable (MBDUM)29 proxying 
for a country’s financial system orientation. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure is more 
significant in MB than in BB countries. 
 
Over ten years ago, Ferri et al. (1999) pointed out, that in the developing 
economies there are not enough external CRs and their quality is poor due to their 
short history. While the latter claim cannot be empirically confirmed or rejected, the 
former argument finds support in the data collected for this study. Roughly 4 percent 
of firms (or 14 after exclusion of the U.S. and Japan from the sample) and 3 (17) 
percent of annual observations in the sample are from developing countries
30
.  
In addition, in developing countries there is a strong causal relation between 
sovereign and firms’ CRs documented by recent studies (e.g. Borensztein et al., 
2007; Williams et al., 2013). Therefore, frequent historical downgrades and 
volatility for sovereign ratings of developing economies regarded as excessive by a 
number of scholars (Ferri et al., 1999; Monfort and Mulder, 2000) lead to increased 
volatility of firms’ CRs. Due to the aforementioned, the information role of CRs in 
the process of issuing equity (Frank and Goyal, 2009) or debt (Tang, 2009) loses 
importance. In other words, one would expect that capital markets’ investors from 
developing countries do not attach as much weight to the CRs as their peers from 
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 MBDUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the economy has the market-based (MB) financial 
system and zero if the economy’s financial system is bank-based (BB). 
30
 See Appendix D for the number of firms and observations for advanced and developing countries.  
30 
 
advanced countries. 
Moreover, there is ample evidence indicating that the comparative importance 
of banks and capital markets in developing and advanced economies is quite 
different. Basically, the more economically developed is a country, the more 
important become stock and bond markets relative to banks (Allen and Gale, 1995, 
1999; Boot and Thakor, 1997, 2000; Boyd and Smith, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen 
and Levine, 2012; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Song and Thakor, 2010). 
Consequently, in developing countries firms finance a larger share of their 
investment needs with various forms of bank lending than their counterparts from 
advanced economies. Thus, as in Hypothesis 1, a weaker effect of CRs on a capital 
structure is expected. 
To examine the idea formulated below in Hypothesis 2, I split the overall 
sample into advanced and developing sub-samples of countries. Second, I apply the 
interaction term between the CRs and the dummy variable (DEVDUM)
31
 proxying 
for a country’s economic development. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure in developing 
economies is less significant than in advanced economies. 
 
According to the trade-off theory (TOT) the positive role of better credit ratings 
on availability of debt at lower price should result in easier and cheaper access to the 
credit market. Hence, firms react by increasing debt financing relative to equity 
financing (e.g. Tang, 2009). de Jong et al. (2008) make a logical argument that in a 
country with a more developed bond market, firms enjoy more alternatives to 
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 DEVDUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is classified as advanced economy and 
zero otherwise (IMF, 2012). 
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borrow funds, and lenders are more prone to provide financing. Due to that fact, the 
importance of CRs as an important signaling tool for borrowers (in line with the 
TOT) should rise with the level of credit market development. 
In my study I use the interaction between firms’ CRs and a proxy for bond 
market development level (BOND). If the development of bond market strengthens 
the positive effect of CRs on firms’ debt ratio, the coefficient of my interaction 
variable should be significant and positive. I test for this relation in my third 
hypothesis formulated below. 
 
Hypothesis 3. A credit rating has a more positive effect (or a less negative effect) on 
a firms’ capital structure in economies with more developed bond markets. 
 
Due to diverse results in the literature (Antoniou et al., 2008; Borio, 1990; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and a rapid development of stock markets in many BB 
countries during last three decades (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009; Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003), many scholars criticize the traditional differentiation between BB 
or MB economies as inaccurate. A financial architecture variable (FINARCH) 
measures a country’s financial system orientation, its annual fluctuations, and is an 
additional and alternative proxy
32
 for the MB versus BB differentiation between 
economies (Čihák et al., 2012; Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2002, 2006).  
Thus, in line with the argument used in the development of Hypothesis 1, one 
would expect, that the higher the value of FINARCH (indicating a more 
market-oriented financial orientation of the country), the more significant the effect 
of CRs on the firm’s capital structure. In order to investigate this relation, I interact 
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zero otherwise. 
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companies’ CRs with the FINARCH variable. 
 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure is more 
significant in countries with more market-oriented financial architecture. 
 
Assuming that companies have a target leverage ratio, in a perfect market with 
no frictions and costs impeding the speed of adjustment (SOA), in case of any 
deviation from a target gearing ratio, a company would instantaneously return to its 
optimal level of leverage. The existing literature shows that the firm’s SOA towards 
its target level of gearing depends on the costs and benefits stemming from such an 
adjustment (e.g. Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006; Faulkender et al., 2012; Korajczyk 
and Levy, 2003). An excellent example of direct adjustment costs are transaction 
costs of issuing/repurchasing debt and equity incurred by a firm when it converges 
to its desired gearing ratio which can significantly impede the realization of target 
capital structure and cause a company to divert from its optimal leverage 
periodically (Fischer et al., 1989; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 
2006). Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012) classify the adjustment costs into three 
categories: the above-mentioned direct transaction costs of accessing capital markets, 
information asymmetry between inside and outside investors, and the government 
laws/regulations constraining firms’ financial flexibility. Cook and Tang (2010) 
document that firms operating in favorable macroeconomic environments have 
faster SOAs towards their target debt ratios. They use term and default spreads, GDP 
growth, and dividend rate as proxies for access to capital markets.  
Faulkender et al. (2012) forcefully argue that the assumption of a same speed of 
adjustment for different firms employed in most of prior research is unreasonable. 
They document that the rate of adjustment is substantially different for under- and 
33 
 
over-levered companies (29.8 and 56.4 percent respectively). They explain such a 
discrepancy 
Even if adjustment costs were equal for under- and over-levered firms, the 
benefits may be asymmetrical. Under-levered firms forego tax benefits of 
leverage and have little concern with financial distress costs. Yet potential 
financial distress costs loom quite large for over-levered firms. (p.636). 
In addition, they compare the SOAs of rated and non-rated companies and argue 
that when firms are over- (under-) levered, and have a CR, they adjust substantially 
slower (faster) than non-rated firms. They propose that this is associated with the 
different degree of financial constraints of two types of companies due to the 
different ease of access to financial markets and costs of doing so for rated (less 
financially constrained) and non-rated firms (more financially constrained). They 
argue that the fact of having or not having a CR is so important that it can reverse 
the findings of faster (slower) SOAs for over- (under-) levered companies. 
Kashyap et al. (1994) use bond CRs to distinguish between financially 
constrained (those without bond CRs) and unconstrained companies (those having 
bond CRs). Korajczyk and Levy (2003) document that financially unconstrained 
firms are more likely to deviate from their target gearing ratio in an attempt to time 
the markets by issuing/repurchasing securities when macroeconomic conditions are 
most favorable. In their sample, out of 565 firm events labeled as “financially 
constrained” only 8 had investment-grade CRs issued by S&P and the rest of events 
had either speculative-grade CRs or were not rated. 
According to Byoun (2011) firms with low CRs have insufficient internal funds 
and therefore are forced to engage in capital market transactions in order to fund 
their investment needs. This in turn enables them to adjust their debt ratio at 
relatively low marginal cost
33
. On the other hand, companies with high CRs, only 
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rarely tap capital markets due to internal funds large enough to pay for their 
investment needs. In other words, the adjustment of their capital structure would 
require from firms an additional “trip” to either the stock or the bond market, thus, 
incurring extra costs. His findings are confirmed by Faulkender et al., (2012) who 
also find that the companies adjust with faster speed when adjustment costs are sunk 
(when in order to raise funds, a firm has already borne transaction costs and can 
simultaneously converge towards its target debt ratio) relative to when these costs are 
incremental.  
To test for the idea formulated below in Hypothesis 5, I use two approaches. 
First, I interact CRs with LAGLEV variable and check if the obtained estimates are 
significant
34
. Second, I divide the samples of firms with respect to their CRs into two 
groups: companies with investment-grade CRs versus firms with speculative-grade 
CRs. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Firms with high credit ratings (less financially constrained) adjust 
towards their optimal debt-equity ratios at a slower speed than firms with poor credit 
ratings (more financially constrained). 
 
In addition to hypothesized disparities between the effects of CRs on a 
company’s capital structure in different groups of countries (categorized with respect 
to economies’ financial orientations or economic development), credit ratings may 
have different impact on firm’s leverage ratio across countries. Furthermore, this 
effect may be quite different even if economies belong to the same previously 
                                                                                                                                                      
company can simultaneously converge towards its target debt ratio without incurring a significant 
additional cost. 
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 Following the methodology used by Cook and Tang (2010), positive (negative) coefficients mean 
relatively slower (faster) speed of adjustment towards target debt ratios. 
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defined group (e.g., the U.S. and Japan are both classified as advanced countries).  
There is evidence (Li et al., 2006) indicating to particularly important role of 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) and their 
services in the U.S. CRs have been a part of the regulatory system of American 
banking industry since 1931
35
. Moreover, according to the SEC report (SEC, 2008), 
as of June 2008 there were at least 44 kinds of forms and rules applying CRs issued 
by NRSROs into financial regulations and contracts. Poon (2003) argues that “most 
companies in the US believe that having a rating from the two major rating agencies, 
S&Ps and Moody’s, is desirable, indeed indispensable for an issuer in capital 
markets.” (p.594). Also the fact that most relevant studies examining the effect of 
CRs on capital structure have focused on the American market (e.g. Byoun, 2011; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2009; Kisgen, 2009; Leary and Roberts, 
2005; Tang, 2009) may indicate that CRs are more important in the U.S. than in 
other economies. 
Recent literature (Behr and Güttler, 2008; Packer and Reynolds, 1997) indicates 
that Japanese firms receive lower credit ratings (CRs) in comparison with American 
companies. Investigating Moody's long-term issuer and sovereign bond ratings, 
Nickell et al. (2000) document that “Highly rated Japanese issuers (…) possess 
somewhat more volatile ratings than their US counterparts in that down-grades are 
more likely” (p.211). Consequently the criticism of CRs issued by the major CRAs 
based in the U.S. is strong in Japan (Fairchild and Shin, 2006). Actually, both 
Japanese firms and authorities suspect that the reason for this kind of treatment is 
intentional and has its roots in an attempt to hamper their credibility and 
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cost). 
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competitiveness versus American companies (since S&P and Moody’s are both 
U.S.-based CRAs). In addition, in the 1990s S&P entered the Japanese rating 
industry using aggressive policy by issuing a number of unsolicited CRs. This modus 
operandi was seen as a “financial blackmail” that put a pressure on Japanese 
companies to order and pay for the solicited CRs (Deb et al., 2011). For these 
reasons, the perceived reliability of CRs in eyes of Japanese investors and/or firms 
may be diminished, and therefore, the information role of CRs in the process of 
issuing equity (Frank and Goyal, 2009) or debt (Tang, 2009) loses importance. In 
other words, one could expect that capital markets’ investors and companies from 
Japan do not attach as much weight to the S&P’s CRs as their peers from other 
advanced countries. 
In addition, the U.S. and Japan are traditional benchmarks for the MB and BB 
economy used in prior studies (e.g. Antoniou et al. 2008). Therefore, according to my 
Hypothesis 1, there is another reason to expect that the effect of CRs on companies’ 
capital structure is more significant for firms based in the U.S. than in Japan. Due to 
the above-mentioned arguments, I hypothesize that CRs issued by S&P play more 
significant role on firms’ capital structure in the U.S. than in other countries and that 
this difference is even more pronounced with respect to Japanese companies. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure is more 
significant in the U.S. than in other economies (especially Japan). 
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3.2 Data Sources 
 
My initial intention was to use a world-wide and comprehensive set of 
economies in regards to different financial systems, bond market sizes, and their 
global economic importance (e.g., in terms of global gross national product, world 
trade and the world population). To test for the ideas formulated in Hypotheses 1 to 6, 
in my sample all firms have to have CRs. Consequently, due to the limited 
availability of S&P’s long-term domestic issuer credit ratings36, the final sample 
includes just 19 economies. I eliminated countries with less than 7 covered firms in 
the period of study
37
. The remaining set of economies largely coincides with the 
G-20 group members: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, the U.K., and the U.S. In addition, it includes 
other major European economies (the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), 
and countries growing in importance in the Southeast Asian region (Hong Kong and 
Thailand). Appendix C lists the sample countries and classifies them as being 
market-based (MB) or bank-based (BB), and as being advanced or developing 
economies. 
 
[Insert Appendix C here] 
 
The whole sample is an unbalanced panel of 17,046 annual observations (323 for 
Australia, 551 for Canada, 394 for France, 327 for Germany, 86 for Hong Kong, 53 
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 The poor CR firms’ coverage is especially the case in developing countries, and is in line with 
Ferri et al.’s (2001) statement that in developing economies “ratings are by far less widespread for 
banks and corporations” (p.115). Despite the already pivotal and growing global importance of 
Chinese economy, due to the insufficient data, the sample does not include Chinese firms. The S&P 
share of Chinese credit rating market seems to be negligible. 
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 A similar approach is applied by de Jong et al. (2008). 
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for India, 86 for Indonesia, 132 for Italy, 1,823 for Japan, 144 for Korea, 170 for 
Mexico, 133 for the Netherlands, 111 for Russia, 109 for Spain, 186 for Sweden, 129 
for Switzerland, 55 for Thailand, 505 for the U.K., and 11,729 for the U.S.) and 
1,513 distinct, major non-financial companies (27 Australian, 55 Canadian, 40 
French, 35 German, 11 Hong Kong, 8 Indian, 13 Indonesian, 16 Italian, 240 Japanese, 
19 Korean, 16 Mexican, 13 Dutch, 18 Russian, 10 Spanish, 16 Swedish, 13 Swiss, 7 
Thai, 53 British, and 904 American). Each firm is represented by at least three 
consecutive annual observations
38
 in the sample, for which it was rated by S&P, 
listed on a major stock exchange of the sample countries and had no missing 
variables. 
In accordance with the existing studies, all firms have total assets greater than 
one million US dollars (Hovakimian et al., 2009), leverage ratios less than one 
(Huang and Ritter, 2009), and market-to-book ratios greater than zero but less than 
ten (Leary and Roberts, 2005). To diminish the influence of outliers, all firm-specific 
factors are winsorised at the first and ninety-ninth percentile (Faulkender et al., 2012). 
In addition, all financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are removed from the 
sample (Fan et al., 2012). This is due to the nature of financial firms’ liabilities which 
significantly differ from those of non-financial entities. The annual observations are 
defined based on the fiscal year-ends (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The final sample 
covers a period of 20 years (1991 to 2010)
39
. Appendix D presents a number of 
sample observations by year and by country. 
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[Insert Appendix D here] 
 
Apart from the separate regressions with respect to both financial orientation and 
economic development of countries, I conduct an individual analysis for the U.S. and 
Japan. The reason for doing so is threefold. First, the pivotal economic importance of 
both countries and their financial markets for the global economy (stock and bond 
markets alike) requires particular attention.  
Second, due to the limited S&P’s issuer credit ratings there is a huge disparity in 
the numbers of total country observations between some of the economies. As we 
can observe in Appendix D, Thai, Indian, Japanese, and American companies 
represent about 0.46, 0.53, 15.86, and 59.75 percent of the total sample firms, 
respectively. This phenomenon can create so called “over-representation bias” in the 
regression analysis by the economies with the most observations. Consequently, the 
results obtained could lack in a reliability and give rise to criticism. That is why in all 
of the statistical analyses for the panel of all countries, separate regressions for the 
groups of MB and BB countries, as well as, for a group of advanced economies were 
rerun after excluding firms from the U.S. and Japan.  
Third, there is evidence (Li et al., 2006; Deb et al., 2011) indicating a 
particularly important role of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs) and their services in the U.S.
40
 On the other hand, the CRs assigned for 
Japanese firms by the biggest three CRAs are deemed to be downwardly biased as 
compared with their peers from other countries. Behr and Güttler (2008) based on the 
Moody’s rating data find that CRs issued for Japanese firms are lower than CRs for 
American companies (after controlling for firms risk and other characteristics)
41
. 
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Nickell et al. (2000) find that Japanese firms with high CRs are more likely to be 
downgraded as compared to the companies based in the U.S. Consequently, the 
criticism of CRs issued by the major CRAs is particularly strong in Japan (Fairchild 
and Shin, 2006). 
Appendix D gives the number of observations with respect to years and 
countries of the sample. Looking at the figures, we can observe that the annual 
observations of firms based in MB and advanced economies (as compared to the 
companies based in BB and developing countries) represent roughly 82 and 97 
percent of all observations, respectively
42
. This unequal share, as mentioned before, 
is an outcome of the CRs data availability from the databases used in the collecting 
data process. 
 
3.3 Explanations of Variables 
 
3.3.1 Firm-Specific Determinants 
 
As a benchmark dependent variable I employed long-term leverage to the market 
value of total assets ratio (MLEV)
43
. There are a number of reasons supporting this 
choice. First, in terms of a debt’s maturity, de Jong et al. (2008) suggest “Since the 
short-term debt consists largely of trade credit which is under the influence of 
completely different determinants, the examination of total debt ratio is likely to 
generate results which are difficult to interpret” (p.1956). Second, market leverage is 
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 In line with the prior studies (de Jong et al., 2008; Giannetti, 2003; Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012), 
three additional measures of a firm’s leverage ratio are used as a robustness check: total leverage to 
the market value of total assets ratio (MLEVT), long-term leverage to the book value of total assets 
ratio (BLEV), and total leverage to the book value of total assets ratio (BLEVT). 
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mostly used in the relevant research (e.g. Antoniou et al., 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999; Fama and French, 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Leary and 
Roberts, 2005). Moreover, Welch (2004) points out the theories of target ratios are 
implicitly about market gearing. 
The existing studies document the importance of a similar set of factors affecting 
firms’ debt-equity ratios (e.g. Kisgen, 2009; Lemmon et al., 2008; Lemmon and 
Roberts, 2010; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and Ratti et al., 2008). In their recent paper, 
Frank and Goyal (2009) identify six core determinants for market leverage ratio. In 
my thesis I closely follow their paper and use all of the six factors: profitability 
(EBIT/TA), growth opportunities (MTB), relative tangible assets (TANG/TA), firm 
size (SIZE), median industry leverage (MEDLEV), and annual inflation rate (INFL). 
Appendix E lists all dependent and independent variables, their definitions and data 
sources. 
 
[Insert Appendix E here] 
 
According to the pecking order hypothesis (POT) formulated by Donaldson 
(1961), and developed later by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), 
Profitability (EBIT/TA) has an inverse relationship with leverage. The POT states 
that firms prefer to finance their investments first from their internal funds (retained 
earnings) and use debt capital only when their internal resources are exhausted, 
whereas equity financing is the least preferred (due to the asymmetric information 
and adverse selection problems). Because the ability to accumulate earnings largely 
depends on profitability, more profitable firms should be less leveraged. Thus, a 
negative association is expected. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994), 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Hovakimian and Li (2011), Leary and Roberts 
42 
 
(2005), Mittoo and Zhang (2008), and Rajan and Zingales (1995), confirm the 
negative relationship. However, an opposite relationship is suggested by the 
proponents of Kraus and Litzenberger’s (1973) trade-off theory (TOT). The more 
profitable the firm is, the higher the tax shield benefits from using debt. Therefore, 
there is an incentive for the companies to increase their gearing. The evidence for 
such an association was found by Hovakimian et al. (2004), Jensen (1986), and 
Korteweg (2010). 
There are two main reasons for the negative relation between the growth 
opportunities (MTB) and debt-equity ratios. The first one stems from the TOT, 
which claims that the expected growth raises the cost of financial distress. The 
second is consistent with the prediction of the market timing theory (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002) which suggests the tendency for firms to issue stock when their 
stock price is overvalued (high market-to-book ratios (MTB)). The inverse relation 
has been documented by Byoun (2008), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), 
Hovakimian et al. (2004), Hovakimian and Li (2011), and Myers (1984). On the 
other hand, a fast growing entity needs more funding and is more likely to exhaust 
its retained earnings (González and González, 2008). Thus, in line with the POT, 
firms will seek external funds and borrow more in the form of debt rather than 
equity. Therefore, an increase in gearing might occur (Antoniou et al., 2008). It is 
not uncommon for scholars to find this kind of relation (MacKay and Phillips, 2005; 
Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012). 
Larger firms are more transparent (Flannery and Rangan, 2006), diversified 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988), and have stable earnings (Fama and French, 2002). All 
of the mentioned features make them less prone to fall into financial distress or go 
bankrupt, which according to the TOT allows companies to increase their leverage. 
Moreover, bigger companies enjoy easier access to the debt markets thanks to lower 
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information asymmetry (Ferri and Jones, 1979). Thus, firm size (SIZE) and gearing 
should be positively related as confirmed by the majority of papers (e.g., Lemmon et 
al., 2008; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). 
Relative tangible assets (TANG/TA) can serve as collateral for the secured debt. 
Therefore the agency problem is less severe and the external loans are easier to 
obtain (Scott, 1977; Williamson, 1988). Among others, Harris and Raviv (1991) and 
Titman and Wessels (1988) point out that firms with more relative tangible assets in 
times of financial difficulties will suffer a lower loss in market value (a larger loss is 
more likely in the case of intangible assets). Consequently, the scope for asset 
substitution is decreased and the risk for lenders is smaller. The positive relationship 
between the relative tangible assets and leverage is documented by Antoniou et al. 
(2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and González (2008), Hovakimian et 
al. (2004), Hovakimian and Li (2011), and Ö ztekin (2011). On the other hand, the 
POT states that higher adverse selection pushes firms to issue debt rather than equity. 
Therefore, companies which are smaller or have less relative tangible assets and are 
more likely to experience adverse selection costs should have higher gearing ratios 
(Leary and Roberts, 2005; Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). Appendix F 
summarizes the expected relations between leverage ratio and various determinants. 
 
[Insert Appendix F here] 
 
3.3.2 Industry-Specific Determinants 
 
Median industry leverage (MEDLEV) has been widely used as a proxy of the 
omitted industry specific factors (e.g. product market interactions or the nature of 
competition) influencing the capital structure of a firm operating in it. Frank and 
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Goyal (2009) find that including the median industry leverage makes a number of 
firm specific determinants insignificant (e.g. intangible assets or research and 
development expenses of a company). Previous research find evidence for the 
positive relation between industry and firm leverage ratios (Byoun, 2008; Frank and 
Goyal, 2004; González and González, 2008; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Lemmon et al., 
2008). I create the MEDLEV variable based on the U.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) four-digit code system, according to which I group the firms 
into 12 broad categories
44
. Appendix G provides the list of all industries falling 
within each category and their corresponding SIC codes. 
 
[Insert Appendix G here] 
 
3.3.3 Credit Rating-Related Determinants 
 
Similar to Gande and Parsley (2005) and Cheng and Neamtiu (2009), this 
research assigns ordinal numerical values to all S&P’s credit rating letter grades. I 
employ the CR variable (RATING) by coding all S&P’s long-term domestic issuer 
credit ratings as 22 ordinal values (from 1 to 22) where AAA = 22, AA+ = 21, AA = 
20, AA- = 19, A+ = 18, A = 17, A- = 16, BBB+ = 15, BBB = 14, BBB- = 13, BB+ = 
12, BB = 11, BB- = 10, B+ = 9, B = 8, B- = 7, CCC+ = 6, CCC = 5, CCC- = 4, CC = 
3, SD = 2, D = 1. 
In a relation between firms’ CRs and gearing ratios, two sources of endogeneity 
occur: unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity (for a detailed explanation see 
section 3.5.1). One way to reduce the possibility of the endogeneity between 
independent and dependent variables is based on the usage of the first lag of the 
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 This approach is similar to the one used by de Jong et al. (2008). 
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independent variables (in my thesis the first lag of the RATING variable). This 
approach is commonly used in the finance literature and seems particularly crucial to 
follow it when dealing with the relation between CRs and capital structure (e.g. 
Kisgen, 2009). For this reason in all regression analyses I use the CRs lagged one 
year (RATINGL1) as compared with the remaining variables. Appendix H 
summarizes the whole spectrum of the firms’ issuer credit ratings used by S&P 
along with corresponding ordinal coding system. 
 
[Insert Appendix H here] 
 
Since this study emphasizes the importance of CRs, seven more credit 
rating-related variables are included: (RATINGL1*FINARCH, RATINGL1*MBDUM, 
RATINGL1*DEVDUM, RATINGL1*BOND, RATINGL1*LAGLEV, RATINGL1*US, 
and RATINGL1*JAPAN)
 45
. These seven interaction terms according to my best 
knowledge have never before been used in the literature and their job is to test for 
the proposed Hypotheses 1 to 6. In addition, in order to examine the potential effect 
of the credit rating industry’s reform in the U.S. (initiated in 2006) on the relation 
between firms’ CRs and their debt ratios, I interact the RATINGL1 and the dummy 
variable (REFORM). This dummy variable equals one for the years 2006 to 2010 
(the period of the reform) and zero otherwise and does not enter the model itself 
(included only as the interaction with the RATINGL1 variable). As mentioned, this 
reform took place in the U.S., and thus, it is not expected to have any bearings on 
the relation between the CRs and a firm’s capital structure in other countries. 
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 All of the listed interaction variables incorporate the first lag of the credit rating variable 
(RATINGL1) in order to minimize a threat of CRs’ intrinsic endogeneity (as explained in section 
3.5.1). 
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3.3.4 Macroeconomic Variables 
 
In addition to firm-level factors, some macroeconomic variables are used. To 
capture the countries’ financial orientation in line with the traditional approach 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000), a dummy variable (MBDUM) equals one when 
company operates in a market capital oriented environment (Australia, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the 
U.K, and the U.S.), and equals zero otherwise (France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain). Antoniou et al. (2008) find that firms functioning in 
the BB Japan and continental Europe (France and Germany) have higher leverage 
ratios as compared to the firms from the U.S. and the U.K. They argue that debt 
ratios are affected by the financial arrangements of a country.  
Due to the mixed results in existing research and the questionable validity of the 
crude division of countries into two groups, MB and BB, this study employs an 
additional and alternative, continuous variable (FINARCH), measuring the degree of 
market orientation of an economy (Beck and Levine, 2002; Čihák et al., 2012; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Tadesse, 2002, 2006). This variable is a first 
principal component of an aggregate of three indices representing country’s financial 
orientation: the relative size of stock markets to the banking industry, the relative 
degree of activity in stock markets to that in banking sector, and the relative 
efficiency of stock markets to banks. Basically, the higher is the value of FINARCH, 
the more market-oriented is the financial system of a particular country (Levine, 
2002; Tadesse, 2006). In contrast to the questionable MB/BB differentiation, The 
FINARCH variable is measured annually, therefore, it captures the different pace of 
overall development of stock markets across countries. 
Another dummy variable (DEVDUM) differentiates between advanced and 
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developing economies according to the classification proposed by the IMF (2012). 
This variable is equal to one when an entity resides in advanced country (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.), and is equal to zero otherwise (India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand). 
(BOND) is a proxy for the importance of bond market defined as the sum of 
public and private bond market capitalization over GDP (de Jong et al., 2008). It is 
expected that there exists a positive relation between the BOND variable and firms’ 
leverage ratio, since the more developed the market, the more ways for companies to 
borrow
46
.  
A higher inflation rate (INFL) is usually linked with higher interest rates thus a 
larger cost of borrowing. Hence, managers are less inclined to raise a new capital in 
the form of debt, and an inverse relation is expected (Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012). 
On the other hand, if higher inflation is expected (and assuming the interest rate 
does not increase much), then firms will time the market by raising funds in a form 
of debt, hoping to repay it later at lower price (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Moreover, 
the higher the expected inflation, the higher the real value of benefits stemming from 
the tax deduction (Jõeveer, 2013). 
 
3.4 The Basic Model 
 
3.4.1 The Autoregressive Model 
 
The popularity of dynamic modeling for capital structure has been growing fast 
(Fama and French, 2002; Ju et al., 2005; Hovakimian et al., 2001; González and 
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 However, at least to some degree, bond and bank financing can be substitutes. 
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González, 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). This study’s 
results are built based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) argue that in order to obtain a valid dynamic 
model, which takes into account the possibility of the autoregressive (AR) process on 
an error term and the influence of adjustment costs on the firm SOA towards its 
target level of gearing, a one-period lagged dependent variable (              ) is 
required. Furthermore, it is expected that firms have fixed unobserved effects (  ) 
influencing their capital structure e.g., reputation or management performance. These 
time-invariant effects also must be included in the model (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 
2006). The autoregressive model is specified below. 
 
                                 +    
  
                +      (1) 
 
Where              stands for the leverage ratio for company i in year t, (α0) 
is a constant term,      and      are the coefficients of true unknown parameters 
to estimate.                  is the first lag of the dependent variable (to capture 
the dynamic aspect of capital structure). (X) is a vector of explanatory variables of 
firm capital structure
47
 composed of k-factors (k = 1,…, 11). These determinants 
and their corresponding abbreviations are listed below: 
 
1) EBIT/TA = earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of total 
assets ratio (used as a proxy for profitability) 
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 All of the aforementioned variables (1-11), their definitions, sources and expected signs are listed 
and described in Appendices E and F. 
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2) MTB = market-to-book ratio (used as a proxy for growth opportunities) 
3) SIZE = natural logarithm of book value of total assets (used as a proxy 
for firm size)  
4) TANG/TA = property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets 
ratio (used as a proxy for the relative tangibility of firm assets) 
5) RATINGL1 = first lag of S&P’s long-term domestic issuer credit rating (a 
proxy for the probability of default of a firm) 
6) MEDLEV = industry median leverage (a proxy for the industry effects) 
7) INFL = inflation rate (a proxy for the macroeconomic conditions) 
8) BOND = public plus private bond market capitalization over GDP (a 
proxy for the importance of a country’s credit market) 
9) FINARCH = country financial architecture: the larger value, the more 
MB-oriented is financial system (an annually measured 
additional and alternative proxy for the degree of financial 
systems’ market orientation) 
10) MBDUM = dummy variable equals one when company operates in a market 
capital oriented environment and zero otherwise (a traditional, 
time-invariant proxy for a country’s market orientation) 
11) DEVDUM = dummy variable equal to one when an entity resides in an 
advanced country and zero otherwise (a proxy for the level of 
economic development) 
Term (  ) stands for time-invariant unobserved firm fixed effects (reputation or 
management performance) which influence firms’ capital structure. Term       
represents the time-specific shocks which can fluctuate over time and affect all the 
firms in one or more countries (e.g., demand shocks). The error term       has a 
mean equal to zero, constant variance σ2, and does not suffer from serial correlation. 
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After plugging in all the determinants listed above, equation (1) gives the base model 
used in Tables 3 to 8. 
 
3.4.2 The Dynamic Model 
 
The traditional dynamic approach used in the literature on capital structure tests 
for a presence of an optimal debt-equity ratio, and how fast firms rebalance towards 
it. The annual changes between years t and t-1 in leverage ratios of company i 
(           -               ) partly absorb the gap between its lagged leverage in 
year t-1 (              ) and the optimal leverage of the firm i in year t 
(          *). Assuming that this optimal gearing ratio is also a function of k 
determinants from equation (1), then: 
 
          * =   
  
   kXkit + ωit      (2) 
 
Where ( ks) are coefficient estimates which are the same for all companies, (X) 
is a vector of k-determinants (like in the first equation) and (ωit) is a serially 
correlated error term suspected of heteroskedasticity, and with a mean equal to zero. 
Whenever the adjustment costs of rebalancing towards the optimal level of leverage 
outweigh the cost of being outside of the aforementioned optimum, the managers 
will allow their firm’s leverage to divert temporarily from it. Due to the costs related 
to the adjustment process (e.g., transaction costs), companies are restricted from 
making too frequent adjustments towards their target debt ratios. Leary and Roberts 
(2005) estimate that firms rebalance their gearing roughly once a year by either 
issuing or repurchasing securities (debt and/or equity). Equation (3) presented below 
shows how firms adjust towards their desired debt levels. 
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           -                = α (          * -               )  (3) 
 
Where again the degree of adjustment coefficient (α) takes any value between 
zero and one and represents the transaction costs obstructing the full adjustment 
towards the firm’s optimal leverage (          *). There is an inverse relation 
between the coefficient (α) and the adjustment costs. If (α) equals one (no transaction 
costs), firm’s current debt ratio and its target ratio are equal:             = 
          *). If (α) equals zero, no adjustment occurs. This may be the case when 
the costs of adjustment are too high, or staying of the target level of gearing carries 
lower costs than adjusting towards it. Equation (3) after simple rearrangements of 
terms can be rewritten as equation (4) below. 
 
          = α          * + (1 – α)                    (4) 
 
Substituting equation (2) into (4), I get: 
 
           = (1 – α)               +    
  
   kXkit + αωit    (5) 
Where (α) measures how fast firms adjust towards their desired debt ratios. 
Moreover, equation (5) assumes that (α) is less than one but greater than zero 
(Antoniou et al., 2008) and that all companies eventually converge their current 
gearing ratios to their desired optimal levels. Simply replacing vector (X) with all 11 
independent variables listed in section 3.4.1, taking notice of the panel nature of 
regression estimates and time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects (  ) 
explained in equation (1), I obtain: 
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           =   0 + (1 – α)               +   1EBIT/TAit +   2MTBit  
 +   3SIZEit  +   4TANG/TAit +   5RATINGL1i(t-1)   
 +   6MEDLEVjt +   7INFLmt  +   8BONDmt    
 +   9FINARCHmt +   10MBDUMm +   11DEVDUMm  
 +         m +    
    
      t + α   + αωit     (6) 
 
Where in addition to firm-, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables, I 
also incorporate the set of country-dummy variables         m (González and 
González, 2008; Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012). These dummies capture legal, 
financial and economic differences between economies. In addition,              t is 
a set of 19 time-dummy variables used in line with the prior literature and capturing 
unobservable time-specific shocks (represented by the term      in equation (1)) 
which affect all the firms and fluctuate over time.  
 
3.5 Methods of Estimation 
 
3.5.1 Unsolved Endogeneity Problem Using The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and The Within Groups (Fixed Effects) 
 
In a relation between CRs and an entity’s capital structure, two sources of 
endogeneity take place: unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity. The former 
phenomenon occurs when some unobservable factors cause a change in both the 
dependent and independent variables. The simultaneity arises when the explanatory 
variable is affected by the dependent variable or its lags. It can be easily argued that 
some unobservable determinants (company’s reputation or management 
performance) affect both a company’s capital structure and a CR issued by a CRA 
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(Kisgen, 2009). If these changes have the same (different) direction for both the CR 
and a debt ratio, the OLS finds a positive (negative) relationship between them.  
Moreover, when CRAs assess firms’ creditworthiness, they pay attention to the 
firm’s current and past levels of debt. Since the CR can be seen as a proxy for a 
default probability therefore the higher the company’s leverage, the higher the 
default probability and a possibility of a lower CR. On the other hand, it is obvious 
that as the CR improves, the firm’s costs of debt financing are lower, and thus the 
managers of that entity could borrow cheaper and increase its leverage in the future, 
which in turn could cause a CR downgrade. This suggests a simultaneity problem 
and therefore the Within Groups technique would yield biased, possibly even 
spurious and yet statistically significant results (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
One approach used to reduce the possibility of the aforementioned endogeneity 
between a firm’s CR and its gearing ratio is to use the first lag of the CR. This 
method is widely used in the finance literature (whenever there is a thread of 
endogeneity between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables) 
and seems particularly crucial to follow it when dealing with the relation between 
credit rating and capital structure (e.g., Kisgen, 2009). For this reason in all 
regression analyses presented in this study I use the CR lagged one year (RATINGL1) 
as compared with the remaining variables. However, using this approach does not 
guarantee that the endogeneity problem will be solved. 
 
3.5.2 Biased Speed of Adjustment (SOA) Using The Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and The Within Groups (Fixed Effects) 
 
In addition to the described endogeneity problem, it has been empirically 
proven that in case of firms’ capital structure, estimation results for the SOA 
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obtained from either the OLS or the Within Groups
48
modeling are highly biased 
(both methodologies) and inconsistent (in case of the Within Groups the results 
become consistent as sample period approaches infinity (Lemmon et al., 2008)). In 
the OLS procedure unobserved heterogeneity occurs (see the previous section), 
resulting in biased coefficients because firm fixed unobserved effects (  ) used in 
equations (1) and (6) are omitted and correlated with explanatory regressors. In 
addition, since the dependent variable            is a function of the fixed effects 
(  ), therefore, the inconsistent estimates of the coefficients are an outcome of the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable (              ) and the fixed 
effects (  ). As a result, the lagged leverage’s coefficient is inflated in the OLS 
dynamic models. Since a firm’s SOA is obtained by subtracting the coefficient on 
lagged leverage ratio from one, thus, the SOA from the OLS model is 
downward-biased (deflated). 
It has been shown that on the one hand, using the Within Groups estimation 
technique eliminates the aforementioned unobserved heterogeneity from the model. 
On the other hand, the model would still suffer from a correlation between the 
transformed lagged leverage and the transformed error term
49
. Consequently, the 
lagged leverage’s coefficient is deflated and a firm’s SOA inflated when using the 
Within Groups method. The bias however decline with panel length
50
 (hence it is 
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 The Within Groups is simply the OLS model using the deviations of each dependent observation 
from its time average regressed on the deviations of all the independent variables from their 
respective within-group means (for each firms separately). This method is equivalent to the Least 
Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) which creates a dummy variable for each cross-section unit (firm) 
to proxy for the time invariant unobserved firm fixed effects. 
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 Where the transformed lagged leverage is (              ) - (            ) and transformed 
error term is     -   . Since the average error term    includes        , the mentioned correlation 
arises. 
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 In their paper, Huang and Ritter (2009) investigated a time period from 1963 to 2001 (twice as 
long as in my thesis) and the Within Groups coefficient estimates for the lagged leverage were still 
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called the short panel bias). Huang and Ritter (2009) document biased coefficients 
for lagged debt ratios and a huge discrepancy between the two aforementioned 
approaches (inflated coefficient equal to 0.844 using the OLS and deflated 
coefficient equal to 0.262 using the Within Groups technique). 
 
3.5.3 The Difference Generalized Method of Moments  
 
One estimation technique that is able to handle problematic unobserved 
heterogeneity (OLS), simultaneity (OLS and Within Groups), and the short panel 
bias (Within Groups) outlined in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 is the Difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Wintoki et al. (2012) assert that the GMM procedure successfully accounts for the 
dynamic nature of dependent variable, while accounting for any potential sources of 
endogeneity. In the first-differencing approach, one takes a generic dynamic 
equation (5) for companies’ capital structure and rewrites it in the first-differenced 
(hereafter transformed) form such that: 
 
            = (1 – α)                +    
  
   k Xkit + α ωit   (7)  
 
Where  s represent first differences of respective terms. This transformed 
equation handles the unobserved heterogeneity by simply eliminating firm fixed 
effects (  ). However, the differenced lagged dependent variable                 
is still correlated with the differenced error term  ωit
51
. Thus, just like in case of the 
Within Groups model, the estimated SOA is inflated and the bias decline with panel 
                                                                                                                                                      
biased downward. 
51
 Due to the correlation between ωi(t-1) and               . 
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length (short panel bias). A traditional instrumental variables (IV) approach could be 
a remedy, provided that a set of reliable instruments could be identified (which in 
practice is often unachievable). 
As a solution to this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the Difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique to obtain valid instruments 
(IVs). In their approach, after first-differencing equation (5) into transformed 
equation (7), they show that under the assumption of no second-order serial 
correlation in residuals ωit, the moment (orthogonal) conditions exist between the 
 ωit and the dependent/independent variables lagged two or more periods. Thus, the 
lagged values of regressors are valid instrumental variables (IVs) for their first 
differences from equation (7) (Huang and Ritter, 2009). 
However, the Difference GMM technique suffers from four major shortcomings. 
First, as Beck et al. (2000) point out: if the true theoretical model is in levels, a 
differencing could diminish “the signal to noise ratio” and lessen the reliability of 
the tests. Second, the lags of explanatory variables could be weak IVs of the 
first-differenced variables, especially if they are serially correlated (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond et al., 2001)
52
. Third, the influence of 
measurement errors on the explained variable could be aggravated (Griliches and 
Hausman, 1986). Fourth, it suffers from a significant sample bias when the 
autoregressive lagged leverage parameter is highly persistent i.e. close to one (which 
is exactly the case of the capital structure dynamic modeling (e.g., Antoniou et al., 
2008)).  
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 One potential signal of such weak instruments can be spotted when the autoregressive parameter α 
is near to or even less than the one obtained from the Within Groups estimation. 
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3.5.4 The System Generalized Method of Moments 
 
Previous research suggests that the system GMM procedure developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) can deal with the 
unobserved heterogeneity (OLS), simultaneity (OLS and Within Groups), the short 
panel bias (Within Groups), as well as the above-mentioned problems arising when 
the Difference GMM technique is applied (see section 3.5.3). The System GMM 
includes both equations (5) and (7). In addition to the lagged values of variables used 
as instruments for their first differences from transformed equation (7), the System 
GMM utilizes the lagged first differences as instrumental variables (IVs) for the 
regressors from a non-transformed/levels equation (5). Therefore, we have a system 
of two equations: the transformed (7) and the levels (5).  
In my thesis I use a Two-Step System GMM procedure
53
 with orthogonal 
deviations, since first-differencing magnifies gaps which in turn lead to a loss of 
observations in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2006, 2008). Among others, Antoniou 
et al. (2008) state that “in most cases the two-step GMM-SYS estimates are more 
efficient than the one-step estimators” (p.71). The same estimation technique 
(Two-Step System GMM) is found to be the most appropriate when dealing with the 
dynamic capital structure (where the estimated lagged coefficient of leverage is 
known to be highly persistent) of firms and data obtained from the Compustat 
database
54
 (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). In their empirical paper, the authors 
compare among seven most popular applied methodologies according to the recent 
literature.
55
 According to their thorough comparative examinations, each of the 
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 Specifically, I use the program “xtabond2” written by David Roodman for STATA users. 
54
 In my thesis I also use the Compustat database to obtain firm- and industry-specific determinants. 
55
 The seven techniques are listed by the authors as follow: OLS, Fixed Effects, Difference GMM, 
System GMM, two different ways of Long Differencing, and Corrected Least-Squares. 
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methodologies has some shortcomings, however the Corrected Least Squares 
Dependent Variable (LSDVC) and Two-Step System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 
1998) appear to be the most accurate when dealing with the censored and clustered 
data. The main drawback of the former one is an assumption of exogenous regressors 
and the latter one is a second order correlation
56
. Because a CR is a variable of the 
main interest in my paper and due to its intrinsic endogeneity the LSDVC method is 
less appropriate to use. Therefore, the best choice seems to be the Two-Step System 
GMM. Flannery and Hankins (2013) come to a similar conclusion and state that for 
unbalanced panels, Two-Step System GMM by Blundell and Bond (1998) “remains 
the best option for higher levels of endogeneity if the lagged dependent variable is of 
interest.” (p.13). One more aspect worth mentioning is related to the statistical power 
of coefficient estimates. Namely, while using the Two-Step System GMM (and a 
One-Step System alike) the t-values for estimated regressors are particularly 
sensitive to the number of firms, observations and the length of sample analysed i.e., 
the shorter is the length of a sample and the less observations are in it, the smaller the 
t-statistics. In addition, the Two-Step System GMM methodology tends to report 
downward-biased standard errors
57
. To alleviate this drawback I apply the 
Windmeijer’s (2005) small-sample corrected standard errors. 
The author of STATA program “xtabond2” Roodman (2006, 2008) argues 
elegantly that the GMM methodology has a tendency to proliferate the number of 
instrumental variables (IVs). The instruments count is quadratic with regards to time 
dimension (T). Furthermore, Roodman (2008) points out that if there are too many 
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 Flannery and Hankins (2013) argue however, that even in the presence of a second order serial 
correlation the estimates from Two-Step System GMM are still consistent and perform much better 
than OLS or FE. In addition, this methodology produces coefficients that are least affected by panel 
imbalances (especially important in case of the lagged leverage. The coefficients for the lag of a 
dependent variable (gearing ratio) are almost identical for time periods of 30, 12, and 6 years. 
57
 This problem is especially severe in case of relatively small samples. 
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IVs, invalid results appear to be valid i.e. false positive results. In other words, a 
large number of instruments would overfit the instrumented regressors and bias their 
estimated coefficients e.g., Tauchen (1986), Windmeijer (2005), and Ziliak (1997). In 
addition, a Hansen J-test of over-identification also known as the test for instruments 
validity (Hansen, 1982) used in Two-Step System GMM models would be weakened, 
yielding implausibly high p-values equal to one. This kind of problem has been 
documented in Andersen and Sørensen (1996) and Bowsher (2002).  
Thus, while using the GMM procedure a rule of thumb to follow is to keep the 
number of IVs below the number of firms
58
 (Roodman, 2006, 2008). The prior 
research applies two techniques to control for the instruments proliferation. The first 
way, which is the one more commonly applied, uses employment of a “certain” 
limited number of lags
59
. Second way, is the application of collapsing instruments as 
explained by Roodman (2008) who argues that “collapsed instruments are 
straightforward conceptually: one is made for each lag distance, with 0 substituted 
for any missing values” (p.17). This simple trick makes the instruments count linear 
in regards to time (T), dramatically reducing the number of instruments (e.g., Beck 
and Levine, 2004). Moreover, he advocates a simultaneous use of both techniques 
when necessary. Hence, in order to achieve this goal and in line with Roodman’s 
remedy, throughout my study a minimum feasible number of lags (from 2 to 6 
depending on the size of samples) and when necessary also collapsed instruments are 
used in order to keep the number of instruments below the number of firms in the 
sample. 
Throughout this thesis, when applying the Two-Step System GMM estimation 
technique, I control for the potential endogeneity of all four firm-specific 
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 In my thesis I conform to this rule rigorously. 
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 This number is always kept below the maximum number of lags and varies depending on the time 
dimension and number of firms in the samples. 
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determinants (EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, and TANG/TA), as well as the firms’ CRs60. In a 
similar vein, to deal with a potential endogeneity of interaction terms and MEDLEV 
variable I employ their second and further lags as instruments. Following previous 
studies (González and González, 2008), I treat all macroeconomic variables as 
exogenous. 
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 Also all of the CR-related interaction variables (RATINGL1*MBDUM, RATINGL1*FINARCH, 
RATINGL1*DEVDUM, RATINGL1*BOND, RATINGL1*LAGLEV, RATINGL1*US, 
RATINGL1*JAPAN, and RATINGL1*REFORM) in Table 5 are treated as endogeneous. 
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Chapter 4. Discussion of the Results 
 
This chapter discusses the descriptive statistics, determinants of firms’ leverage 
ratios, estimation results of the OLS, Within Groups, and the Two-Step System 
GMM models. 
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
In Table 1, I investigate the disparities between leverage ratios and firm-specific 
characteristics (all winsorised at first and ninety-ninth percentile)
61
, industry-specific 
factors, and macroeconomic variables in samples with different financial systems and 
level of economic development. In general, most of the variables used in my study 
differ statistically in terms of their average and median values across market-based 
oriented (MB) and bank-based oriented (BB) countries, as well as across advanced 
and developing economies. This lends support to the claim that the financial systems 
and economic environments in which firms exist, has a large impact on their major 
characteristics (e.g., profitability, growth opportunities, size, and relative tangible 
assets). 
Panel A shows that two out of four measures of companies leverage ratios are 
significantly lower for firms operating in MB countries, one significantly higher and 
one roughly the same as in BB countries. Such mixed results are not surprising in 
light of the relevant studies. The traditional view of firms based in a BB 
environment being more geared (Antoniou et al., 2008; Borio, 1990) clashes with a 
number of papers providing evidence for the opposite phenomenon (e.g. Rajan and 
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Zingales, 1995; Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). One explanation might stem from 
excessive costs of bank debt (Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). The other 
reasoning is highlighted by Rajan and Zingales (1995) who point out that in BB 
economies, the banking industry “provide both debt and equity finance to firms so 
the greater availability of financing does not reflect in the leverage ratio.” (p.1448). 
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000) argue that consistently higher gearing ratios 
observed in MB countries might be an outcome of the banking system’s inability to 
provide enough credit to firms in BB economies. Finally, since in MB countries 
capital markets tend to be more developed, thus, not only stock but also bond 
markets alike are responsible for greater share of firms’ financing while the latter 
kind of funds representing debt in a capital structure of companies. Figures 1 (2) 
show annual plot of means of the MLEV (BLEV) dependent variable and their 
corresponding logarithmic trends over time. In general, looking at Figures 1 and 2, I 
conclude that both samples (MB and BB) display an increasing trend in gearing 
ratios over the years. 
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 
In line with recent studies (Fan et al., 2012) Panel B indicates that firms 
operating in developing markets display higher debt-to-equity ratios (and a 
decreasing trend over the years) than their counterparts from advanced economies 
which exhibit fairly stable leverage ratios over the time-period of investigation. In 
addition, the difference between the long-term debt ratios (MLEV and BLEV) and 
total debt ratios (MLEVT and BLEVT) is more pronounced in developing sample, 
similar to Booth et al. (2001). 
Panel C shows a comparison between the U.S. and Japan. It is clear, that in 
63 
 
three cases (except for MLEVT) gearing ratios of companies based in the U.S. are 
significantly higher. These results are surprising only from the above-mentioned 
traditional view that firms based in a BB environment are more highly geared. 
However, some recent studies report roughly equal leverage ratios for American and 
Japanese firms (Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012) or even substantially lower for 
Japanese companies (de Jong et al., 2008; Nguyen and Shekhar, 2007).  
Moreover, line charts of debt ratios’ annual mean values (Figures 1 and 2) 
indicate an increasing (decreasing) trend for American (Japanese) sample of firms. 
Borio (1990) documents a similar phenomenon and argues that unlike other 
economies
62
 “US companies have retired substantial amounts of equity, substituting 
them with debt.” (p.4). Nishioka and Baba (2004) point out that since late 1990s 
Japanese companies have been reducing their debt ratios in order to regain their 
creditworthiness and/or due to lack of investment opportunities. 
Figure 3 presents comparison of average FINARCH values for different samples 
between two periods: 1991-2000 and 2001-2010. Additionally, Figures 4 and 5 show 
yearly plots of average and median FINARCH values for different samples. Looking 
at those Figures, I can conclude that falling leverage ratios in the Japanese market 
can be associated with a relatively faster rise in values of the FINARCH variable 
(according to Figures 3 through 5). In 2003, the degree of MB orientation of 
Japanese financial system (measured as the relative size, efficiency and activity of 
stock markets vis-à-vis country’s banking system) caught up with that of the U.S.63  
In general, leverage ratios in all samples demonstrate the same feature with 
respect to their fluctuations over time, namely the debt ratios (book and market alike) 
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 His study examines the firms’ leverage levels from G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.).  
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 However, it remains an empirical question to what degree this was caused by the development of 
stock markets and to what it was an outcome of diminishing role of Japanese Keiretsus.  
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tend to increase during crises and drop during economic prosperity periods
64
 (Booth 
et al., 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
 
[Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 here] 
 
In case of the credit ratings (CRs), the MB oriented sample of firms enjoys 
ratings higher by approximately 0.6 and one notch (in terms of both mean and 
median values respectively) than the firms from BB oriented countries. Moreover, 
the comparison of standard deviations indicates greater variation in credit ratings 
issued for companies operating in BB environment. 
As expected, CRs are fewer and have lower grades in the developing countries 
as compared with their advanced peers (with the difference of roughly 3.5 and four 
notches for means and medians). Moreover, despite the maximum CR assigned in 
developing sample being 5 notches lower, the standard deviation of CRs in this 
sample (3.185) is still higher than that of advanced sample (3.074). This evidence 
suggests considerably greater variability of CRs in developing economies as 
highlighted in the development of Hypothesis 2. 
In case of Panel C of Table 1, the Japanese sample presents an average and 
median CRs two notches better than in the U.S. 
 
[Insert Table 1: Panels A, B, and C here] 
 
Correlation analysis indicates to a negative and statistically significant 
association between CRs and firms’ debt ratios in all samples (not reported but 
available on request). These correlations are significant at one percent level in all 
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samples, have the largest absolute values in the U.S. sample and the smallest in 
Japanese followed by developing sample.  
Table 2 presents mean values of dependent variables (MLEV, MLEVT, BLEV, 
and BLEVT) and their firm-specific determinants by different credit ratings. 
Corresponding Figures 6 to 9 show plots of dependent variables’ means by different 
credit ratings. Concluding, from the average values of debt-to-equity ratios and their 
plots, it is clear that in general, the least leveraged firms are those with the highest 
CRs. Moreover, for all of the Table 2’s Panels, as the companies’ rating increases, so 
do firms’ profitability, its growth opportunities, size and relative tangible assets. 
 
[Insert Table 2: Panels A to F and Figures 6 to 9 here] 
 
Figure 10 presents a yearly plot of mean values for firms’ CRs in all of the 
analyzed samples. When CRAs assess firms’ creditworthiness, they pay close 
attention to firm indebtedness. In other words, the higher the company’s leverage, 
the higher the default probability and a possibility of a lower CR. Therefore, the 
rising average gearing ratios in the MB, BB, advanced and American samples (see 
Figures 1 and 2) correspond to decreasing means of CRs for those four samples over 
time (see Figure 10). Likewise, falling average gearing ratios in the developing and 
Japanese samples
65
 correspond to increasing average CRs for those samples
66
 as 
exhibited in Figure 10. 
 
[Insert Figure 10 here] 
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 Even in the developing and Japanese samples, the average CRs were falling during 1991 to 1999 
period. 
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4.2 The Determinants of the Firm Leverage Ratio 
 
In order to investigate the relations between the independent variables and firm 
capital structure, in particular to test for Hypotheses 1 and 2, I run a set of 
regressions using three different methodologies: OLS, Within Groups, and Two-Step 
System GMM. The last one, is used in accordance with the most relevant and recent 
studies (Antoniou et al., 2008; Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Ö ztekin and Flannery, 
2012) and in order to eliminate problems stemming from the endogeneity and 
dynamic (autoregressive) nature of a firm’s gearing policy67 leading to unreliable 
and biased results
68
. OLS and Within Groups (Fixed Effect methodology) are 
conducted for two reasons. First, they provide me with a simple and reliable 
(although only approximate) indication whether the SOAs obtained in the GMM 
estimation process are correct. Second, it is a common procedure and a form of 
robustness check. In my thesis, I rely on a System GMM estimation technique. 
In each of the Table 3 Panels (A, B, and C), I present seven columns of 
estimation coefficients and their corresponding t-values. Companies from all 
countries are pooled in column 1. Firms from market-oriented (MB) and 
bank-oriented (BB) countries are presented in columns 2 and 3 respectively. 
Columns 4 and 5 represent the regression results for firms operating in advanced and 
developing economies, and columns 6 and 7 correspond to the U.S. and Japanese 
samples of firms.  
When Two-Step System GMM procedure is applied in Panel C, LAGLEV 
coefficients are in between OLS and Within Groups (being closer to those from Panel 
A) i.e., which is where they should be as pointed out in the relevant studies (Bond et 
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 For a comprehensive review of problems with dynamic modeling associated with different 
methods of estimation see Flannery and Hankins (2013). 
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 The endogeneity problem and its proposed solutions are briefly discussed in section 3.5.1. 
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al., 2001; Roodman, 2006). Moreover, in Panel C the m1, m2, and the Hansen tests
69
 
indicate that Two-Step System GMM specification is correctly specified for each of 
the samples. This is achieved by strictly following Roodman (2008), who points out 
that if there are too many IVs, false results seem valid while using the GMM 
procedure, and the rule of thumb to follow is to keep the number of instruments 
below (or within a close range) that of firms in the sample. This in turn is achieved 
by using an appropriate number of lags (from 2 to 6) and “collapsed instruments” 
when necessary (in case of the developing sample). Thus, in the following analyses I 
rely on the System GMM estimation technique. 
Panel C indicates positive and statistically significant (at the highest level) 
coefficients for LAGLEV
70
 regardless of country’s financial orientation and 
economic development. Such a positive effect is consistent with results of e.g., 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) and González and González (2008). The coefficients on 
LAGLEV are between zero and one which according to Antoniou et al. (2008) 
implies that: 
The estimates are stable and the leverage ratio converges to its desired level 
over time. This confirms the existence of dynamism in the capital structure 
decision in the sense that firms adjust their leverage ratios to achieve their 
target. (p.82). 
In addition, the degree of explanatory power of the estimated models falls 
dramatically after exclusion of the LAGLEV variable from the analysis
71
. All 
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 The tests for the first (m1) and second (m2) order correlations test the null hypotheses of no first 
or second order serial correlation of in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. The Hansen test of 
over-identification tests the null hypothesis of the validity of instrumental variables used in the 
model. 
70
 In accordance with the recent trend in existing research, the results presented are based on 
long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). All estimates were also 
conducted using three alternative proxies for firms’ leverage ratios (not reported but available on 
request). Any significant discrepancies than occur in the results are discussed. 
71
 The estimated results based on the static models of the capital structure are not presented but 
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columns in Panel C, display results confirming the applicability of capital structure 
partial adjustment models and broadly consistent with the prior literature (Antoniou 
et al., 2008; Ö ztekin, 2011). The coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio (LAGLEV) 
in columns (1, 2, and 4) indicate roughly equal and rapid SOAs. For example, the 
coefficient from column 2 (0.6402) implies that on average rated non-financial firms 
based in the MB countries close 36 percent (=1- 0.6402) of the gap between their 
actual and target gearing within one year. At this speed it takes only about 18 
months
72
 to close half the gap between companies’ current and target levels of debt. 
Likewise, firms based in the BB countries converge towards their desired leverage 
level by 32 percent a year. This suggests that rated firms in BB countries adjust at a 
slower speed towards their optimal capital structures than their peers from MB 
countries (Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012). This evidence suggests that firms in the MB 
environment is characterized by lower costs of adjustment or larger benefits of 
convergence towards the optimum gearing ratio (or both) than firms in the BB 
financial orientation. In a similar vein, Japanese firms adjust at more sluggish pace as 
compared with their American counterparts. Antoniou et al. (2008) document similar 
divergence in the SOAs and argue that because of the stronger ties and close 
long-term relation between companies and creditors (banks) in BB economies, the 
costs of being away from optimum capital structure are lower than the costs of 
adjustment
73
. Therefore, firms can adjust slowly towards desired level of debt ratio. 
Moreover, unlike their peers from market-oriented countries (the U.K. or the U.S.), 
in bank-oriented countries (Germany or Japan) firms depend less on the signaling 
                                                                                                                                                      
available on request. 
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 This calculation is simply ln(0.5)/ln(1- 0.3598) (e.g., Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012). 
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 Among others, the agency costs associated with being off the desired level of leverage ratio are 
expected to be lower in BB countries. 
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mechanism of debt to manifest their quality to a big group of investors in equity or 
bond markets. 
 Furthermore, Panel C exhibits the fastest speed of adjustment (in order to 
calculate a firm’s SOA, I subtract the value of the coefficient on LAGLEV from one) 
for companies based in developing economies (Mexico, India, Indonesia, Russia, 
and Thailand). These companies, on average, approach their desired debt ratios by 
48 percent within one year and it only takes just over a year to close half of the 
distance separating their actual and target leverage ratios. Similar to Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) and González and González (2008), my estimates suggest that in all 
samples, especially in developing economies, the target market debt ratios are of 
pivotal importance for companies, therefore, the POT and the market timing are not 
the dominant factors. 
As for the disparities in the SOAs between samples, they might be explained by 
various costs and benefits of the adjustment process stemming from a different 
source of financing in MB, BB, and developing countries. There is evidence 
showing that in MB economies, capital markets are more developed, thus, firms 
when in need of financing raise funds by issuing bonds (public debt) or equity. As 
pointed out in the development of Hypotheses 1 and 2, in BB but also developing 
countries, firms are much more inclined (or have no other choice) but to finance 
their investments with private debt (bank lending). Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
argue that since bonds traditionally have few covenants, the pressure for firms using 
bonds to converge towards their targets is smaller than those imposed by banks on 
their borrowers (via a number of tight covenants).  
My results from the developing sample indicate that firms from these countries 
adjust towards their target capital structure at a faster speed (roughly 48 percent 
annually) than firms operating in advanced countries (about 36 percent annually). 
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Such a rapid SOAs in developing economies are in line with the those reported by  
González and González (2008), who document very fast SOAs (approximately 50 
percent and above). However my estimates of SOAs are much higher than those 
documented by Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012) who estimate 30 to 22 percent of 
annual convergence towards target gearing ratios for companies based in developing 
countries
74
.  
One issue worth mentioning with regards to SOAs is the fact that using three 
alternative dependent variables (MLEVT, BLEV, and BLEVT) as proxies for firms 
leverage ratios, all the main results remains broadly unchanged, but in all samples, 
the adjustment speeds are faster using MLEV than BLEV (a similar trend is observed 
in Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012), or when using MLEVT rather than BLEVT (same 
regularity documented in González and González, 2008). Thus the slowest SOAs are 
reported in models of BLEVT (total leverage to the book value of total assets ratio) 
and the fastest in models of MLEV. 
Additional support for the applicability of a partial adjustment models and the 
importance of target debt ratios on firms’ capital structure policies is presented in 
Appendix I. In it I summarize the annual percentage SOA estimates for gearing 
ratios (proxied by MLEV variable) of firms based in 17 countries using One-Step 
System GMM technique separately for each country (in the case of U.S. and 
Japanese firms I present the results from Two-Step System GMM as in Panel C of 
Table 3). I apply a One-Step System GMM due to a small samples size, in which 
case the two-step option should be avoided (Hayashi, 2000; Roodman, 2008
75
). 
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 The difference in the SOAs for developing countries between my thesis and Ö ztekin and 
Flannery’s (2012) estimates may stem from the different samples used (e.g., time-period, countries, 
number of observations and firms, as well as the fact that I restrict my sample to only rated 
companies). 
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 For a more detailed interpretation, Roodman (2008) explains that:  
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Moreover, in order to minimize the number of instruments I only use 2 to 3 
“collapsed” lags of independent variables as instruments. The estimated SOAs are 
positive in all samples and statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent level in 15 
countries.  
 
[Insert Appendix I here] 
 
The estimated relation between EBIT/TA and market leverage ratio is negative 
for all estimations on Table 3 and statistically significant in five columns. In 
columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 (for the U.S. and Japanese sample regressions) the 
coefficients on EBIT/TA are (-0.1691 and -0.2513), respectively. Given the sample 
average values of EBIT/TA (0.091 and 0.053) and MLEV (0.215 and 0.174), a 10 
percent rise in profitability ratio of American (Japanese) firm brings about a similar 
decrease in its debt-to-equity ratio i.e. 0.72 (0.74) percent, ceteris paribus
76
. This 
inverse relation is consistent with the POT and similar to the results obtained by 
González and González (2008) indicating that firms prefer their internal funds to 
debt financing and equity (more expensive external sources of funding). Basically, 
according to the POT higher profitability of a company, leads to more internal 
resources available for funding new investments (subject to dividends). 
                                                                                                                                                      
The two-step variants use a weighting matrix that is the inverse of an estimate, S, of Var[z' ε], 
where z is the instrument vector. This ‘optimal’ weighting matrix makes two-step GMM 
asymptotically efficient. However, the number of elements to be estimated in S is quadratic in the 
number of instruments, which in the present context can mean quartic in T. Moreover, the 
elements of the optimal matrix, as second moments of the vector of moments between instruments 
and errors, are fourth moments of the underlying distributions, which can be hard to estimate in 
small samples.(p.8). 
76
  This calculation is simply 0.091*0.1*(-0.1691)/0.215 and 0.053*0.1*(-0.2513)/0.174 for the U.S. 
and Japanese samples, respectively (following Firth et al. (2012) and Guariglia (2008)). 
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Coefficients for MTB are significant and negative
77
 for columns 1, 2, 4, and 6, 
which is consistent with the TOT, as well as de Jong et al. (2008), Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), and Rajan and Zingales (1995). Basically, the costs of financial 
distress and the agency costs of gearing are larger for fast growing companies. 
Consequently, investors ask for a higher rate of return which is parallel to a higher 
cost of debt financing for firms (Antoniou et al., 2008). For columns 3, 5, and 7 
coefficients are not statistically significant. 
In case of the SIZE and TANG/TA variables, the coefficients have mixed signs 
and lack of statistical significance. In addition, the estimation results exhibit positive 
and very significant coefficients on MEDLEV variable, which controls for industry 
effects
78
. This is consistent with prior studies (Byoun, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2004) 
and supports Frank and Goyal’s (2009) argument of its unique importance possibly 
being a proxy for a number of factors. Negative and statistically significant 
coefficients on BOND in the MB and American samples are puzzling
79
. 
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 When Book leverage ratios (BLEV and BLEVT) are used as the dependent variable, the 
coefficients on MTB either lose their significance (columns 1, 2, 4, and 6) or switch their signs and 
remain statistically insignificant (column 7). This evidence indicates that an inverse relation between 
a proxy for firms’ growth and its market gearing ratios is mechanical (regardless of the TOT). The 
market value of a firm’s equity appears simultaneously in the numerator of MTB regressor and in the 
denominator of the dependent variable (MLEV or MLEVT). Thus, as market value of equity rises, so 
does the MTB variable, whereas the firm’s market leverage ratio falls. 
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 Except for the BB and Japanese samples. 
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 In case of the U.S. sample, during the first decade (1991-2000) the ratio of public (private) bond 
markets to the GDP was falling (growing). The BOND variable is composed of the market 
capitalization of public bond market (all bonds issued by government), as well as private bond market 
(all bonds issued by financial institutions, and non-financial firms) as a share of the GDP. As a 
robustness check I ran a regression replacing BOND variable with BONDPRIV variable which 
includes only a private bond market. The coefficient on BONDPRIV changed to positive and 
remained statistically significant, while all other estimates were unchanged. 
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4.3 Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
The main object of interest in this thesis is the relation between firm credit 
rating (CR) and leverage ratio, in other words, the coefficients for RATINGL1 
variable. From Panel C of Table 3, I can conclude that the results for this 
determinant are robust
80
 and confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2. There is a negative and 
statistically significant relation between CRs and firms’ debt-equity ratio for the 
overall, MB, advanced, and the U.S. panels
81
. For the U.S. sample the coefficient on 
RATINGL1 is -0.0037. This means that a CR upgrade (or downgrade) by 4 notches 
(e.g., from A to AA+ or vice versa) in year t would lead to a 1.48 percent drop (or 
increase) of company’s debt-to-equity ratio in year t+1, all else equal. This evidence 
is consistent with negative and significant correlations between CRs and debt ratios 
described in the previous section. Negative and statistically significant coefficients 
on the RATINGL1 variable inform that on the one hand, higher CRs make firms 
more transparent in the eyes of investors. This in turn leads to lower information 
asymmetry and adverse selection problem (two major factors standing behind the 
formulation of the POT), thereby decreasing the cost of equity financing (e.g., Liu 
and Malatesta, 2007). Frank and Goyal (2009) conclude that in line with the pecking 
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 I also conduct a large number of regression analyses: exclusion of regulated industries, zero-debt 
observations, alternative measures of TANG/TA, SIZE, and firm leverage ratios (3 more alternative 
measures applied: MLEVT, BLEV, and BLEVT). Moreover, I used the CRs from the same period as 
the leverage, as well as the First-Difference GMM and the One-Step System GMM methodologies 
with different number of lags for instrumental variables, without orthogonal differencing, and with 
collapsed instruments. In most of the cases the results were robust and indicate an inverse and 
statistically significant relation between the firms’ gearing ratios and their credit ratings for MB, 
advanced and the U.S. panels of companies as in Panel C. 
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 Only when BLEVT is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient on RATINGL1 is positive but 
statistically insignificant. Similar evidence was reported by Frank and Goyal (2009) who observe a 
significant and positive (negative) impact on the total debt to book (market) assets ratios if a firm has 
a debt with an investment-grade rating. 
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order theory (POT):  
(…) possessing a credit rating involves a process of information revelation by 
the rating agency. Thus, firms with higher ratings have less of an adverse 
selection problem. Accordingly, firms with such ratings should use less debt and 
more equity. (p.10). 
On the other hand, companies with high CRs are usually those with large 
internal funds (Byoun, 2011) and in line with the POT they use excess cash to pay 
back existing debt rather than repurchase their equity (Myers, 2003). Furthermore, 
the negative relation between CRs and the firms’ capital structure might stem from 
the fact that despite potentially easier access to cheap debt, highly rated companies 
do not issue it in order not to be downgraded
82
. 
In addition, my estimates are broadly in line with the financial flexibility 
hypothesis (FFH) formulated by Byoun (2011). He finds that due to the different 
stage of development and financial constraints, there is a negative relationship 
between the CRs and gearing ratios (the better the CRs, the lower the debt ratio). A 
similar relation was found by Leary and Roberts (2005). Moreover, the same 
coefficients are insignificant for the BB and Japanese samples of companies, which 
give support for Hypothesis 1.  
Regarding Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on RATINGL1 in column 5 (developing 
economies) is positive but not statistically significant at satisfactory level
83
. This 
evidence is contrasting with the coefficient in column 4 (the advanced sample). Such 
a result is consistent with my Hypothesis 2 stating that “The effect of a credit rating 
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 When CRAs assess firms’ creditworthiness, they pay close attention to firm indebtedness. In other 
words, the higher the company’s leverage, the higher the default probability and a possibility of a 
lower CR. Therefore, the higher the CR, the less debt could be issued by a firm before its CR dropped, 
which in turn forces companies to maintain low leverage ratios (e.g., Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005). 
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 As Flannery and Hankins (2013) point out, the System GMM results have low statistical 
significance when the size of sample is small and its length short. However, these estimates are not 
biased. 
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on a firms’ capital structure in developing economies is less significant than in 
advanced economies” (p.24) .  
In case of the BB and especially the developing samples, one important point 
has to be made. Namely, the lower significances at least to some extent might be 
linked to the small number of observations and companies as compared to the MB or 
the advanced samples of firms. However, this kind of problem is an intrinsic part of 
all capital structure studies conducted for the panel of many countries e.g. de Jong et 
al. (2008), Fan et al. (2012), Flannery and Hankins (2013), González and González 
(2008), and Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012).  
It is obvious that a big part of the overall, advanced and MB samples size is 
composed of firms based in the U.S. (this is also the case for Japanese firms in the 
BB sample)
84
. Looking at the estimates shown in Table 3, I observe a high degree of 
similarity in coefficient estimates and their corresponding t-values for American, 
overall, MB, and advanced samples. This fact in conjunction with the 
over-representation of the U.S. and Japan gives a reason to suspect that the U.S. and 
Japan drive the results exhibited in columns 1 through 4.  
In this thesis I apply a twofold solution to this drawback. First, I conduct 
additional analyses with American and Japanese firms excluded from the four 
potentially affected samples. Second, in the following paragraph I present the results 
of analyses in which I include four interaction variables RATINGL1*MBDUM, 
RATINGL1*DEVDUM, RATINGL1*US, and RATINGL1*JAPAN capturing the 
hypothesized different impacts of CRs on firms financing policies. These interaction 
terms not only allow me to preserve a bigger sample by retaining all observations 
and firms which in turn leads to more reliable results, but also, serve as a proxy for 
the test of equality of coefficients between different samples (Institute for Digital 
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Research and Education, 2013). In both cases the results reconfirm my suspicion of 
the U.S. (and Japan to much lesser extent) driving the results and that a different 
impact of CRs on firms’ capital structure is much more pronounced between the U.S. 
and Japan than between market-based and bank-based financial environments in 
general. 
 
[Insert Table 3: Panels A, B, and C here] 
 
In Table 4 I present the regression estimates of the overall, MB, BB, and 
advanced panels (columns 1 through 4) truncated by dropping American and 
Japanese firms, in order to investigate for any significant disparities in comparison 
with the results from Panel C of Table 3. Columns 5 through 7 exhibit the same 
estimates as in Table 3. 
First, as expected and in line with Flannery and Hankins (2013) due to 
diminished sizes of truncated samples, the statistical significances of coefficients are 
smaller in general. With respect to the SOAs, the changes go in the same direction. 
In columns 1 through 4 the exclusion of U.S. and Japanese firms result in relatively 
faster rates of adjustments. These differences amount to approximately 5, 5, 8, and 
1.5 percent respectively, meaning that on average rated non-financial firms from 17 
(12 advanced) analysed countries close roughly 41 (37.5) percent of the gap between 
their actual and target gearing within one year respectively. Likewise, at this speed it 
takes only about 15 (18) months
85
 to close half the gap between companies’ current 
and target debt ratios in columns 1 and 4.  
Moreover, in line with the results from Table 3, the SOAs in the BB sample are 
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relatively slower when compared with the MB sample (although the difference 
narrowed down to just about one percent). The firms operating in MB environment 
close approximately 41 percent of the distance between their desired and actual 
leverage ratios within one year, whereas their counterparts from the BB sample 40 
percent. 
Looking at the firm-specific coefficients, some significant changes occurred 
with respect to MTB and SIZE regressors. The results for MB (BB) samples suggest 
that there is a positive and statistically insignificant (significant) influence of MTB 
on companies’ capital structure. These estimates are consistent with Edwards and 
Nibler (2000) who find that in BB oriented Germany large shareholders are able to 
impose stricter monitoring, thus, the mitigation of agency costs occurs (conflict 
between the managers’ and shareholders’ interests is diminished). Consequently, the 
effect of growth opportunities cannot be explained by the TOT. Instead, in line with 
the POT, perhaps in order to finance their growth, firms in need of more funding 
(after exhausting their internal funds) seek external forms of financing. Moreover, 
according to the POT firms are more likely to tap the bond rather than the stock 
market. It is not uncommon for the scholars to find this kind of relation 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1994; MacKay and Phillips, 2005).  
Also the coefficients on SIZE variable switch sign to positive in all three panels 
when U.S. firms are excluded (columns 1, 2, and 4). These estimates offer a support 
to the TOT. In addition, they indicate that indeed the results in the mentioned 
samples were previously driven by over-representation of American firms (as in 
Table 3). Finally, in all truncated samples a substantial rise in importance of the 
industry effect emerges. 
According to my Hypothesis 6, after inspecting coefficients on RATINGL1, it 
becomes clear that both the economic and statistical importance fell in the case of 
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columns 1, 2, and 4, but increased in column 3. On the one hand, these changes 
suggest that a negative impact of CRs on a firm’s leverage ratio was upward-biased 
(in absolute values) in columns 1, 2, and 4 by the sheer number of companies from 
the U.S. In other words, the effect of a CR on a firm’s capital structure is more 
significant in the U.S. as compared with the other countries. On the other hand, the 
coefficient on RATINGL1 in column 3 of Table 4 is more statistically significant and 
has higher absolute value (as compared with column 3 of Table 3). These estimates 
indicate that the effect of a CR on a company’s debt ratio in Japan is weaker than in 
other BB oriented countries. In fact, in comparison with evidence from Table 3, the 
influence of CRs on a capital structure remained statistically significant (at the 
highest 1 percent level) only in the advanced sample (column 4) but its absolute 
value dropped by 0.006 (from -0.0044 in Table 3 to -0.0038 in Table 4). This may 
suggest that (when a traditional division of countries’ financial orientation into MB 
and BB is applied), there is no significant difference in CRs impact on firms’ debt 
ratios between MB and BB environment. In other words, estimates from Table 4 do 
not support the idea formulated in Hypothesis 1. However, the results are consistent 
with Hypotheses 2 and 6. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.4 Tests of Hypotheses 1 to 6 (Using the Interaction Terms) 
 
Table 5 (Panels A to G) exhibits additional set of variables which are used to 
capture the interactions between RATINGL1 and other independent variables 
(MBDUM, FINARCH, DEVDUM, BOND, and LAGLEV). In column 1 (and 2) of 
each of Panels (Panels A, D, and E), I present interactions between MBDUM, 
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FINARCH, DEVDUM, and BOND regressors and the RATINGL1 variable, to deal 
with Hypotheses 1 and/or 4, 2, and 3 respectively
86
. In addition, in order to control 
for the over-representation bias of American and Japanese firms, as well as, to assess 
the validity of Hypothesis 6 I include two interaction variables (RATING*US and/or 
RATING*JAPAN) in column 1 (Panels A through D) and 2 (Panels A and D). 
The next column examines the validity of Hypothesis 5. In the last column (two 
columns) of Panels A to C, and F (Panel D), in line with a commonly applied 
procedure I reintroduce all significant interaction terms simultaneously as robustness 
measure
87
 (González and González, 2008). Finally, in the case of the U.S. sample 
(Panel F) in column 3, I use the interaction term between the RATINGL1 variable 
and the dummy variable REFORM
88
. 
 
4.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
The coefficients on RATINGL1*MBDUM shown in column 1 (1 and 4) of 
Panels A and E (panel D) indicate that there is no significant difference in the CRs’ 
effect on firms’ capital structure between the MB and BB countries. This evidence is 
consistent with the existing studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, 2003; Tadesse, 2006) 
which document that during the last two decades of the twentieth century the stock 
markets in many BB economies expanded rapidly in terms of both market 
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 The MBDUM and FINARCH variables are two alternative proxies capturing the different financial 
orientation of countries’ financial systems. Thus, with respect to the overall, advanced, and 
developing samples corresponding to Panels A, D, and E, I apply the interaction between MBDUM 
(FINARCH) and RATINGL1 separately in column 1 (2). 
87
 Furthermore, this procedure can be applied since my hypotheses are not mutually exclusive (e.g., 
Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). 
88
 As a robustness measure, the same interaction terms were included in all other Panels of Table 5 
and just like in the U.S. sample were found to be insignificant. Due to the lack of significance and for 
the brevity of this thesis the relevant results are not presented but available on request. 
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capitalization and equity financing. This in turn, finds support in Figures 3 to 5 
showing among others, that by 2000, BB countries managed to catch up with MB 
countries in terms of the average and median values of FINARCH variable 
(measuring the size, activity and efficiency of stock markets as compared with 
banking industries corresponding features). Therefore, statistically insignificant 
coefficients on RATINGL1*MBDUM
89
 are less of a surprise than would otherwise 
be (holding strictly to the traditional MB/BB line of argument highlighted in 
Hypothesis 1).  
Consequently, the arguments in favor of greater importance of CRs in countries 
traditionally regarded as MB, as well as, simply categorizing economies into MB 
and BB (Antoniou et al., 2008) do not hold in my study. On the one hand, this calls 
for an additional analysis of samples divided with respect to the two 
above-mentioned decades
90
. On the other hand, these estimates support the need of 
employment of the FINARCH variable as an additional and alternative measure of 
financial systems’ orientation91 affecting the relation between CRs and a capital 
structure. 
 
4.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
To analyze whether CRs influence firms’ capital structure in a different way 
based on the level of economic development of a country in which they are based, I 
interact RATINGL1 with DEVDUM in Panels A, B, and C of Table 5. The 
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 In case of Panel D, the coefficient on RATINGL1*MBDUM is significant but not robust 
(statistically significant in column 1, but insignificant in column 4). 
90
 See section 4.5.2. 
91
 It can capture the fluctuations of relative size, efficiency and activity of stock markets vis-à-vis the 
banking industry in each of in the samples’ countries. 
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coefficients on RATINGL1*DEVDUM in column 1 (1 and 2 in case of Panel A) are 
consistent with the idea expressed in Hypothesis 2. 
In general, my estimates suggest that there is a significant difference in the CRs 
effect depending on the economic development of an economy. This result informs 
that in the advanced countries, the link between higher CRs and increased equity 
issuance (in line with the POT) outweighs the positive role of ratings on availability 
of credit at lower price (according to the TOT). In a similar vein, in case of 
developing countries the former effect is less (or the latter more) prominent or both.  
 
4.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
 
The coefficients on RATINGL1*BOND are proxying for the different 
importance of a CR, depending on the size of bond market as a share of GDP in a 
given country. Looking at column 1 (and 2 in case of Panels A, D, and E), in all but 
two panels
92
 the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. This evidence 
initially confirms the idea stated in Hypothesis 3 that “A credit rating has a more 
positive effect (or a less negative effect) on a firms’ capital structure in economies 
with more developed bond markets”. 
However, after reintroducing all of the significant interaction terms in the last 
column, only in Panels A and D (the overall and advanced samples) do the results 
provide strong statistical support the claim that a larger and more developed bond 
market fosters a positive relation between CRs and firms’ debt ratios. In other words, 
the results are not robust suggesting that the effect of a CR on a company’s capital 
structure is independent of bond market development. Therefore, in my thesis I do 
not find the support for Hypothesis 3. 
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 The Japanese and developing samples are those exceptions. 
82 
 
4.4.4 Hypothesis 4 
 
The last prediction tested in column 1 (or column 2 of Panels A, D, and E) is 
stated in Hypothesis 4 which is closely linked to and based on a similar line of 
arguments as in Hypothesis 1. In order to check if the influence of a CR on 
companies’ gearing ratios grows together with the degree of financial system’s 
market orientation, I interact two relevant variables: RATINGL1 with FINARCH. 
The FINARCH variable enables me to measure the level of the stock markets 
development relative to the banking industry in three dimensions: size, efficiency 
and activity (Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2006) and their annual fluctuations. In contrast 
to the MB/BB differentiation, it captures the overall development of stock markets 
in all groups of countries (being relatively faster in bank-based economies). 
Inspecting Figures 4 and 5, we can observe three major peaks and inflection points: 
1997/1998 (the Southeast Asia crisis influencing mainly developing economies), 
2000/2001 (the dotcom bubble outburst affecting to some extent all samples’ plots) 
when BB financial architecture’s yearly means caught up with their MB counterparts 
and 2007/2008 (the recent global financial crisis impacting all samples’ plots).  
The estimates in six out of seven Panels (except for the Japanese sample) are 
broadly in line with Hypothesis 4 i.e., they display the negative signs for coefficients 
on RATINGL1*FINARCH and are statistically significant at standard levels (in 
Panels A, B, D, and F). The interpretation of these results confirms a higher 
dependence of firms’ capital structure on their CRs when companies operate in an 
environment with more developed stock markets (more MB oriented). A likely 
explanation for this evidence can be the ability of the annually measured FINARCH 
to capture the fluctuations in size, activity and efficiency of the stock markets 
relative to banks.  
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The negative relation between CRs and a capital structure is consistent with the 
pecking order theory (POT)
93
. In other words, firms with better CRs have smaller 
problems with asymmetric information/adverse selection leading to lesser degree of 
equity underpricing which is equivalent with cheaper cost of capital (Liu and 
Malatesta, 2007). Thus, they issue more equity and less debt (Frank and Goyal, 
2009). Consequently, the more developed equity market, the more significant this 
effect. Despite relatively high FINARCH values, this relation does not take place in 
Japanese sample, possibly due to mistrust of local investors and firms in CRs issued 
by U.S.-based credit rating agencies (CRAs) such as S&P. 
 
4.4.5 Hypothesis 5 
 
In column 2 (3) of the Table 5 Panels B, C, F, and G (A, D, and E), I interact 
RATINGL1 with LAGLEV. Except for the developing sample of firms, the 
coefficients reported are uniformly positive in terms of signs. Furthermore they are 
statistically significant (one or five percent levels) in five panels (the overall, MB, 
BB, advanced, and U.S.). These results suggest that the better (worse) the CR, the 
slower (faster) the speed of adjustment (SOA) towards a target level of leverage. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, in order to calculate a firm’s SOA, I subtract the 
value of the coefficient on LAGLEV from one. For the MB sample (Panel B), the 
coefficient on RATINGL1*LAGLEV, is 0.0093. This means that a company with AA 
credit rating closes almost 1 percent less of the gap between its actual and target 
gearing within one year than its counterpart with AA- credit rating. In a similar vein, 
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 See page 74 in section 4.3 for more detailed explanation of the inverse relation between the firms’ 
leverage ratios and their CRs. 
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the difference in the SOAs between the firms with the highest and the lowest 
investment-grade CR (AAA versus BBB-) amount to over 8 percent. 
This evidence suggests that CRs are a proxy for the degree of firms’ financial 
constraints (Byoun, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012; Kashyap et al., 1994). According 
to Byoun (2011) firms with low CRs have “great need of external funds utilize 
available financial resources”(p.35). Therefore, even though a firm with poorer CR 
(Firm A) faces higher costs of accessing capital markets as compared to a firm with 
better CR (Firm B), due to lack of internal earnings to fund investment opportunities, 
Firm A often engages in capital market transactions. This in turn enables it to adjust 
its debt ratio at relatively low marginal cost (Faulkender et al., 2012). On the other 
hand, Firm B with high CR, only rarely taps capital markets due to sufficient internal 
funds (enough to pay for its investment needs). Therefore, the adjustment of its 
capital structure would require from it an additional “trip” to either the stock or the 
bond market, and thus, extra costs. In other words, the companies adjust with faster 
speed when the costs of this process are sunk (when in order to raise funds, a firm 
has already borne transaction costs and can simultaneously converge towards its 
target debt ratio) relative to when these costs are incremental.  
My estimates are also consistent with Korajczyk and Levy (2003), who 
document that financially unconstrained firms more likely deviate from their target 
gearing ratio in an attempt to time the markets by issuing/repurchasing securities 
when macroeconomic conditions are most favorable
94
. In their sample, out of 565 
firm events labeled as “financially constrained” only 8 had investment-grade CRs 
issued by S&P and the rest of events had either speculative-grade CRs or were not 
rated. 
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 A good example of such a firm is Apple. 
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A statistically insignificant coefficient on RATINGL1*LAGLEV in Panel G can 
be associated with Hypothesis 6’s argument of a particularly forceful criticism of 
CRs issued by the U.S.-based CRAs in Japan (Fairchild and Shin, 2006). This 
estimate indicates that despite the documented high degree of MB orientation 
proxied by the FINARCH variable shown in Figures 4 and 5, the potential costs of 
adjustment and/or benefits of converging towards desired gearing ratios are 
independent of a CR in Japan. 
 
4.4.6 Hypothesis 6 
 
In order to investigate whether the importance of CRs issued by S&P for 
companies based in the U.S. and Japan is significantly different from the rest of MB 
and BB countries, I include two additional interaction terms in column 1 (and 2 in 
Panels A and D) of the relevant Panels in Table 5. The negative and statistically 
significant at the highest level coefficients on RATINGL1*US confirm the idea of a 
particularly important role of NRSROs and their services in the U.S. in comparison 
with other countries formulated in Hypothesis 6. The coefficients on 
RATINGL1*JAPAN exhibit mixed signs and are not statistically significant at 
standard levels. 
 
4.4.7 Credit Rating Industry’s Reform in the U.S. (2006-2010) and its Impact 
on the Relation between CRs and Firms’ Capital Structure 
 
Finally, in the case of the U.S. sample (Panel F of Table 5) in column 3, I use 
the interaction term between the RATINGL1 variable and the dummy variable 
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REFORM
95
 . I do this in order to capture the effect of the mentioned reform (see 
section 2.3.2) started in 2006. A negative
96
 but statistically insignificant coefficient 
on RATINGL1*REFORM suggests that CRs’ effect on firms' gearing in the U.S. was 
unaffected by the period corresponding to the series of reforms. As described in 
section 2.3.2, this reform took place in the U.S., and thus, it is not expected to have 
any bearings on the relation between the CRs and a firm’s capital structure in other 
countries. However, as a robustness measure the same interaction term was included 
in all other Panels of Table 5. Just like in the U.S. sample, these coefficients were 
statistically insignificant. Due to the lack of significance and in order to improve 
readability of results presented in Table 5, the relevant results are not presented but 
available on request. 
 
[Insert Table 5, Panels A to G here] 
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 This dummy variable equals one for the years 2006 to 2010 (the period of the rating industry’s 
reform in the U.S.) and zero otherwise. 
96
 I would expect the successful reform to strengthen the role of CRs on the firms’ capital structure, 
thus, the coefficients on RATINGL1*REFORM to be negative and significant, in line with the 
hypothesized inverse relation between CRs and leverage ratios (see page 7 in Chapter 1 and page 74 
in section 4.3) confirmed in Tables 3 and 4. 
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4.5 Robustness Tests 
 
Previously estimated samples are split with respect to firm size, rating classes, 
and time periods. 
 
4.5.1 Robustness of Findings by Firm Size 
 
Prior research (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2009) check for 
the robustness of their results by, among others, splitting data samples according to 
firm size and or time periods. Thus, following the existing literature, I acknowledge 
the fact that many determinants might influence different kind of companies in 
various ways and running one regression to fit one model with all firms may not be 
the appropriate procedure. In general, the results show that the partial adjustment 
model fits all groups of companies. 
In Table 6, I divide four previously estimated samples (MB, BB, the U.S., and 
Japan) into two size categories according to their total assets (SIZE)
97
. The results 
with respect to firms SOAs show that in all samples larger firms adjust less rapidly 
even though theoretically, their sensitivity to fixed transaction costs (part of the 
adjustment costs) should be weaker. These results reconfirm the findings of previous 
studies (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008). Faulkender et al. (2012) document that "larger 
firms adjust excess leverage more slowly, consistent with the costs of excess leverage 
being smaller for larger firms.” (p.645).  
Moreover, they find this relation robust with respect to over- and under-levered 
group of firms alike. In general, the bigger the company, the less fluctuation in its 
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 In line with Antoniou et al. (2008) and Mao (2003) I do not present the medium-size companies 
(between 40
th
 and 60
th
 percentile of total assets). 
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cash flows, therefore, lower costs associated with being away from its desired level 
of debt. Additionally, larger firms rely more on bond financing (which traditionally 
has few covenants), associated with relatively lesser pressure for these firms to 
converge towards their targets as compared with pressure imposed by banks on their 
borrowers via a number of tight covenants (as argued by Flannery and Rangan, 
2006). 
Furthermore, this evidence seems to be in line with the prior results indicating 
that companies with better CRs (proxying for the lesser degree of financial 
constraints) exhibit slower SOAs. In their study, Faulkender et al. (2012) use a firm 
size and a bond credit rating as proxies for the financial constraints. According to 
Table 2, the larger is the firm, the higher is its CR, and therefore similar kinds of 
factors might be behind the relation between CRs or firm size and its SOA. In other 
words, in line with Byoun (2011) and Faulkender et al. (2012), larger firms are less 
financially constrained than their smaller counterparts, and have reasons to display 
slower SOAs as compared with smaller (financially constrained) firms. Faulkender et 
al. (2012) argue that in case of financially unconstrained (large) companies, 
converging towards their target debt ratios “would require a ‘special’ trip to the 
capital markets, and the associated costs would be offset only by the benefits of 
moving closer to target leverage” (p.633). Korajczyk and Levy, (2003) document 
that financially unconstrained firms are more likely to deviate from their target 
capital structure in an attempt to time the markets by issuing/repurchasing securities 
when macroeconomic conditions are most favorable.  
In addition, RATINGL1 is more important both statistically and economically for 
smaller firms than for larger in three samples (especially the American) of firms
98
. 
This result seems logical and is in line with Byoun (2011), Frank and Goyal (2009), 
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 The Japanese sample is the only exception. 
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and suggests that according to the POT, CRs help smaller companies to access capital 
markets and raise funds in form of equity (negative coefficients in MB, BB, and 
American samples). 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.5.2 Robustness of Findings Over Time (by Decades) 
 
In Table 7 the samples are split into two decades (1991-2000
99
 and 2001-2010). 
The results indicate that the growing criticism of CRAs and their CRs that has taken 
place since 1997 might have a significant impact on the CRs’ influence on companies’ 
capital structure. This could be caused by financial market’s diminished reliance on 
CRs and their information role due to CRAs damaged reputation and CRs regarded 
as often inaccurate or unreliable indicators of firms’ probability of default. 
Consequently, it can be observed that the importance of CRs in MB countries (that 
also applies to U.S. sample) was indeed much stronger during the period 1991-2000 
as compared with the more recent decade (2001-2010).  
In addition, the results offer support to Hypothesis 6. In case of Japanese sample, 
the coefficients on RATINGL1 are much less significant and their magnitudes are 
comparatively smaller than those from the BB sample (0.0006 and -0.0019 for Japan 
compared to -0.0038 and -0.0042 for the BB sample) for the first and second ten-year 
periods respectively. During both decades, In the American sample the coefficients 
on RATINGL1 are the most significant and the largest (compared with coefficients on 
RATINGL1 in other samples). This evidence suggests that in the U.S. CRs are 
relatively more important as determinants of firms’ capital structure. 
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.5.3 Robustness of Findings Across Different Rating Classes (Additional 
Support of Hypothesis 5) 
 
In this section I elaborate on the results exhibited in Table 8, in which I divide 
previously estimated samples (MB, BB, advanced, developing, the U.S, and Japan) 
into two subsamples based on the firms’ CRs (those with an investment-grade CR 
and those with a speculative-grade CR). I was motivated by the most recent approach 
of Faulkender et al. (2012)
100
 and their forceful argument of SOAs being highly 
dependent on credit ratings (stemming from the financial constraints problem similar 
to that examined by Byoun (2011)). The results in Table 8 are consistent with those 
from Table 5 (where I use the RATINGL1*LAGLEV interaction term), and show that 
the SOAs are faster (slower) for firms with speculative (investment) CRs.  
Inspecting the results further, I can conclude that the largest disparity in the 
SOAs between investment- and speculative-grade sub-samples occurs in the 
developing panel of firms. In this sample, companies with speculative (investment) 
CRs close about 47 (32) percent of the gap between their actual and target debt ratios 
within one year, and with these speeds it takes 13 (21) months to close half the gap 
between firms’ desired and current gearing ratios. In other words, firms with 
below-investment CRs close approximately 15 percent more of the gap annually and 
they need 8 months shorter period to close half of the distance between the 
above-mentioned debt ratios. The estimated coefficients on the LAGLEV variable 
proxying for the SOAs of firms with different CRs suggest that Byoun (2011), 
Faulkender et al. (2012), and Korajczyk and Levy’s (2003) arguments apply to my 
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thesis. The results also indicate that no matter the financial orientation or economic 
development of the country in which firms are based, those with poorer issuer CRs 
adjust towards their target gearing ratios at a faster speed.  
Summing up, the results in Table 8 offer additional support to Hypothesis 5, that 
companies with high CRs adjust towards their target gearing ratios at a slower speed 
than firms with poor CRs. Moreover, my estimates suggest that this difference in the 
SOAs (being the smallest in the BB sample and the largest in the developing sample) 
occurs in all examined panels of firms. 
 
[Insert Table 8, Panels A to C here] 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
An extensive literature has formed during the last fifty years or so that 
investigates the main forces driving the firms’ capital structure. However until 
recently, the impact of credit ratings (CRs) on capital structure had been neglected. 
Recent studies that include CRs are conducted with respect to the American market 
(Byoun, 2011; Hovakimian et al., 2009; Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Leary and Roberts, 
2005; Sufi, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012).  
My thesis extends prior research by investigating the role of CRs on firms’ 
capital structure and their speed of adjustment towards target level in 19 countries 
with different financial orientations and levels of economic development. I 
investigate a 20-year period sample for 1,513 non-financial companies. 
I find that except for Japan, the impact of CRs on capital structure is more 
significant and negative in countries with more market-oriented financial systems 
(measured by the FINARCH variable), whereas the traditional simple division into 
MB and BB countries has no significant influence on the relation between CRs and 
firms’ gearing ratios. A likely explanation for this evidence is the ability of the 
annually measured FINARCH to capture the fluctuations in size, activity and 
efficiency of the stock markets relative to banks.  
The negative relation between CRs and gearing ratios is related to the pecking 
order theory (POT). Companies with better CRs have smaller problems with 
asymmetric information and adverse selection (two major components in the 
formulation of the POT), and therefore, benefit from the decreased cost of equity 
financing (e.g., Liu and Malatesta, 2007). Thus, they issue more equity and less debt 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Consequently, the more developed equity market, the 
more significant this effect. Despite relatively high FINARCH’s values, this relation 
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does not take place in the Japanese sample, possibly due to mistrust of local 
investors and firms in CRs issued by U.S.-based credit rating agencies (CRAs) such 
as S&P. 
Furthermore, the relation between the CR and firms’ leverage ratio is negative 
and significantly stronger in advanced than in developing economies. This disparity 
has a twofold explanation. First, due to low presence, short history and high 
volatility of CRs in the developing countries, their information role in the process of 
issuing equity (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Liu and Malatesta, 2007) or debt (Tang, 
2009) loses reliability. Second, in developing economies firms rely more on bank 
lending than their counterparts from advanced economies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2012). 
In addition, my results are robust and indicate that regardless of financial 
orientation or economic development of a country, firms with poorer CRs enjoy 
faster SOAs. This can be explained by different degree of financial constraints 
(Byoun, 2011; Faulkender et al., 2012; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). 
Moreover, I find that CRs issued by S&P have a particularly strong influence 
on debt ratios of U.S. companies. My estimates suggest that CRs’ effect in the MB 
and American samples decreased significantly during the second decade (2001-2010) 
of analyzed period, which coincides with the widespread critiques of CRAs and their 
services. This may suggest that the CRAs are not immune to criticism and that 
perceived reliability of CRs as information tool in eyes of investors and/or firms has 
fallen. Lastly, my results also show that the recent series of rating industries’ reforms 
in the U.S. (2006-2010) carried no significant impact on the relation between CRs 
and capital structure. 
A major limitation of research in my thesis is data constraint. Due to the limited 
S&P’s CRs there is a huge disparity in the numbers of firms and observations 
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between the U.S., Japan and other MB and BB countries. The same drawback 
applies to the big differences between advanced and developing samples of firms. 
On the one hand, this creates over-representation bias and difficulties in comparison 
of results across samples. On the other hand, small number of observations in 
developing sample leads to potential problems with using the Two-Step System 
GMM technique and potentially unreliable estimates. Moreover, consistent with the 
literature (Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2005) my thesis can suffer from 
self-selection bias. First, firms with CRs tend to have higher profitability, liquidity, 
and lower leverage ratios. Second, the decision of applying for a CR also depends on 
the factors influencing the CR level. Finally, CRs tend to be quite stable over time 
(especially in the advanced countries). Therefore, my CR variable is highly 
consistent within company and thus has low within-firm variation that causes 
potentially unreliable estimations. This limitation applies to the Within Groups, 
First-Differencing GMM, and System GMM methods alike. 
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Appendix A 
The Detailed Explanations of Exchange Act Rules 17g-1 through 17g-6 Implemented 
on the 26
th
 of June 2007 by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
 
 
Source: SEC (2011) 
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Appendix B 
All Issued Ratings by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs) for the Year 2010 
“The table summarizes below list the number of outstanding ratings reported by each NRSRO in its 
Form NRSRO annual certification for 2010. For each NRSRO, the table sets forth the number of 
outstanding ratings for the five asset classes.” (p.5). Since the publication of this summary, one more 
CRA applied and was granted a status of NRSRO (HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V. on the 5
th
 of 
November 2012. 
 
 
 
Source: SEC (2011) 
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Appendix C 
Sample’s Countries Grouped by Financial Systems’ Orientation and Economic 
Development 
This appendix presents all the countries used in the study with regards to their level of economic 
development, according to the International Monetary Fund’s classification. There are 5 economies 
considered as developing and 14 as advanced. Moreover, there are 8 economies with financial system 
classified as bank-based and 11 countries with market-based. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), IMF (2012), and Popov (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank-Based Market-Based Developing Advanced
France Australia India Australia
Germany Canada Indonesia Canada
India Hong Kong Mexico France
Indonesia Korea Russia Germany
Italy Mexico Thailand Hong Kong
Japan the Netherlands Italy
Russia Sweden Japan
Spain Switzerland Korea
Thailand the Netherlands
the U.K. Spain
the U.S. Sweden
Switzerland
the U.K.
the U.S.
Country Financial System’s Orientation Country’s Economic Development
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Appendix D 
Number of Sample Observations by Year and by Country 
Due to the limited availability of S&P’s CRs, the whole sample of rated firms with at least three 
consecutive observations during the whole period 1991-2010 covers just 19 countries. The poor CRs 
coverage is especially pronounced in case in developing countries, as well as earlier years of the 
analyzed period. The overall sample is an unbalanced panel of 17,046 annual observations: 323 for 
Australia, 551 for Canada, 394 for France, 327 for Germany, 86 for Hong Kong, 53 for India, 86 for 
Indonesia, 132 for Italy, 1,823 for Japan, 144 for Korea, 170 for Mexico, 133 for the Netherlands, 111 
for Russia, 109 for Spain, 186 for Sweden, 129 for Switzerland, 55 for Thailand, 505 for the U.K., 
and 11,729 for the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year AUSTRALIA CANADA FRANCE GERMANY HONG KONG INDIA INDONESIA
1991 7
1992 9 2
1993 11 2 1
1994 1 12 3 1
1995 10 17 5 3 1
1996 13 22 5 4 1
1997 15 26 5 6 1 3
1998 17 31 6 1 3
1999 17 33 8 2 3
2000 20 35 21 15 3 3
2001 23 41 26 18 5 1 3
2002 23 41 32 21 5 1 5
2003 23 42 32 23 5 1 6
2004 22 44 33 28 6 6 7
2005 24 46 37 31 9 7 8
2006 24 46 38 31 9 7 10
2007 23 45 38 33 9 8 10
2008 23 43 39 34 10 8 9
2009 23 38 33 10 7 8
2010 22 38 31 9 7 8
total country obs. 323 551 394 327 86 53 86
1.89% 3.23% 2.31% 1.92% 0.50% 0.31% 0.50%
total sample obs. 17,046
as a percentage of 
total sample obs.
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Appendix D continued 
 
Year ITALY JAPAN KOREA MEXICO NETHERLANDS RUSSIA
1991 12
1992 13
1993 15 1
1994 18 1 2
1995 20 1 2 1
1996 22 1 2 1
1997 51 2 6 1 1
1998 72 2 7 1
1999 2 108 2 9 1
2000 4 139 2 9 11 3
2001 5 141 6 11 11 5
2002 5 146 8 12 11 7
2003 9 159 10 12 11 9
2004 13 196 10 13 10 11
2005 14 194 13 15 11 12
2006 16 196 13 15 13 12
2007 16 107 15 15 13 11
2008 16 105 19 14 13 14
2009 16 57 19 13 13 13
2010 16 52 19 13 13 11
total country obs. 132 1,823 144 170 133 111
0.77% 10.69% 0.84% 1.00% 0.78% 0.65%
total sample obs. 17,046
as a percentage of 
total sample obs.
Year SPAIN SWEDEN SWITZERLAND THAILAND the U.K. the U.S.
1991 1 16 279
1992 1 18 307
1993 3 2 1 19 341
1994 3 3 1 17 360
1995 3 3 1 19 386
1996 4 3 1 2 21 417
1997 4 7 2 2 21 461
1998 4 7 2 2 27 526
1999 8 5 2 27 585
2000 7 11 7 2 22 633
2001 7 14 8 2 24 662
2002 8 14 8 2 31 682
2003 8 14 9 2 32 700
2004 8 14 9 3 31 717
2005 7 14 10 4 35 747
2006 7 13 11 5 35 776
2007 9 14 13 7 31 800
2008 9 15 13 7 28 805
2009 9 15 13 7 27 778
2010 9 15 13 6 24 767
total country obs. 109 186 129 55 505 11,729
0.64% 1.09% 0.76% 0.32% 2.96% 68.81%
total sample obs. 17,046
as a percentage of 
total sample obs.
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Appendix E 
Firm, Industry, and Country Characteristics 
This appendix lists all dependent and independent variables used in the regression analysis. The 
Name column quotes the exact names of dependent (MLEV, MLEVT, BLEV, and BLEVT) and 
independent variables used in the econometric modeling process, corresponding to the mentioned 
characteristics. The Definition column describes calculations performed to obtain the variables. The 
Data Source / Reference column provides all the databases and articles from which the author obtains 
all variables. 
 
 
Name Variable Definition Data Source / Reference
Dependent 
variable
MLEV Long-term leverage to 
the  market value of 
total assets ratio
Long-term debt/(Book Value of Total 
Assets-Book Value of Equity + Market 
Value of Equity)
Compustat 
MLEVT Total leverage to the 
market value of total 
assets ratio
(Long-term debt + Short-term debt)/(Book 
Value of Total Assets-Book Value of 
Equity + Market Value of Equity)
Compustat 
BLEV Long-term leverage to 
the book value of total 
assets ratio
Long-term debt/Book Value of Total assets Compustat 
BLEVT Total leverage to the 
book value of total 
assets ratio
(Long-term debt + Short-term debt)/Book 
Value of Total assets
Compustat 
Firm 
characteristics
EBIT/TA Profitability ratio Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Book 
Value of Total assets
Compustat 
(Long-term debt + Short-term
Debt + Preferred capital + Market Value of 
Equity)/Book Value of Total assets
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total annual assets 
measured in the U.S. dollars
Compustat 
TANG/TA Relative tangible assets [Property, Plant and Equipment Total 
(Net)]/Book Value of Total Assets
Compustat
RATINGL1 Standard & Poor’s 
domestic long-term  
issuers credit ratings 
lagged one year as 
compared with all other 
variables
transformed by assigning ordinal values: 
from 1 for the lowest rating (D), to 22 for 
the highest rating (AAA)
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             
S&P Global Credit Portal
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
(growth opportunities)
Compustat 
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Appendix E continued  
 
 
 
 
Name Variable Definition Data Source / Reference
Industry 
characteristic
MEDLEV Median industry 
leverage
The median value of MLEV  variable by SIC 
code and by year
Compustat,                    
EHSO (2012),                       
de Jong et al. (2008)
Macroeconomic 
variables
INFL  Annual Inflation rate Inflation measured by the consumer price 
index reflects the annual percentage 
change
The World Bank (2011)
BOND Annual Bond Market 
Development
Measured annually such as: (public bond 
market capitalization + private bond market 
capitalization) / GDP
de Jong et al. (2008),            
Čihák et al. (2012)
The first principal component of three 
indices measuring the country’s financial 
system orientation based on the relative 
size, activity, and efficiency of stock 
markets vis-à-vis the banking sector. The 
higher is the value of FINARCH, the more 
market-oriented is the financial system of a 
country.
Čihák et al. (2012), Levine 
(2002), Tadesse (2006)
           The relative size index: [(market 
capitalization of domestic stocks / GDP) / 
claims of the banking sector against the 
private real sector / GDP)]
Čihák et al. (2012)
           The relative efficiency index: [(total 
value of shares traded /average real market 
capitalization) * (banking overhead costs / 
banking assets)]
Čihák et al. (2012)
           The relative activity index: [(total 
value of shares traded / GDP) / (claims of 
the banking sector against the private real 
sector / GDP)]
Čihák et al. (2012)
MBDUM Market based economy 
dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
economy has the market-based financial 
system and zero otherwise
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002),    
Popov (1999)
DEVDUM Developed economy 
dummy
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
economy is considered as advanced and 
zero otherwise
IMF (2012)
REFORM
the U.S. credit rating 
industry's reform 
dummy
A dummy variable equals one for the years 
2006 to 2010 (the period of the rating 
industry’s reform in the U.S.) and zero 
otherwise.
Compustat 
FINARCH Financial Architecture 
(measured annually)
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Appendix F 
Expected Relations between a Firm’s Capital Structure and its Determinants 
This appendix presents the observed direction of the impact of firm, industry and macroeconomic 
determinants of capital structure in the previous research from the field if investigation. A plus sign (+) 
means that in their study authors find evidence for a positive and significant relation between the 
dependent and independent variables. A minus sign (-) equals to the negative and significant relation. 
The Literature Source column provides the number of papers in which the aforementioned 
relationship was observed. 
 
Capital Structure 
Determinants
Variable 
Used as a 
Proxy
Expected Sign Literature Source
Lagged leverage   
( first lag of firm's 
gearing ratio)
LAGLEV + Alti (2006), Antoniou et al. (2008), Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan
(2006), Frank and Goyal (2004), Harford et al. (2009), Hovakimian et al. (2001),
Huang and Ritter (2009), Ju et al. (2005), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Leary and
Roberts (2005), Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012), Strebulaev (2007)
Profitability EBIT/TA - Antoniou et al. (2008), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1994), Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), Hovakimian and Li (2011), Leary and Roberts (2005), Lemmon et al.
(2008), Mittoo and Zhang (2008), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels
(1988)
Growth 
opportunities
MTB - Antoniou et al. (2008), Byoun (2008), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Flannery and
Rangan (2006), González and González (2008), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Hovakimian
and Li (2011), Lemmon et al. (2008), Mittoo and Zhang (2008), Myers (1984)
Firm size SIZE + Antoniou et al. (2008), Byoun (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), González and
González (2008), Hovakimian and Li (2011), Lemmon et al. (2008), Mittoo and Zhang
(2008), Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012)
Relative tangible 
assets
TANG/TA + Antoniou et al. (2008), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Flannery and Rangan
(2006), González and González (2008), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Hovakimian and Li
(2011), Lemmon et al. (2008), Mittoo and Zhang (2008), Ö ztekin (2011)
- Byoun (2011), Frank and Goyal (2009), Leary and Roberts (2005)
Industry median 
leverage
MEDLEV + Byoun (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Frank and Goyal (2004), González and
González (2008), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Hovakimian and Li (2011), Lemmon et al.
(2008), Ö ztekin (2011), Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012)
Inflation rate INFL + Frank and Goyal (2009), Jõeveer (2013)
Bond market BOND + de Jong et al. (2008)
Financial 
architecture
FINARCH - to the best of my knowledge, there has been no prior study documenting such a
relation. However, since the FINARCH variable is an additional and alternative way
to measure market orientation of financial systems, the same sign is expected as for
the MBDUM dummy variable.
- Antoniou et al. (2008), Borio (1990)
Developed 
economy
DEVDUM + Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Fan et al. (2012)
the U.S. credit 
rating industry's 
reform (2006-
2010)
REFORM Does not enter the model itself (included only as the interaction with the 
RATINGL1 variable).
Firm-specific characteristics
Market-based 
economy
MBDUM
Firm credit rating 
(first lag)
RATINGL1
Industry-specific characteristics
Macroeconomic variables
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Appendix G 
The U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes 
 
 
 
Sources: Compustat, EHSO (2012), and de Jong et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Industry Name Industry SIC Codes
1 Food producers and processors, farming, fishing 0100-0799 2090-2099 0900-0999 2000-2079
2 Paper, forestry, packaging, printing, publishing, photography 0800-0899 2600-2799
3 Engineering, mining, metallurgy, oil and gas exploration 1000-1499 3300-3569 3580-3599
4 Building, construction 1500-1999 2400-2499
5 Beverages, tobacco 2080-2089 2100-2199
6 Textile, leather, clothing, footwear, furniture 2200-2399 2500-2599 3100-3199
7 Chemicals, healthcare, Pharmaceuticals 2800-2899
8 Diversified industry 2900-3099 3200-3299 3800-3999
9 Computer, electrical, electronic equipment 3570-3579 3600-3699
10 Automotive, aviation, transportation 3700-3799 4000-4799
11 Utilities 4900-4999
12 Services 4800-4899  5000-5799 5800-5899  5900-5999 
7000-7199  7200-7299 7300-7499 7500-7799 
7800-7999 8000-8399 8400-8599 8600-8699 
8700-8799  8800-8899
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Appendix H 
Author’s Ordinal Coding System along with S&P’s Rating Scale 
This table summarizes the whole spectrum of the firms’ issuer credit ratings used by S&P. The 
highest possible rating assigned (AAA), is reserved for the firms with “Extremely strong capacity to 
meet financial commitments” and the lowest possible rating (D) means “Payment default on financial 
commitments” S&P (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: S&P (2012) 
 
 
 
Rating
AAA 22
AA+ 21
AA 20
AA- 19
A+ 18
A 17
A- 16
BBB+ 15
BBB 14
BBB- 13
BB+ 12
BB 11
BB- 10
B+ 9
B 8
B- 7
CCC+ 6
CCC 5
CCC- 4
CC 3
SD 2
D 1
Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
Ordinal Value Asigned
105 
 
Appendix I 
Speeds of Adjustment (SOAs) by Countries (One-Step System GMM) 
This table summarized the annual percentage SOAs estimates for market gearing ratio (proxied by 
the MLEV variable) of firms based in each of 19 sample’s countries using One-Step System GMM 
technique separately for all countries except Japan and the U.S., for which the Two-Step System 
GMM estimates from Table 4 are used. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their 
definitions. Rows (1) to (19) exhibit information on each of sample’s economy. Mean and median 
values are presented in the last two rows (20) and (21). *, **, and *** indicate estimates’ statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Row Country Firms Observations SOA
(1) Australia 27 295 0.26***
(2) Canada 55 495 0.31***
(3) France 40 366 0.21***
(4) Germany 35 285 0.40***
(5) Hong Kong 10 76 0.14***
(6) India 8 45 0.75
(7) Indonesia 13 73 0.72
(8) Italy 16 116 0.45**
(9) Japan 240 1,583 0.25***
(10) Korea 19 124 0.64
(11) Mexico 16 153 0.31**
(12) the Netherlands 13 127 0.38**
(13) Russia 18 92 0.65
(14) Spain 10 101 0.40***
(15) Sweden 16 172 0.55***
(16) Switzerland 13 116 0.26***
(17) Thailand 7 48 0.30**
(18) the U.K. 53 440 0.45***
(19) the U.S. 904 10,765 0.35***
(20) Mean 80 814 0.41
(21) Median 16 127 0.38
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Market-Based vs. Bank-Based Countries 
 
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, total number of observations, minimum and 
maximum values for dependent variables and firm-level characteristics: MLEV, MLEVT, BLEV, 
BLEVT, EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, and TANG/TA (all winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile); S&P’s 
issuer credit rating: RATING; median industry leverage: MEDMLEV; and macroeconomic variables: 
INFL, BOND, FINARCH, and DEVDUM during the whole period of investigation (from 1991 to 
2010). The t-values and z-values are given for the two-sided t-test for equality of means and 
two-sided non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of medians respectively. Both tests 
investigate the differences between characteristics from market-based vis-à-vis bank-based 
economies. The test statistics are equal to MB minus BB. *, **, and *** indicate that the 
hypothesized differences between means and medians are statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
Variable T-test
Non-par. 
test
Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. T-Value Z-Value
Leverage
MLEV 0.183 0.155 0.131 2,282 0.000 0.731 0.190 0.166 0.120 1,212 0.000 0.699 -1.57 -2.97***
MLEVT 0.228 0.198 0.146 2,282 0.000 0.733 0.257 0.236 0.139 1,212 0.001 0.779 -5.60***  -6.66***
BLEV 0.239 0.220 0.144 2,282 0.000 0.854 0.223 0.206 0.133 1,212 0.000 0.727 3.25*** 2.78***
BLEVT 0.298 0.282 0.147 2,282 0.000 0.873 0.296 0.285 0.141 1,212 0.003 0.783 0.43 -0.11
Profitability
EBIT/TA 0.091 0.084 0.073 2,282 -0.217 0.366 0.079 0.068 0.059 1,212 -0.118 0.408 5.38*** 7.53***
Growth
MTB 1.269 1.067 0.792 2,282 0.187 6.460 0.920 0.805 0.561 1,212 0.056 5.585 15.09*** 15.82***
Firm Size
SIZE 8.711 8.741 1.404 2,282 4.295 12.407 9.586 9.717 1.585 1,212 4.923 12.622 -16.15*** -15.99***
Tangible Assets
TANG/TA 0.436 0.424 0.238 2,282 0.018 0.946 0.356 0.324 0.217 1,212 0.009 0.898 10.08*** 9.42***
Firm Rating
RATING 14.589 15 3.115 2,282 1 22 13.927 14 3.670 1,212 1 22 5.34*** 4.93***
(Corresponding 
S&P's grade) BBB+ BBB+ D AAA BBB BBB D AAA
Industry 
Characteristic
MEDLEV 0.173 0.155 0.099 2,282 0.006 0.575 0.182 0.163 0.094 1,212 0.000 0.687 4.02*** 13.45***
Macro. Variables
INFL 2.542 2.214 2.502 2,282 -4.023 34.999 3.699 1.978 5.283 1,212 -0.399 85.742 -7.20*** -0.02
BOND 67.620 70.431 25.089 2,282 6.876 125.063 75.928 82.235 36.177 1,212 1.831 147.418 -7.13*** -9.45***
FINARCH 0.367 0.359 1.272 2,281 -2.786 3.395 0.773 0.706 1.033 1,202 -2.283 2.855 -10.16*** -10.25***
DEVDUM 0.901 1 0.298 2,282 0 1 0.794 1 0.405 1,212 0 1 8.16*** 8.83***
Market-Based Countries 65.29 %  of annual 
sample's obs. (excl. the U.S.)
Bank-Based Countries 34.71 %  of annual 
sample's obs. (excl. Japan)
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Panel B: Advanced vs. Developing Countries  
 
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, total number of observations, minimum and 
maximum values for winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile dependent variables and firm-level 
characteristics: MLEV, MLEVT, BLEV, BLEVT, EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, and TANG/TA (all winsorised 
at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile);  S&P’s issuer credit rating: RATING; median industry leverage: 
MEDMLEV; and macroeconomic variables: INFL, BOND, FINARCH, and MBDUM during the 
whole period of investigation (from 1991 to 2010). The t-values and z-values are given for the 
two-sided t-test for equality of means and two-sided non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for equality 
of medians respectively. Both tests investigate the differences between characteristics from advanced 
vis-à-vis developing countries. The test statistics are equal to advanced minus developing. *, **, and 
*** indicate that the hypothesized differences between means and medians are statistically significant 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Variable T-test
Non-par. 
test
Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. T-Value Z-Value
Leverage
MLEV 0.181 0.157 0.124 3,019 0.000 0.716 0.211 0.184 0.142 475 0.000 0.731 -4.29*** -4.14***
MLEVT 0.232 0.205 0.140 3,019 0.000 0.779 0.278 0.248 0.163 475 0.001 0.741 -5.88*** -5.53***
BLEV 0.233 0.212 0.141 3,019 0.000 0.854 0.239 0.237 0.136 475 0.001 0.727 -0.83 -1.88*
BLEVT 0.296 0.281 0.146 3,019 0.000 0.873 0.302 0.298 0.142 475 0.004 0.783 -0.76 -1.40
Profitability
EBIT/TA 0.081 0.075 0.064 3,019 -0.217 0.366 0.122 0.107 0.088 475 -0.148 0.408 -9.69*** -10.09***
Growth
MTB 1.145 0.963 0.718 3,019 0.157 6.460 1.162 0.981 0.861 475 0.056 5.585 -0.40 1.00
Firm Size
SIZE 9.122 9.174 1.519 3,019 4.295 12.431 8.334 8.087 1.403 475 4.923 12.622 11.23*** 11.14***
Tangible Assets
TANG/TA 0.392 0.354 0.235 3,019 0.009 0.946 0.513 0.536 0.195 475 0.040 0.898 -12.23*** -11.33***
Firm Rating
RATING 14.854 15 3.074 3,019 1 22 11.208 11 3.185 475 1 17 23.29*** 21.18***
(Corresponding 
S&P's grade) BBB+ BBB+ D AAA BB BB D A
Industry 
Characteristic
MEDLEV 0.173 0.156 0.095 3,019 0.006 0.687 0.198 0.185 0.112 475 0.000 0.670 -4.82*** -4.88***
Macro. Variables
INFL 2.041 2.002 1.174 3,019 -4.023 9.069 8.680 6.363 7.535 475 -0.854 85.742 -19.16*** -31.39***
BOND 78.031 81.285 23.779 3,019 14.081 147.418 22.644 24.659 15.270 475 1.831 66.380 67.25*** 33.24***
FINARCH 0.524 0.557 1.190 3,008 -2.709 3.395 0.400 0.591 1.327 475 -2.786 2.855 1.92* 1.52
MBDUM 0.681 1 0.466 3,019 0 1 0.474 0 0.500 475 0 1 8.49*** 8.83***
Advanced Countries 86.41%  of annual sample's 
obs. (excl. the U.S. and Japan)
Developing Countries 13.59 %  of annual sample's 
obs. 
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Panel C: the U.S. vs. Japan  
 
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, total number of observations, minimum and 
maximum values for winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile dependent variables and firm-level 
characteristics: MLEV, MLEVT, BLEV, BLEVT, EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, and TANG/TA (all winsorised 
at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile);  S&P’s issuer credit rating: RATING; median industry leverage: 
MEDMLEV; and macroeconomic variables: INFL, BOND, FINARCH during the whole period of 
investigation (from 1991 to 2010). The t-values and z-values are given for the two-sided t-test for 
equality of means and two-sided non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of medians 
respectively. Both tests investigate the differences between characteristics from the U.S. vis-à-vis 
Japan. The test statistics are equal to the U.S. minus Japan. *, **, and *** indicate that the 
hypothesized differences between means and medians are statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
 
Variable T-test
Non-par. 
test
Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. dev. No. obs. Min. Max. T-Value Z-Value
Leverage
MLEV 0.215 0.192 0.150 11,729 0.000 0.669 0.174 0.149 0.139 1,823 0.000 0.562 11.68*** 11.59***
MLEVT 0.245 0.223 0.158 11,729 0.001 0.697 0.272 0.248 0.187 1,823 0.000 0.676 -5.89***  -4.75***
BLEV 0.290 0.270 0.167 11,729 0.000 0.811 0.195 0.176 0.146 1,823 0.000 0.590 25.03*** 23.38***
BLEVT 0.330 0.314 0.169 11,729 0.003 0.838 0.305 0.292 0.193 1,823 0.000 0.703 5.19*** 5.45***
Profitability
EBIT/TA 0.091 0.086 0.065 11,729 -0.131 0.280 0.053 0.045 0.039 1,823 -0.024 0.186 34.36*** 31.01***
Growth
MTB 1.336 1.075 0.820 11,729 0.410 5.212 0.939 0.832 0.450 1,823 0.311 3.004 30.58*** 25.65***
Firm Size
SIZE 8.163 8.036 1.330 11,729 5.401 11.710 9.393 9.390 1.131 1,823 6.988 12.029 -42.08*** -35.48***
Tangible Assets
TANG/TA 0.375 0.328 0.243 11,729 0.015 0.897 0.383 0.325 0.221 1,823 0.067 0.912 -1.37 -2.79***
Firm Rating
RATING 13.240 13 3.564 11,729 1 22 15.323 16 3.406 1,823 2 22 -24.13*** -22.72***
(Corresponding 
S&P's grade) BBB- BBB- D AAA BBB+ A- SD AAA
Industry 
Characteristic
MEDLEV 0.176 0.167 0.061 11,729 0.059 0.405 0.157 0.137 0.109 1,823 0.000 0.529 7.08*** 19.81***
Macro. Variables
INFL 2.517 2.805 1.024 11,729 -0.356 4.235 -0.083 -0.250 0.749 1,823 -1.347 3.298 130*** 60.94***
BOND 149.501 146.413 14.778 11,729 126.357 177.475 165.181 173.940 39.237 1,823 85.211 238.792 -16.88*** -18.66***
FINARCH 0.314 0.234 1.271 11,450 -2.207 2.547 0.713 0.159 1.619 1,823 -1.655 3.740 -10.06*** -7.52***
the U.S. 86.55 %  of annual sample's obs. 
(combined U.S & Japan)
Japan 13.45 %  of annual sample's obs. (combined 
U.S & Japan)
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Table 2: Average Leverage Ratios and Firm-Specific Characteristics by 
Different Credit Ratings 
Panel A: Market-Based Countries (excluding the U.S.) 
 
This table presents mean values for dependent variable: MLEV, MLEVT, BLEV, and BLEVT, as well 
as, firm-level characteristics: EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, TANG/TA after grouping companies according to 
their credit ratings. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Bank-Based Countries (excluding Japan) 
 
 
Below B 40 0.286 0.367 0.354 0.430 0.012 1.053 7.012 0.347
B 49 0.338 0.377 0.334 0.370 0.017 0.770 7.582 0.420
BB 76 0.218 0.268 0.250 0.309 0.090 1.317 8.018 0.390
BBB 304 0.201 0.243 0.256 0.308 0.087 1.154 8.666 0.464
A 200 0.160 0.203 0.222 0.281 0.096 1.365 9.279 0.442
AA 24 0.081 0.117 0.122 0.183 0.116 1.710 9.706 0.270
AAA 57 0.078 0.122 0.126 0.213 0.086 1.715 9.646 0.407
Long-term 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Credit 
Ratings N Growth
Relative 
Tangible 
Assets
Total 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio Profitability
Long-term 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio
Natural Log. 
of Firm Size 
(U.S.$)
Below B 50 0.243 0.401 0.230 0.336 0.070 0.667 7.125 0.526
B 38 0.266 0.344 0.294 0.366 0.095 0.833 7.736 0.377
BB 94 0.214 0.267 0.250 0.310 0.097 1.024 8.682 0.337
BBB 164 0.187 0.253 0.205 0.275 0.072 0.839 9.888 0.330
A 73 0.158 0.222 0.203 0.282 0.069 0.948 10.431 0.320
AA 38 0.084 0.134 0.120 0.191 0.114 1.008 11.117 0.424
AAA 3 0.026 0.058 0.034 0.076 0.033 0.634 10.946 0.226
Credit 
Ratings N
Long-term 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio Profitability Growth
Relative 
Tangible 
Assets
Long-term 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio
Natural Log. 
of Firm Size 
(U.S.$)
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Panel C: Advanced Countries (excluding the U.S. and Japan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Developing Countries 
 
 
 
Below B 38 0.290 0.380 0.367 0.459 0.021 1.093 7.192 0.295
B 52 0.300 0.346 0.329 0.376 0.024 0.797 7.685 0.345
BB 128 0.217 0.263 0.254 0.310 0.081 1.156 8.269 0.284
BBB 413 0.195 0.243 0.240 0.299 0.074 1.009 9.144 0.413
A 272 0.160 0.208 0.216 0.281 0.089 1.244 9.597 0.409
AA 62 0.083 0.128 0.121 0.188 0.115 1.280 10.571 0.365
AAA 60 0.076 0.119 0.121 0.206 0.083 1.661 9.711 0.398
Credit 
Ratings N
Long-term 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio Profitability Growth
Relative 
Tangible 
Assets
Long-term 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio
Natural Log. 
of Firm Size 
(U.S.$)
Below B 52 0.241 0.391 0.225 0.319 0.062 0.652 6.989 0.556
B 35 0.317 0.388 0.298 0.356 0.092 0.798 7.596 0.484
BB 42 0.213 0.282 0.239 0.310 0.133 1.151 8.738 0.595
BBB 55 0.204 0.272 0.226 0.278 0.140 1.304 8.720 0.446
A 1 0.063 0.080 0.301 0.382 0.067 3.698 6.969 0.554
Long-term 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio
Relative 
Tangible 
Assets
Credit 
Ratings N
Long-term 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio Profitability Growth
Natural Log. 
of Firm Size 
(U.S.$)
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Panel E: the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
Below B 430 0.361 0.403 0.432 0.481 0.004 0.968 7.266 0.398
B 508 0.369 0.398 0.438 0.470 0.032 1.061 7.233 0.379
BB 1,009 0.257 0.280 0.332 0.360 0.084 1.179 7.683 0.339
BBB 1,445 0.198 0.225 0.265 0.301 0.090 1.187 8.456 0.410
A 1,128 0.136 0.170 0.215 0.267 0.117 1.610 8.727 0.381
AA 218 0.073 0.104 0.154 0.222 0.150 2.248 9.700 0.415
AAA 153 0.040 0.084 0.086 0.176 0.172 2.697 10.382 0.310
Profitability Growth
Relative 
Tangible 
Assets
Credit 
Ratings
Natural Log. 
of Firm Size 
(U.S.$)
Long-term 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratioN
Long-term 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Total 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio
Below B 18 0.234 0.518 0.249 0.556 0.018 0.740 9.017 0.229
B 32 0.262 0.515 0.266 0.530 0.029 0.697 9.382 0.384
BB 121 0.252 0.440 0.279 0.487 0.038 0.878 9.065 0.452
BBB 189 0.148 0.244 0.172 0.285 0.055 0.967 8.918 0.336
A 180 0.102 0.162 0.124 0.198 0.066 1.072 9.361 0.319
AA 151 0.250 0.309 0.271 0.336 0.062 1.024 10.165 0.545
AAA 30 0.144 0.234 0.183 0.286 0.044 0.932 11.636 0.328
Credit 
Ratings N
Long-term 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
Long-term 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio
Total 
leverage to 
book value of 
total assets 
ratio Profitability Growth
Natural Log. 
of Firm Size 
(U.S.$)
Relative 
Tangible 
Assets
Total 
leverage to 
market 
value of total 
assets ratio
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Table 3: Determinants of Firms’ Capital Structures 
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). T-statistics based on 
asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. The Bayesian Information Criterion based 
on the Model Chi-Square (BIC) determines the overall fit of the model. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LAGLEV + 0.7727*** 0.7709*** 0.7425*** 0.7783*** 0.5031*** 0.7746*** 0.8520***
(-77.08) (70.09) (29.54) (77.94) (5.92) (64.31) (40.96)
EBIT/TA - -0.1221*** -0.1253*** -0.1192*** -0.1251*** -0.1088*** -0.1412*** -0.2343***
(-8.46) (-8.02) (-3.24) (-8.41) (-1.90) (-7.64) (-5.48)
MTB - -0.0127*** -0.0137*** -0.0055* -0.0127*** -0.0185*** -0.0146*** 0.0056
(-10.53) (-10.30) (-1.69) (-10.25) (-2.96) (-9.86) (1.55)
SIZE + 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0047*** 0.0003 0.0019 -0.0004 0.0034**
(0.51) (-0.54) (3.81) (0.52) (0.29) (-0.60) (2.54)
TANG/TA + 0.0126*** 0.0127*** 0.0222*** 0.0131*** 0.0332 0.0141*** 0.0254***
(3.79) (3.59) (2.61) (3.95) (1.30) (3.50) (3.44)
RATINGL1 - -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0026*** -0.0017*** 0.0011 -0.0017*** -0.0011*
(-5.35) (-4.83) (-3.61) (-5.37) (0.45) (-4.09) (-1.75)
MEDLEV + 0.1646*** 0.1353*** 0.2337*** 0.1494*** 0.4792*** 0.0858*** 0.0844***
(13.47) (9.57) (7.54) (12.52) (5.88) (5.23) (4.49)
INFL + 0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 0.0031*** 0.0006 0.0213*** 0.0176***
(1.37) (0.93) (1.12) (3.18) (0.72) (16.95) (6.73)
BOND + 0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0007 0.0008*** 0.0002***
(2.32) (-1.63) (-0.13) (3.27) (-1.29) (4.74) (3.12)
FINARCH - -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0056 0.0019 0.0052***
(-1.39) (-1.18) (0.63) (-1.52) (-1.07) (1.27) (3.93
MBDUM - -0.0054 -0.0076
(-0.75) (-1.11)
DEVDUM + 0.0000 0.0364**
(0.00) (2.39)
Firms 1,513 1,133 380 1,451 62 904 240
Observations 15,472 12,811 2,661 15,061 411 10,765 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
Adjusted R sqr. 0.79 0.78 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.94
BIC -23667.77 -18834.59 -5154.97 -23260.48 -441.59 -15595.46 -4192.07
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
All 
Countries
MB 
Countries
BB 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
the U.S. JapanAdvanced 
Countries
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Panel B: Fixed Effect (FE) 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). T-statistics based on 
asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Year dummies are included, but not presented. Hausman test compares the fixed effect versus random 
effect. The Bayesian Information Criterion based on the Model Chi-Square (BIC) determines the 
overall fit of the model. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LAGLEV + 0.4706*** 0.4787*** 0.3679*** 0.4795*** 0.0889* 0.4854*** 0.5099***
(29.03) (27.57) (10.88) (29.27) (1.96) (25.71) (13.55)
EBIT/TA - -0.2326*** -0.2396*** -0.1866*** -0.2353*** -0.1671* -0.2613*** -0.3891
(-11.77) (-11.47) (-3.30) (-11.65) (-1.87) (-11.07) (-6.52)
MTB - -0.0315*** -0.0319*** -0.0284*** -0.0318*** -0.0201*** -0.0345*** -0.0213***
(-13.69) (-13.34) (-4.99) (-13.49) (-2.93) (-12.65) (-2.86)
SIZE + 0.0129*** 0.0116*** 0.0333*** 0.0133*** 0.0035 0.0114*** 0.0426***
(4.84) (4.17) (3.55) (4.92) (0.29) (3.72) (2.61)
TANG/TA + 0.0262* 0.0306** 0.0233 0.0334** -0.1488** 0.0367** 0.1324**
(1.81) (2.01) (0.55) (2.26) (-2.32) (2.11) (2.21)
RATINGL1 - -0.0014** -0.0015** -0.0015 -0.0016** -0.0003 -0.0018* -0.0005
(-2.03) (-1.96) (-1.03) (-2.23) (-0.12) (-1.90) (-0.34)
MEDLEV + 0.3799*** 0.3546*** 0.5251*** 0.3448*** 0.6839*** 0.3037*** 0.2905***
(15.06) (12.87) (8.63) (14.51) (7.51) (7.98) (4.56)
INFL + 0.0009* 0.0001 0.0010 0.0024** 0.0009 0.0134*** 0.0120***
(1.69) (0.32) (1.43) (2.42) (1.28) (12.50) (5.14)
BOND + 0.0001** -0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0001** -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0000
(2.13) (-3.33) (1.47) (2.31) (-0.54) (-0.04) (0.06)
FINARCH - -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0008
(-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.34) (-0.47) (0.02) (-0.65) (0.48)
Firms 1,513 1,133 380 1,451 62 904 240
Observations 15,472 12,811 2,661 15,061 411 10,765 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
Adjusted R sqr. 0.46 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.59 0.45 0.62
BIC -9326.26 -7620.37 -1869.15 -9106.31 -254.63 -6263.35 -1363.82
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Advanced 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
the U.S. JapanIndependent Variable Expected 
Sign
All 
Countries
MB 
Countries
BB 
Countries
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Panel C: Two-Step System GMM 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all 
columns are MLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and 
further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LAGLEV + 0.6375*** 0.6402*** 0.6792*** 0.6406*** 0.5219*** 0.6527*** 0.7460***
(32.35) (30.29) (10.81) (31.28) (3.95) (29.09) (9.60)
EBIT/TA - -0.1454*** -0.1632*** -0.0406 -0.1478*** -0.1512 -0.1691*** -0.2513*
(-5.52) (-6.06) (-0.26) (-5.66) (-0.45) (-5.46) (-1.79)
MTB - -0.0166*** -0.0170*** 0.0089 -0.0173*** 0.0139 -0.0179*** 0.0019
(-7.28) (-6.97) (0.54) (-7.33) (0.62) (-6.56) (0.08)
SIZE + -0.0009 -0.0014 0.0150 -0.0001 -0.0153 -0.0031 -0.0023
(-0.53) (-0.67) (0.91) (-0.05) (-0.65) (-1.42) (-0.19)
TANG/TA + 0.0060 -0.0022 0.0238 0.0077 0.0750 -0.0009 0.0442
(0.55) (-0.21) (0.32) (0.75) (0.64) (-0.08) (0.32)
RATINGL1 - -0.0039*** -0.0042*** -0.0041 -0.0044*** 0.0043 -0.0037*** 0.0005
(-5.02) (-4.84) (-1.03) (-5.48) (0.73) (-4.00) (0.16)
MEDLEV + 0.2755*** 0.2430*** 0.1921* 0.2522*** 0.4454*** 0.2316*** 0.0398
(9.39) (7.71) (1.65) (9.13) (2.81) (6.61) (0.23)
INFL + 0.0005 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0034*** 0.0009 0.0159*** 0.0177***
(0.91) (-0.07) (0.41) (3.21) (0.80) (11.03) (4.03)
BOND + 0.0001 -0.0003** -0.0000 0.0001** 0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0000
(1.40) (-2.29) (-0.35) (2.17) (0.48) (-1.77) (-0.02)
FINARCH - -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0024 0.0134*** -0.0015
(-0.66) (-0.54) (0.63) (-0.92) (-0.31) (6.51) (-0.09)
MBDUM - 0.0120*** -0.0190** -0.0747
(3.10) (-2.08) (-0.86)
DEVDUM + 0.0090 0.0613*** 0.0492
(0.48) (3.14) (1.03)
Firms 1,513 1,133 380 1,451 62 904 240
Observations 15,472 12,811 2,661 15,061 411 10,765 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -11.52*** -10.74*** -6.17*** -11.16*** -2.97*** -9.95*** -3.40***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.70 0.62 0.65 0.54 1.19 0.68 1.38
Hansen test (p-value) 0.29 0.60 0.47 0.21 0.81 0.37 0.17
the U.S. JapanIndependent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
All 
Countries
MB 
Countries
BB 
Countries
Advanced 
Countries
Developing 
Countries
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ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔRATINGL1(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics 
based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms 
are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented.  
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Table 4: Determinants of Firms’ Capital Structures; Truncated Samples 
(Two-Step System GMM) 
 
 See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LAGLEV + 0.5906*** 0.5931*** 0.6008*** 0.6240*** 0.5219*** 0.6527*** 0.7460***
(16.21) (9.96) (7.69) (18.40) (3.95) (29.09) (9.60)
EBIT/TA - -0.0485 -0.1874** -0.4710* -0.0668 -0.1512 -0.1691*** -0.2513*
(-1.04) (-2.48) (-1.94) (-1.27) (-0.45) (-5.46) (-1.79)
MTB - -0.0056 0.0000 0.0674** -0.0050 0.0139 -0.0179*** 0.0019
(-1.55) (0.02) (2.07) (-1.33) (0.62) (-6.56) (0.08)
SIZE + 0.0012 0.0064 -0.0024 0.0047 -0.0153 -0.0031 -0.0023
(0.34) (0.89) (-0.25) (1.48) (-0.65) (-1.42) (-0.19)
TANG/TA + 0.0038 0.0593 -0.0928 0.0134 0.0750 -0.0009 0.0442
(0.18) (1.16) (-1.14) (0.77) (0.64) (-0.08) (0.32)
RATINGL1 - -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0058 -0.0038*** 0.0043 -0.0037*** 0.0005
(-1.49) (-0.10) (-1.15) (-3.24) (0.73) (-4.00) (0.16)
MEDLEV + 0.4221*** 0.3519*** 0.2347* 0.3612*** 0.4454*** 0.2316*** 0.0398
(8.67) (4.50) (1.66) (8.39) (2.81) (6.61) (0.23)
INFL + 0.0003 0.0000 0.0023** -0.0019 0.0009 0.0159*** 0.0177***
(0.55) (0.06) (2.10) (-1.12) (0.80) (11.03) (4.03)
BOND + -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0000
(-0.66) (-1.16) (1.33) (-0.05) (0.48) (-1.77) (-0.02)
FINARCH - 0.0006 0.0003 0.0061 0.0007 -0.0024 0.0134*** -0.0015
(0.43) (0.21) (0.71) (0.49) (-0.31) (6.51) (-0.09)
MBDUM - 0.0021 0.0033 -0.0747
(0.21) (0.32) (-0.86)
DEVDUM + 0.0186 0.0212 -0.0119
(0.95) (1.50) (-0.27)
Firms 369 229 140 307 62 904 240
Observations 3,124 2,046 1,078 2,713 411 10,765 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -8.05*** -6.42*** -4.82*** -8.12*** -2.97*** -9.95*** -3.40***
m2(Z-statistic) -0.22 0.09 0.54 0.15 1.19 0.68 1.38
Hansen test (p-value) 0.42 0.63 -0.62 -1.43 0.81 0.37 0.17
MB 
Countries 
(excl. the 
U.S.)
BB 
Countries 
(excl. Japan)
Advanced 
Countries 
(excl. the 
U.S. & 
Japan)
Developing 
Countries
the U.S. JapanIndependent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
All 
Countries 
(excl. the 
U.S. & 
Japan)
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chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all 
columns are MLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and 
further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), 
ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔRATINGL1(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics 
based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms 
are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Table 5: Two-Step System GMM (with Interaction Terms) 
Panel A: All Countries 
  
The dependent variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LAGLEV + 0.6457*** 0.6480*** 0.5190*** 0.5557***
(33.07) (33.57) (10.54) (11.60)
EBIT/TA - -0.1417*** -0.1323*** -0.1551*** -0.1342***
(-5.36) (-5.14) (-6.04) (-5.11)
MTB - -0.0149*** -0.0146*** -0.0140*** -0.0137***
(-6.58) (-6.63) (-6.67) (-6.66)
SIZE + -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0000
(-0.50) (-0.46) (-0.25) (0.03)
TANG/TA + 0.0086 0.0066 -0.0061 0.0006
(0.85) (0.67) (-0.61) (0.07)
RATINGL1 - 0.0039 0.0038* -0.0060*** 0.0015
(1.48) (1.72) (-5.93) (0.73)
MEDLEV + 0.2931*** 0.2953*** 0.2563*** 0.2625***
(11.03) (11.24) (8.74) (9.77)
INFL + 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
(1.16) (1.34) (0.90) (1.30)
BOND + -0.0002 -0.0007*** 0.0001** -0.0004**
(-1.19) (-2.80) (1.94) (-2.03)
FINARCH - -0.0005 0.0101*** -0.0003 0.0091***
(-0.66) (2.82) (-0.42) (2.71)
MBDUM - 0.0475** 0.0525*** 0.0131*** 0.0673***
(2.42) (2.82) (3.59) (4.50)
DEVDUM + 0.1055*** 0.1774*** 0.0033 0.1052***
Interaction Variables (2.21) (3.69) (0.19) (3.17)
RATINGL1*MBDUM - 0.0034
(1.46)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(-3.08) (-3.00)
RATINGL1*DEVDUM - -0.0110*** -0.0103*** -0.0090***
(-3.88) (-4.19) (-3.78)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0000* 0.0001*** 0.0000***
(1.78) (3.45) (2.82)
RATINGL1*US - -0.0043** -0.0062*** -0.0037***
(-2.23) (-3.33) (-3.87)
RATINGL1*JAPAN + 0.0016 -0.0032
(0.64) (-1.49)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + 0.0111*** 0.0084**
(3.04) (2.39)
Firms 1,513 1,513 1,513 1,513
Observations 15,472 15,472 15,472 15,472
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -11.58*** -11.58*** -11.98*** -11.65***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.74
Hansen test (p-value) 0.38 0.51 0.44 0.27
All 
Significant
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses 
1 to 3 and 6
Hypotheses 
2 to 4 and 6
Hypothesis 
5
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and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, 
distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in 
Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation are: 
RATINGL1(t-2)*MBDUM(t-2) (column 1), RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2) (columns 2 & 4), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*DEVDUM(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), and RATINGL1(t-2)*US(t-2) (columns 1, 2, & 
4), RATINGL1(t-2)*JAPAN(t-2) (columns 1 & 2), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 3 & 4), and 
further lags. Additional instruments used for the levels equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*MBDUM(t-1)) 
(column 1),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)) (columns 2 & 4),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*DEVDUM(t-1)), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)), and  (RATINGL1(t-1)*US(t-1)) (columns 1, 2, & 4), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*JAPAN(t-1)) (columns 1 & 2),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 3 & 4), and 
further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented.  
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Panel B: Market-Based Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
(1) (2) (3)
LAGLEV + 0.6563*** 0.5624*** 0.5559***
(32.05) (9.91) (9.62)
EBIT/TA - -0.1615*** -0.1577*** -0.1558***
(-5.76) (-5.82) (-5.60)
MTB - -0.0134*** -0.0138*** -0.0117***
(-5.29) (-6.27) (-5.20)
SIZE + -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0003
(-0.34) (-0.22) (0.20)
TANG/TA + -0.0036 -0.0095 -0.0143
(-0.32) (-0.94) (-1.35)
RATINGL1 - 0.0040 -0.0056*** 0.0024
(1.28) (-4.89) (0.78)
MEDLEV + 0.2699*** 0.2182*** 0.2508***
(8.70) (6.62) (8.24)
INFL + -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.07) (-0.14) (-0.08)
BOND + -0.0013*** -0.0002* -0.0008**
(-3.22) (-1.94) (-2.00)
FINARCH - 0.0130*** -0.0006 0.0128***
(3.12) (-0.62) (3.06)
DEVDUM + 0.3193*** 0.0489*** 0.2587***
Interaction Variables (4.98) (2.58) (3.76)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0010*** -0.0009***
(-3.44) (-3.35)
RATINGL1*DEVDUM - -0.0088** -0.0070**
(-2.54) (-2.02)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0001*** 0.0000
(2.57) (1.37)
RATINGL1*US - -0.0094*** -0.0073***
(-3.78) (-2.81)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + 0.0085** 0.0093**
(1.98) (2.13)
Firms 1,133 1,133 1,133
Observations 12,811 12,811 12,811
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -10.84*** -11.14*** -11.19***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.64 0.69 0.69
Hansen test (p-value) 0.26 0.20 0.50
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
All 
Significant
Hypotheses 
2 to 4 and 6
Hypothesis 
5
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chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 
applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation are: 
RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*DEVDUM(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), and 
RATINGL1(t-2)*US(t-2) (columns 1 & 3), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 2 & 3), and further lags. 
Additional instruments used for the levels equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*DEVDUM(t-1)),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)), and  (RATINGL1(t-1)*US(t-1)) (columns 
1 & 3),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 2 & 3), and further lags. T-statistics based on 
asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the 
paprentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Panel C: Bank-Based Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
(1) (2) (3)
LAGLEV + 0.5496*** 0.4653*** 0.5198***
(9.38) (4.69) (7.41)
EBIT/TA - -0.1442 -0.0971 -0.1161*
(-1.51) (-1.12) (-1.76)
MTB - -0.0091 -0.0112 -0.0175**
(-0.85) (-1.45) (-2.35)
SIZE + 0.0063 0.0064** 0.0058**
(1.10) (2.36) (2.13)
TANG/TA + 0.0004 0.0215 0.0221
(0.01) (0.86) (1.06)
RATINGL1 - 0.0015 -0.0054*** 0.0030
(0.28) (-2.80) (0.87)
MEDLEV + 0.3698*** 0.2550*** 0.2915***
(4.25) (4.96) (5.02)
INFL + 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007
(0.95) (1.08) (1.01)
BOND + -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0004
(-1.25) (-0.41) (-1.11)
FINARCH - 0.0079 0.0007 0.0012
(0.95) (0.37) (0.64)
DEVDUM + 0.1505* 0.0369 0.1580***
Interaction Variables (1.91) (1.54) (3.07)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0004
(-0.81)
RATINGL1*DEVDUM - -0.0118* -0.0117***
(-1.76) (-2.97)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0000* 0.0000
(1.70) (1.43)
RATINGL1*JAPAN + 0.0009
(0.17)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + 0.0130** 0.0078*
(2.07) (1.75)
Firms 380 380 380
Observations 2,661 2,661 2,661
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -5.30*** -5.99*** -5.84***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.38 0.51 0.39
Hansen test (p-value) 0.67 0.81 0.72
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses 
2 to 4 and 6
Hypothesis 
5
All 
Significant
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chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 
applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation are: 
RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2)*JAPAN(t-2) (column 1), RATINGL1(t-2)*DEVDUM(t-2), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), (columns 1 & 3), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 2 & 3), and further 
lags. Additional instruments used for the levels equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*JAPAN(t-1)) (column 1),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*DEVDUM(t-1)), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)) (columns 1 & 3),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 2 & 3), and 
further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by the firms are below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Panel D: Advanced Countries 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LAGLEV + 0.6487*** 0.6569*** 0.5447*** 0.5669*** 0.5599***
(33.38) (32.88) (10.51) (11.02) (10.85)
EBIT/TA - -0.133*** -0.1317*** -0.1540*** -0.1444*** -0.1355***
(-5.01) (-5.00) (-5.96) (-5.65) (-5.29)
MTB - -0.0161*** -0.014*** -0.0154*** -0.0146*** -0.0147***
(-7.22) (-6.27) (-7.16) (-6.87) (-7.09)
SIZE + -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001
(-0.18) (-0.14) (0.27) (-0.11) (0.10)
TANG/TA + 0.0094 0.0085 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0019
(0.95) (0.83) (-0.17) (0.02) (0.20)
RATINGL1 - -0.0085*** -0.0064*** -0.0060*** -0.0070*** -0.0075***
(-3.60) (-3.98) (-5.71) (-3.50) (-4.48)
MEDLEV + 0.2664*** 0.2691*** 0.2313*** 0.2453*** 0.2313***
(10.55) (10.35) (8.13) (8.94) (8.65)
INFL + 0.0026** 0.0027*** 0.0031*** 0.0025** 0.0022**
(2.55) (2.58) (3.02) (2.43) (2.26)
BOND + -0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0004**
(-1.05) (-2.80) (2.78) (-0.85) (-2.05)
FINARCH - -0.0004 0.011*** -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0093***
(-0.54) (2.86) (-0.70) (-0.54) (2.65)
MBDUM - 0.0417** 0.0465** 0.0079* 0.0270 0.0603***
Interaction Variables (2.16) (2.47) (1.85) (1.64) (4.16)
RATINGL1*MBDUM - 0.0052** 0.0024
(2.02) (1.17)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0008*** -0.0007***
(-3.12) (-2.94)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0001* 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000***
(1.70) (3.47) (1.47) (2.80)
RATINGL1*US - -0.0045** -0.0065*** -0.0038** -0.0035***
(-2.37) (-3.47) (-1.96) (-3.83)
RATINGL1*JAPAN + 0.0030 -0.0036
(1.17) (-1.64)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + 0.0090** 0.0074* 0.0083**
(2.35) (1.95) (2.19)
Firms 1,451 1,451 1,451 1,451 1,451
Observations 15,061 15,061 15,061 15,061 15,061
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic)  -11.25*** -11.25*** -11.57*** -11.56*** -11.59***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.53 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.57
Hansen test (p-value) 0.59 0.20 0.64 0.39 0.39
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses  
1, 3 and 6
Hypotheses  
3, 4 and 6
Hypothesis 
5
All 
Significant
All 
Significant
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for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 
applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation are: 
RATINGL1(t-2)*MBDUM(t-2) (columns 1 & 4), RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2) (columns 2 & 5), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2), and RATINGL1(t-2)*US(t-2) (columns 1, 2, 4, & 5), RATINGL1(t-2)*JAPAN(t-2) 
(columns 1 & 2), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 3, 4, & 5), and further lags. Additional 
instruments used for the levels equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*MBDUM(t-1)) (columns 1 & 4), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)) (columns 2 & 5),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)), and 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*US(t-1)) (columns 1, 2, 4, & 5),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*JAPAN(t-1)) (columns 1 & 2), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 3, 4, & 5), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic 
standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and 
country dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Panel E: Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 
applies to all columns. Additional instruments used for the transformed equation are: 
(1) (2) (3)
LAGLEV + 0.5832*** 0.5032*** 0.9509*
(3.83) (3.48) (1.77)
EBIT/TA - -0.0860 -0.1494 -0.2405
(-0.34) (-0.77) (-0.77)
MTB - 0.0081 0.0134 0.0228
(0.33) (0.72) (1.02)
SIZE + -0.0102 -0.0362 -0.0165
(-0.43) (-1.48) (-0.44)
TANG/TA + 0.0762 -0.0095 -0.0248
(0.73) (-0.11) (-0.18)
RATINGL1 - 0.0033 0.0081 0.0156
(0.36) (0.96) (1.03)
MEDLEV + 0.3952* 0.4820*** 0.4741**
(1.76) (2.60) (2.27)
INFL + 0.0005 0.0010 0.0007
(0.39) (0.72) (0.52)
BOND + -0.0019 0.0024 0.0006
(-0.38) (0.55) (0.38)
FINARCH - -0.0025 0.0319 0.0047
(-0.22) (1.08) (0.47)
MBDUM - -0.0449 -0.1912* -0.1219
Interaction Variables (-0.31) (-1.88) (-0.84)
RATINGL1*MBDUM - -0.0019
(-0.18)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0029
(-1.27)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.45) (-0.17)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + -0.0379
(-0.77)
Firms 62 62 62
Observations 411 411 411
Period of Est. 1994-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -3.21*** -3.02*** -2.75***
m2(Z-statistic) 1.24 1.46 1.19
Hansen test (p-value) 0.50 0.79 0.11
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses  
1 and 3
Hypotheses  
3 and 4
Hypothesis 
5
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RATINGL1(t-2)*MBDUM(t-2) (column 1), RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2) (column 2), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2) (columns 1 & 2), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (column 3), and further lags. 
Additional instruments used for the levels equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*MBDUM(t-1)) (column 1), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)) (column 2),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)) (columns 1 & 2), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (column 3), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard 
errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and country 
dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Panel F: the U.S. 
 
See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term 
leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. 
The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional 
instruments used for the transformed equation are: RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2) (columns 1 & 4), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (columns 2 & 4), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*REFORM(t-2) (column 3), and further lags. Additional instruments used for the levels 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LAGLEV + 0.6688*** 0.5610*** 0.6529*** 0.5764***
(30.64) (9.44) (29.19) (9.51)
EBIT/TA - -0.1614*** -0.1760*** -0.1674*** -0.1728***
(-4.93) (-5.68) (-5.37) (-5.21)
MTB - -0.0146*** -0.0138*** -0.0182*** -0.0111***
(-5.38) (-5.66) (-6.77) (-4.58)
SIZE + -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0029 -0.0009
(-0.90) (-0.98) (-1.27) (-0.44)
TANG/TA + -0.0012 -0.0100 -0.0014 -0.0107
(-0.11) (-0.91) (-0.12) (-0.92)
RATINGL1 - -0.0131*** -0.0053*** -0.0038*** -0.0116**
(-2.78) (-4.35) (-4.09) (-2.34)
MEDLEV + 0.2486*** 0.2171*** 0.2303*** 0.2280***
(7.10) (6.09) (6.62) (6.44)
INFL + 0.0162*** 0.0166*** 0.0159*** 0.0169***
(11.09) (11.36) (10.98) (11.39)
BOND + -0.0015*** -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0011**
(-2.68) (-1.57) (-1.84) (-1.97)
FINARCH - 0.0240*** 0.0139*** 0.0135*** 0.0252***
Interaction Variables (4.73) (6.90) (6.51) (4.89)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - -0.0009*** -0.0009***
(-2.58) (-2.65)
RATINGL1*BOND + 0.0000** 0.0000
(2.01) (1.26)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + 0.0100** 0.0091*
(2.08) (1.88)
RATINGL1*REFORM - -0.0002
(-0.41)
Firms 904 904 904 904
Observations 10,765 10,765 10,765 10,765
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -10.02*** -10.32*** -9.95*** -10.37***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.67 0.76 0.67 0.75
Hansen test (p-value) 0.18 0.53 0.38 0.16
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses  
3 and 4
Hypothesis 
5
All 
Significant
CR Industry 
Reform 
(2006-
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equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)) (columns 1 & 4), 
 (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (columns 2 & 4),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*REFORM(t-1)) (column 3), and 
further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Panel G: Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term 
leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. 
The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. The same set of instruments as in Tables 3 & 4 applies to all columns. Additional 
instruments used for the transformed equation are: RATINGL1(t-2)*FINARCH(t-2), 
RATINGL1(t-2)*BOND(t-2) (column 1), RATINGL1(t-2)*LAGLEV(t-2) (column 2), and further lags. 
Additional instruments used for the levels equation are:  (RATINGL1(t-1)*FINARCH(t-1)), 
(1) (2)
LAGLEV + 0.6683*** 0.5935***
(9.85) (2.35)
EBIT/TA - -0.2862** -0.1653
(-2.50) (-1.25)
MTB - -0.0051 -0.0168
(-0.37) (-0.95)
SIZE + 0.0117** 0.0073
(2.34) (1.06)
TANG/TA + 0.0385 0.0473
(0.71) (0.56)
RATINGL1 - 0.0004 -0.0016
(0.11) (-0.37)
MEDLEV + 0.0594 -0.1069
(0.56) (-0.68)
INFL + 0.0153*** 0.0155***
(3.89) (4.03)
BOND + 0.0006 0.0017
(0.55) (1.36)
FINARCH - 0.0020 0.0213
Interaction Variables (0.12) (1.22)
RATINGL1*FINARCH - 0.0001
(0.28)
RATINGL1*BOND + -0.0000
(-0.52)
RATINGL1*LAGLEV + 0.0091
(0.56)
Firms 240 240
Observations 1,583 1,583
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -3.33*** -3.36***
m2(Z-statistic) 1.34 1.35
Hansen test (p-value) 0.12 0.11
Independent      
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Hypotheses  
3 and 4
Hypothesis 
5
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 (RATINGL1(t-1)*BOND(t-1)) (column 1),  (RATINGL1(t-1)*LAGLEV(t-1)) (column 2), and further lags. 
T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Year dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Table 6: Robustness of Findings by SIZE (Two-Step System GMM) 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). Firm is classified as 
small (large) if its SIZE is above the 60
th
 (below the 40
th
) percentile of all sample firms. m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the 
null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all 
columns are MLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and further 
lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), ΔMTB(t-1), 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large
LAGLEV + 0.5282*** 0.6850*** 0.4689*** 0.6597*** 0.6234*** 0.7987*** 0.6259*** 0.7509***
(6.49) (12.56) (5.12) (4.48) (16.33) (43.56) (8.12) (3.79)
EBIT/TA - -0.1929* -0.0823 -0.4158* -0.8036 -0.1306*** -0.1344*** -0.3364 -0.2964
(-1.69) (-0.82) (-1.82) (-1.59) (-2.77) (-3.03) (-1.46) (-1.16)
MTB - 0.0027 -0.0153*** 0.0241 0.1361* -0.0354*** -0.0019 -0.0029 0.0184
(0.25) (-2.79) (0.86) (1.68) (-5.56) (-0.85) (-0.13) (0.76)
TANG/TA + 0.0036 0.0109 -0.0226 0.0461 0.0077 0.0129 0.1834** -0.0744
(0.04) (0.18) (-0.29) (0.31) (0.45) (1.24) (2.20) (-0.94)
RATINGL1 - -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0059 0.0043 -0.0074*** -0.0013 0.0008 -0.0027
(-0.52) (0.07) (-0.90) (0.58) (-4.39) (-1.56) (0.26) (-0.64)
MEDLEV + 0.4456*** 0.1422* 0.5873*** 0.1963 0.2770*** 0.1607*** -0.1904 0.317
(4.34) (1.86) (4.14) (0.78) (4.52) (4.53) (-1.56) (0.93)
INFL + 0.0010 0.0006 0.0027*** -0.0018 0.0188*** 0.0132*** 0.0141* 0.0115*
(0.70) (0.69) (3.00) (-0.46) (6.28) (8.68) (1.89) (1.81)
BOND + 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0015* -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009** -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.22) (-0.18) (1.67) (-1.02) (-1.15) (-2.00) (-0.03) (-0.05)
FINARCH - 0.0046 -0.0004 0.0179* -0.0120 0.0170*** 0.0147*** -0.0068 0.0017
(1.22) (-0.20) (1.96) (-1.36) (3.91) (7.58) (-0.21) (0.09)
DEVDUM + 0.0424* -0.0345 -0.0338 -0.0345
(1.68) (-0.78) (-0.35) (-0.34)
Firms 125 108 86 57 575 405 169 87
Observations 805 829 419 442 4,104 4,474 588 665
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -4.90*** -4.72*** -3.03*** -3.48*** -7.86*** -10.27*** -2.39** -3.18***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.30 -0.71 -0.79 -1.53 0.87 -1.49 1.02 1.84*
Hansen test (p-value) 0.37 0.45 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.30 0.27
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
MB countries (excl. 
the U.S.)
BB Countries (excl. 
Japan)
The U.S. Japan
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ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔRATINGL1(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic 
standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and 
country dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Table 7: Robustness of Findings Over Time (Two-Step System GMM) 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all 
columns are MLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), RATINGL1(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991-2000 2001-2010 1992-2000 2001-2010 1991-2000 2001-2010 1991-2000 2001-2010
LAGLEV + 0.4916*** 0.6859*** 0.5752*** 0.7736*** 0.7593*** 0.6133*** 0.5147*** 0.7652***
(6.67) (11.28) (5.18) (5.41) (13.21) (21.39) (3.53) (14.76)
EBIT/TA - -0.1204 -0.0232 -0.0997 0.0289 -0.2280* -0.1621*** -0.5752* -0.2156*
(-1.24) (-0.42) (-0.74) (0.05) (-1.66) (-4.55) (-1.93) (-1.88)
MTB - -0.0030 -0.0086 -0.0095 0.0414 0.0055 -0.0251*** -0.0448 0.0123
(-0.52) (-1.17) (-0.48) (1.19) (0.82) (-6.57) (-1.45) (0.96)
SIZE + 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0149* 0.0028 0.0066 -0.0014 -0.0020 0.0067*
(0.04) (0.23) (-1.70) (0.16) (0.86) (-0.41) (-0.14) (1.79)
TANG/TA + 0.0042 0.0323 0.0225 -0.0092 0.0648 0.0045 0.2852** 0.0116
(0.18) (1.35) (0.24) (-0.06) (0.95) (0.29) (2.35) (0.50)
RATINGL1 - -0.0049** -0.0002 -0.0038 -0.0042 -0.0113*** -0.0023* 0.0006 -0.0019
(-2.38) (-0.12) (-0.88) (-0.68) (-4.17) (-1.84) (0.20) (-1.29)
MEDLEV + 0.5103*** 0.2633*** 0.5107*** 0.1666 0.3001** 0.3253*** -0.1243 0.1861***
(4.42) (4.09) (4.32) (0.55) (2.24) (6.60) (-0.68) (2.61)
INFL + -0.0000 -0.0006 0.0023* -0.0003 -0.0185*** 0.0137*** -0.0037 0.0181***
(-0.06) (-0.28) (1.66) (-0.14) (-2.90) (9.23) (-0.18) (4.78)
BOND + -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0009** 0.0004 0.0001
(-0.91) (-1.07) (0.24) (1.45) (-0.61) (-2.30) (0.41) (0.17)
FINARCH - -0.0076*** -0.0005 0.0198 0.0075 0.0049 0.0110*** -0.0373** 0.0037
(-2.31) (-0.32) (0.63) (0.57) (0.87) (5.44) (-2.20) (0.26)
DEVDUM + 0.0785** 0.0325*** 0.0441 -0.0505
(2.13) (2.84) (0.25) (-1.24)
Firms 122 221 37 140 603 893 108 240
Observations 520 1,526 94 984 3,626 7,139 331 1,252
Period of Est. 1991-2000 2001-2010 1992-2000 2001-2010 1991-2000 2001-2010 1991-2000 2001-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -3.43*** -5.96*** -1.65* -5.07*** -10.31*** -12.09*** -3.19*** -3.26***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.12 0.56 0.22 -0.86 -2.54** 0.32 1.11 0.89
Hansen test (p-value) 0.97 0.54 0.83 0.51 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.88
JapanIndependent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
MB countries (excl. 
the U.S.)
BB Countries (excl. 
Japan)
The U.S.
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further lags. Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), 
ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔRATINGL1(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics 
based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms 
are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Year and country dummies are included, but not presented. 
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Table 8: SOAs for Firms with Investment and Speculative Credit Ratings 
(Two-Step System GMM) 
Panel A: Market-Based and Bank-Based Countries (excluding the U.S. and Japan) 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all 
columns are MLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. 
Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), 
LAGLEV + 0.6145*** 0.5316*** 0.5349*** 0.4881***
(10.28) (3.91) (5.01) (2.65)
EBIT/TA - -0.1100 -0.2400 0.006 0.3092
(-1.22) (-1.49) (0.01) (0.64)
MTB - -0.0047 -0.0206 0.0299 -0.0071
(-0.76) (-1.12) (1.15) (-0.17)
SIZE + 0.0079 0.0178 0.0193 0.0150
(0.72) (0.63) (1.38) (0.45)
TANG/TA + 0.0616 -0.0089 -0.0515 0.1426
(1.17) (-0.09) (-0.62) (1.04)
MEDLEV + 0.2235** 0.3939*** 0.3942** 0.9743***
(2.64) (3.02) (2.56) (3.53)
INFL + 0.0014 -0.0035 -0.0047 0.0005
(1.13) (-1.58) (-1.30) (0.46)
BOND + -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0014
(-1.43) (0.90) (-0.61) (-0.84)
FINARCH - -0.0012 0.0091 -0.0039 0.0012
(-0.99) (1.33) (-0.47) (0.09)
DEVDUM + 0.0111 0.0341 -0.0107 0.1360
(0.80) (0.63) (-0.13) (1.03)
Firms 187 78 92 74
Observations 1,628 418 735 343
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -5.59*** -3.17*** -4.01*** -2.58***
m2(Z-statistic) -1.65* 1.01 -0.18 -0.17
Hansen test (p-value) 0.73 0.49 0.35 0.12
MB Countries (excl. the U.S.) BB Countries (excl. Japan)
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
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ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that 
are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and country dummies 
are included, but not presented. The Investment-Grade (Speculative-Grade) column reports estimated 
coefficients for all firms with S&P’s issuer credit ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
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Panel B: Advanced and Developing Countries (excluding the U.S. and Japan) 
 
See Appendix C for the list of countries grouped by their financial orientation and economic 
development level. See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent 
variable is long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of 
no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all 
columns are MLEV(t-2), EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. 
Instruments for the levels equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), 
ΔTANG/TA(t-1), ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that 
are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year and country dummies 
LAGLEV + 0.6335*** 0.5151*** 0.6775*** 0.5310***
(11.81) (4.06) (4.96) (3.67)
EBIT/TA - -0.1468 -0.1265 -0.2813 0.2466
(-1.39) (-0.78) (-1.48) (0.63)
MTB - 0.0075 -0.0310** 0.0038 0.0150
(0.78) (-2.31) (0.32) (0.37)
SIZE + 0.0109 0.0428 -0.0161 -0.0061
(0.98) (1.27) (-0.76) (-0.23)
TANG/TA + 0.0427 -0.0308 -0.0348 0.1194
(0.84) (-0.36) (-0.44) (0.87)
MEDLEV + 0.1384* 0.4421*** 0.1009 0.8365***
(1.65) (2.98) (0.83) (3.56)
INFL + -0.0026 0.0085 0.0031* 0.0018
(-1.30) (0.92) (1.72) (1.25)
BOND + -0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0001
(-0.23) (0.78) (0.22) (-0.07)
FINARCH - 0.0003 0.0105 -0.0064 0.0005
(0.18) (1.32) (-1.12) (0.04)
MBDUM - -0.0028 -0.1098 -0.0637 0.0430
(-0.13) (-1.20) (-0.74) (0.36)
Firms 252 104 27 48
Observations 2,193 520 170 241
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1994-2010 1994-2010
Correlation 1 -7.16*** -3.03*** -2.39** -3.87***
Correlation 2 -1.59 1.12 -0.74 1.93*
Hansen test (p-value) 0.21 0.43 0.97 0.12
Advanced Countries (excl. 
the U.S & Japan)
Developing Countries
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
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are included, but not presented. The Investment-Grade (Speculative-Grade) column reports estimated 
coefficients for all firms with S&P’s issuer credit ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
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Panel C: the U.S. and Japan 
 
See Appendix E for the list of all variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is long-term 
leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLEV). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. 
The Hansen test is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. Instruments for the transformed equation in all columns are MLEV(t-2), 
EBIT/TA(t-2), MTB(t-2), SIZE(t-2), TANG/TA(t-2), MEDLEV(t-2), and further lags. Instruments for the levels 
equation in all columns are ΔMLEV(t-1), ΔEBIT/TA(t-1), ΔMTB(t-1), ΔSIZE(t-1), ΔTANG/TA(t-1), 
ΔMEDLEV(t-1), and further lags. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
coefficients’ significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year dummies are included, but not 
presented. The Investment-Grade (Speculative-Grade) column reports estimated coefficients for all 
firms with S&P’s issuer credit ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
 
LAGLEV + 0.7285*** 0.6237*** 0.7542*** 0.6479***
(38.40) (20.90) (9.87) (7.39)
EBIT/TA - -0.1510*** -0.2183*** -0.1607 -0.5464
(-5.33) (-4.54) (-1.29) (-1.50)
MTB - -0.0093*** -0.0427*** -0.0022 -0.0305
(-5.78) (-6.98) (-0.13) (-0.40)
SIZE + -0.0004 -0.0030 0.0016 0.0168
(-0.31) (-0.65) (0.30) (0.75)
TANG/TA + 0.0198* 0.0122 -0.0494 -0.0135
(1.91) (0.64) (-0.74) (-0.00)
MEDLEV + 0.1181*** 0.2792*** 0.1199 0.6741*
(3.55) (3.74) (1.12) (1.66)
INFL + 0.0102*** 0.0205*** 0.0167*** 0.0073
(8.69) (7.73) (3.37) (0.26)
BOND + -0.0000 -0.0012* 0.0008 -0.0017
(-0.32) (-1.65) (0.72) (-0.25)
FINARCH - 0.0101*** 0.0140*** 0.0142 -0.0143
(7.10) (3.58) (0.86) (-0.16)
Firms 534 593 207 70
Observations 6,432 4,333 1,246 337
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010
m1(Z-statistic) -12.34*** -7.04*** -5.57*** -2.97***
m2(Z-statistic) 0.66 0.93 1.74* 0.87
Hansen test (p-value) 0.40 0.78 0.27 0.13
the U.S. Japan
Independent 
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
Investment-
Grade
Speculative-
Grade
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Figure 1 
Annual Plot of Means of Long-Term Leverage to the Market Value of Total Assets 
Ratio (MLEV) and Their Corresponding Logarithmic Trends Over Time 
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Figure 2 
Annual Plot of Means of Long-Term Leverage to the Book Value of Total Assets 
Ratio (BLEV) and Their Corresponding Logarithmic Trends Over Time 
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Figure 3 
Comparison of Average FINARCH Values for Samples of Firms with Respect to 
Their Financial Orientations and Economic Development Between two Decades: 
1991-2000 vis-à-vis 2001-2010 
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Figure 4 
Yearly plot of Average FINARCH Values for Samples of Firms 
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Figure 5 
Yearly plot of Median FINARCH Values for Samples of Firms 
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Figure 6 
Average Values of Long-Term Leverage to the Market Value of Total Assets Ratio 
(MLEV) by Different Credit Ratings 
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Figure 7 
Average Values of Total Leverage to the Market Value of Total Assets Ratio (MLEVT) 
by Different Credit Ratings 
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Figure 8 
Average Values of Long-Term Leverage to the Book Value of Total Assets Ratio 
(BLEV) by Different Credit Ratings 
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Figure 9 
Average Values of Total Leverage to the Book Value of Total Assets Ratio (BLEVT) 
by Different Credit Ratings 
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Figure 10 
Yearly plot of Means of Credit Ratings for Regressed Samples of Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
